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Abstract 
Since the beginning of the Reagan Administration in 
1981, there has been a dramatic change in policies 
affecting the national parks and the National Park service. 
The Department of the Interior's goals combined with the 
economic strategies of this Administration have brought 
about new park policies that have departed sharply from 
those of the last two decades. This thesis is designed to 
distill some of the changes evidenced in park policy and the 
Park service under the Reagan Administration. 
Recent changes in park policy are analyzed by comparing 
them to past policies. Thus, there is a substantial review 
of the history of the Park Service and park policies for 
comparison. As it was found, the new park policies 
established during the Reagan Administration are often so 
untraditional, they stand in a class by themselves. They 
have been hailed by developers and scorned by 
preservationists in some cases, other cases find the reverse 
to be true. Regardless of the opinions of those interested 
in the parks, however, the consequences of these policies 
will last long after the end of this administration. 
I certify that I have read this thesis and find that, in 
scope and quality, it satisfies the requirements for the 
degree of Master of Arts. 
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For Joe, who understands what Yellowstone means to me. 
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The impetus for writing a thesis on park management 
stemmed from a discussion with Yellowstone's veteran park 
winterkeeper, Steven Fuller. Talking in his cabin nearby 
the Grand canyon of the Yellowstone over the Christmas 
holidays in 1987, he mentioned that the Park service was 
negotiating with Yellowstone's concessionaire, T.W. 
services, to open canyon Village for winter use. For anyone 
familiar with canyon Village in Yellowstone, this news would 
come as a surprise. 
canyon Village is currently located in the heart of 
Yellowstone's wild country, in what is considered to be 
prime grizzly bear habitat.1 Its site, at an elevation of 
7748 feet, is annually acclaimed one of the coldest spots in 
the continental United states. Canyon Village's twenty-five 
year old lodging facilities typically garner more attention, 
however, ranking as some of the most rustic in the entire 
park system. In no way would the cabins or the lodge 
currently on site be able to comfortably shelter 
Yellowstone's wintertime visitors from its notoriously 
frigid sub-zero wintertime temperatures. 
Yet, what was more puzzling to learn from the 
discussion with Steve Fuller, however, was the knowledge 
lMichael Frome, "Park Tourism is Big Business", 
National Parks, November/December 1984, p.16. 
iv 
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that it was the Park Service that was the initiator of the 
proposal to open Canyon Village for winter use. As an 
agency whose primary purpose is "to conserve the scenery", 
their pursuit of wintertime concession operations at canyon 
seemed illogical.2 Moreover, the 1916 National Park service 
Organic Act specifically mandated that "national interest 
must dictate all decisions affecting public or private 
enterprise in the parks."3 Any "national interest" in 
initiating wintertime operations at canyon Village, however, 
was not apparent.4 
As it stands, the beauty of the traditionally seasonal 
concession operation at canyon allows people to come and 
enjoy the Canyon during the summer, but when the location 
closes in the fall, the flora and fauna have time to 
2Public Law 65-235, 65th Congress, H.R. 15522, August 
25, 1916, "An Act to Establish a National Park Service, and 
for other purposes", United States Statues at Large 1915-
1917, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917) 
p.535. 
3The Park service "Organic Act" as cited in Gundars 
Rudzitis and Jeffrey Schwartz, "The Plight of the 
Parklands", Environment, October, 1982, p.8. 
4That "national interest is not apparent" is a personal 
judgement. I have searched for any proposal regarding 
Canyon Village wintertime operations and have found none. 
If there was any evidence of public interest, logically it 
would surface in the newspapers or, at least, in one of the 
Greater Yellowstone Coalition's quarterly reports. To date, 
however, I can find no reference to it. 
vi 
recover.5 
All spectacular viewpoints from the canyon rim remain 
accessible to winter tourists without winter~ime lodging 
facilities. T.W. Services currently provides daily 
transportation to the canyon in the winter, via snowcoaches 
and snowmobiles, for daytime visitation. Thus, the 
questions begged to be answered: What was motivating the 
Park Service to persuade T.W. Services to provide 
accommodations and food services at canyon Village in the 
wintertime? Why was the Yellowstone Park service choosing 
in this case to emphasize use over preservation? And more 
importantly, what was its significance, if any, in the 
broader framework of future park service policy trends? Any 
satisfactory answer to these questions, however, first 
requires an understanding of park management policies in the 
past. 
SDyan Zaslowsky, These American Lands, (New York: 
Henry, Holt, and company, 1986) p.43. 
Introduction 
For almost a century, federal activism in domestic 
affairs was considered to be an appropriate role of 
government and was widely encouraged. Any dispute over this 
philosophy was "largely confined to academics and political 
ideologues."1 Yet, within the last decade, this idea has 
been challenged on a national scale. Movements to promote 
change have emerged from many political, economic, and 
\ 
social arenas. Yet, none have been ~o powerful as those 
within the Reagan Administration. 
The Reagan Administration's philosophy with regard to 
domestic affairs has been one of less government 
intervention, with more private operation.2 To implement 
this program of domestic reform, the Reagan Administration 
sought Cabinet secretaries who would be willing to act as 
agents "for the president's policy preferences."3 In doing 
so, "President Reagan has made perhaps the most determined 
lEd. John Palmer, Perspectives on the Reagan Years, 
(Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1986) p.1. 
2Richard P. Nathan, "The Reagan Presidency in Domestic 
Affairs", as printed in Ed., Fred I. Greenstein, The Reagan 
Presidency: An Early Assessment, (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1983) p.50. 
3Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr. "The Reagan Administration and 
the Renitent Bureaucracy", The Reagan Presidency and the 
Governing of America, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute 




effort of any recent president to bend the permanent 
government to his will."4 
There are many examples of agencies who have undergone 
extensive change during the Reagan Administration as a 
result of his political appointees work. Five cited in an 
article by Lawrence E. Lynn include: the Employment and 
Training Administration (ETA) of the Department of Labor: 
the Forest service in the Department of Agriculture (FSDA); 
the Mine Health and Safety Administration (MHSA) of the 
Department of Labor; the Federal communications commission 
(FCC); and the National Highway Traffic and Safety 
Administration of the Department of Transportation. As he 
notes, these five agencies and their administrative 
appointees had three primary things in common. The first 
was that each agency head "appeared to reflect Reagan's 
philosophy and intentions in making appointments to 
subcabinet positions."5 secondly, they promoted "Reagan's 
conservative ideology ... dutifully executed administration 
policies concerning budget and staff reductions, 
and ... formulated specific goals consistent with Reagan's 






promoting "definite ideas about changing the agency beyond 
merely carrying out Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
and White House directives."? 
Using Lynn's criteria to distinguish other Reagan 
appointee's playing similar roles, one cannot help to note 
as well the work of the Secretaries of the Interior James 
watt and Donald Hodel. It is my tenet in this thesis that 
their work too serves as an excellent case study of the 
changes promoted by Reagan appointees. They too altered 
agency infrastructure and policies to mirror those coming 
from the White House. Yet, in doing so they were also 
experimenting with some of the nation's most precious 
commodities: our national parks. 
There are hundreds of national parks in the United 
states and all have different policy needs. The National 
Park service (NPS) administers a variety of entities from 
battlefields to historic homes to great primitive areas 
such as Yosemite. Thus, there is a need to set limitations 
on the types of parks to be studied. For the purposes of 
this paper, I will focus primarily on policy changes as 
they have effected the larger primitive parks, known to 
many as the "crowned jewels." These original national 
parks, including Yosemite, Yellowstone, Glacier, Zion, 
?Ibid. 
3 
Bryce, and the Grand canyon, are the most vulnerable as 
they cannot be replaced. Their land forms and scenic 
vistas are unique as is their ecological makeup. Many 
endangered flora and fauna are protected on these lands 
where they have been unable to survive elsewhere. 
In this thesis, it is my intent to explore in depth 
the history of our national parks and the Park Service to 
elucidate the significance of the policies watt and Hodel 
were able to implement affecting them. Did they truly set 
in place radical new polices for the Park service and the 
parks, or were these policy changes taking place gradually 
over time? I am also interested in how the Park Service 
has changed as a result. Are they truly administering the 
national parks as charged by congress and the President to 
do under Public Law 65-235? or are park policies today 
being imposed upon NPS administrators by forces outside of 
government or within the federal system? 
Const~tutionally, the President and congress have the 
right to make laws and execute them. To aid them in 
executing laws affecting the national parks, they 
established the National Park Service in 1916 with the 
mandate that they should "provide for the enjoyment ... by 
the public" of parklands in such a manner so as to 
"conserve the scenery ... for the enjoyment of future 
4 
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generations. 11 8 In doing so, Congress and the President 
created a third party, NPS, through which presidential and 
congressional policies must be carried out. 
While bureaucracies do not have any constitutional 
authority and are thus technically subordinate to congress 
and the President, historically they have gained a great 
deal of power in their own right. This power is partially 
derived from their "expertise".9 As less than one percent 
of Congress and the White House staff have degrees in 
science and land management, historically these bodies have 
deferred to the scientific expertise NPS officials offer 
when making park policy.10 This reliance on bureaucratic 
experts has frustrated the White House and congress at 
times, but has more often than not been adhered to. 
The Reagan Administration, however, chose not to 
adhere to bureaucratic experts' decisions on park policy 
that interfered with their agenda. Instead, the 
Administration relied on political appointees and the 
8Public Law 65-235, as cited in United states statutes 
at Large, (Washington, n.c.: Government Printing Office, 
1917) p.535. 
5 
9Francis E. Rourke, "The Presidency and the 
Bureaucracy: Strategic Alternatives", as cited in Michael 
Nelson, The Presidency and the Political System (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984) p.339. 
lOKathryn A. saterson, "Winding Up A Year In Congress", 
Bioscience, November, 1986, p.659. 
powers granted to the President under the constitution. 
This thesis does not intend to debate whether his policy-
making strategies were legal or illegal. It is assumed 
that they were constitutional. Rather, the questions this 
thesis beg to answer are how did the Reagan Administration 
view NPS experts, how did this Administration choose to use 
its expert information, and how did this Administration's 
agenda fit in with those previously established for the 
national parks? 
In order to find the answers to these questions, it is 
necessary to do a historical review of the parks and the 
National Park Service in order to delineate the public 
policies affecting them. This will help to determine 
whether the Reagan Administration's goals for the parks and 
the National Park Service were actually unprecedented. The 
environment and forces acting on the parks are also very 
important so I will explore the parks from the perspectives 
of congress~ the public, the scientific community, and the 
business community over time as well. 
Chapter I will be a broad overview of the beginnings 
of the national park idea and the national parks. This 
chapter will help to establish the context in which the 
parks were established and it will help us to understand 
American's early perspectives of the parks and the 
subsequent polices set for them. 
6 
The second chapter will focus on the beginnings of the 
National Park service. With the establishment of a federal 
agency whose mission it was to preserve the parks, the 
national park idea was further refined as were the 
management plans for them. Also to be discussed are 
outside "lobbying power influences."11 These various 
lobbying power influences have also had a significant role 
in writing Park Service policy and they have not hesitated 
at times "to criticize the National Park Service when they 
deemed it necessary."12 This chapter will focus on park 
policies through 1950. 
The third chapter will concentrate on park policy as 
it is shaped by NPS, Congress, and the environmental 
movement of the 1960's. All three forces acted to reassess 
the national park idea and subsequent management plans for 
the "crowned jewels." Also to be discussed will be the 
directives emanating from the Department of the Interior 
and the White House.13 These forces will also be evaluated 
as shapers of park policy. 
The fourth chapter will delineate the events and 
llAlston Chase, "Sometimes What Threatens our Parks Is 
The National Park service", New York Times, April 8, 1987, 
p.A2. 
12Ibid. 
13Robert and Patricia Cahn, "Disputed Territory", 
National Parks May/June 1987, p.30. 
7 
forces shaping park policy just prior to the Reagan 
Administration. The record of the Nixon, Ford and Carter 
Administrations will serve as a basis with which to compare 
the Reagan Administration's role in shaping park 
policy. 
Finally, the fifth chapter will analyze the Reagan 
Administration's influence on the national parks and the 
National Park Service. The role that Interior Secretaries 
James Watt and Donald Hodel will be of prime importance as 
political appointees of the President. The National Park 
service role in park policy making in comparison to the 
Administration's, Congresses', and outside forces' powers 
will be analyzed as well. A conclusion will follow this 
chapter wrapping up the changes that have taken place over 
time and comparing them to changes that took place 
specifically within the Reagan Administration. This will 
help to determine whether the Reagan Administration truly 
did play a revolutionary role in reforming park policy and 
the bureaucracy in charge of administering them. If this 
was accomplished, this case study will also help to 
determine how the Administration reshaped ''both public 
policy and the modis operandi of the federal 
8 
bureaucracy."14 And this case study will determine if the 
National Park Service, the primary agency responsible for 
managing the "crowned jewels", and the parks themselves 
were affected in result. 
14Elizabeth Sanders, "The Presidency and the 
Bureaucratic state", as cited in Ed. Michael Nelson, The 
Presidency and the Political System, (Washington,D.C.-:--
Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,1988) p.179. 
9 
Chapter I 
on March 1, 1872, congress established Yellowstone 
National Park. It was the very first park of its kind not 
only in the United states, but in the world. The Act 
establishing this park mandated that the land would be 
"reserved and withdrawn from settlement, occupancy, or 
sale."1 It mandated that regulations "provide for the 
preservation, from injury or spoilation, of any timber, 
mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders".2 
Lastly, the act moved to "provide against the wanton 
destruction of the fish or game. 11 3 It was an unprecedented 
piece of legislation passed by Congress with regard to land 
use. For the first time, congress declared that land did 
not simply exist for one generation's use and profit. 
Rather, Yellowstone had aesthetic value so great that it was 
to be reserved not only for those living, but also for 
future generations to enjoy. 
By 1890, the western frontier was conquered. Since 
then, Yellowstone and the national park idea have become 
l"An Act to set apart a certain tract of land lying 
near the headwaters of the Yellowstone River as a public 
park", as cited in Laws Relating to National Park service, 





increasingly more important in the American mind. From our 
cement palaces, Americans needed to know there were still 
areas in the United states were "natural forces still 
predominate(d), where bison graze(d) freely and grizzly 
bears roam(ed) unrestricted."4 For many, Yellowstone and 
other national parks became this symbol of wildness. They 
were links to America's past in our continuing history. 
With this in mind, as we look back to the actions and 
policies leading to the reservation of wildlands, it is easy 
for us to romanticize the past. In our modern understanding 
of the environment and ecology, we naturally look to our 
American forefathers as having had incredible foresight to 
realize the future need for such areas. In a time of 
abundant wilderness, they "conserved" land. Yet, at the 
time congress established Yellowstone National Park, ecology 
or environmental management was not even a part of our 
vocabulary. 
While Congress moved to hold these original national 
parklands in perpetuity, it was primarily done to ensure the 
public would always have access to them for their 
"enjoyment". There was no consensus among these gentlemen 
as to how these wildlands should be used or managed in order 
4Wayne Owens, "Crying Wolf in Yellowstone", National 
Parks, March/April 1988, p.16. 
12 
to retain their pristine character.5 Moreover, there were 
no wildlife biologists or range specialists to consult. For 
Congress in the late lSOO's, there was nothing to compare 
national parks to. Nothing like a national park had "ever 
been brought under administration before, not even for the 
great military princes. 11 6 
As Congress continued to set land aside as national 
parks through the turn of the century, it became apparent 
there would need to be a central agency administering these 
properties. On August 25, 1916, forty four years after the 
establishment of Yellowstone, the National Park Service 
(NPS) was created as the federal oversight agency for the 
parks. The establishing Act mandated that the Park service 
"provide for the enjoyment ... by the public" of parklands in 
such a manner so as to "conserve the scenery ... for the 
enjoyment of future generations."7 In this statement of 
purpose was an "equivocal mission", one the Park Service has 
struggled with ever since.8 
5Frank A. Waugh, "Technical Problems in National Park 
Development", Scientific Monthly, January, 1918, p.560. 
6Ibid. 
?Public Law 65-235, as cited in United States statutes 
at Large, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1917) p.535. 
8Alston Chase, "How to Save our National Parks", 
Atlantic Monthly, July, 1987, p.36. 
L 
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As there was never any consensus on how the Park 
Service should best manage the parks, or what state the 
parks should be in, early park directors looked to 
precedents set by the United states Army and others who had 
administered the park intermittently prior to 1916. To 
understand the early policies of the Park service, one must 
first understand land management practices in the 1800's. 
Early American's attitudes and actions with regard to land 
use were to greatly influence early national park policies. 
With firmly ingrained ideas toward land use that have 
been retained over a century, the public has been quick in 
modern history to criticize the Park Service should things 
appear amiss. While the early explorers and legislative 
leaders are remembered as the bearers of the national park 
"gift", the Park Service is often depicted as the spoilers 
of it. As the designated protectorate, they are 
automatically assumed to be at fault. But as a review of 
history will prove, there have always been extraordinary 
outside forces acting on the parks. I will argue they are 
found to be equally responsible for any preservation or 
deterioration of our parklands. As Wilbur R. Jacobs notes 
in his treatise "Revising History with Ecology": 
The destruction of our natural environment is usually 
viewed as a great modern problem, the implication being that 
only in the twentieth century has the onslaught taken place. 
There is growing realization, however, that from the 
beginning of history we Americans have been both destructive 
14 
and wasteful ... (of wildlands.) ... It is actually the scale 
of the damage instead of its newness which forces us, though 
still reluctantly, to confront the problem today.9 
It is hoped this thesis will shed some light on the 
history of American's attitudes toward parklands and how 
these lands have subsequently been affected by public 
policies. The problems and prospects our national parks 
face today are the direct result of over two hundred years 
of man's interventions, attitudes, and political actions. 
The Beginnings of Land Management in Colonial America 
Americans have looked to "nature as proof of national 
greatness" since the end of the American revolution.lo 
Realizing their new nation did not have the rich traditions 
of the British Empire, Americans had to seek out and extol 
upon other assets. The most obvious asset was the land. 
Reveling in the beauty of it, early American's "reassured 
themselves that they were destined for a grand and glorious 
future in their own right."11 
Prior to the Civil War, however, there was little 
public concern to preserve or conservatively use land. 
9Wilbur R. Jacobs, "Revising History with Ecology", ed. 
Roderick Nash, Environment and Americans, (New York: Robert 
E. Krieger Publishing co., 1979) p.84. 
lOAlfred Runte, National Parks: The American 




Rather the early to mid-1800's was marked as a time of 
territorial expansion. Americans "burned the forests ... 
diverted rivers from their course or united them at their 
pleasure" to shorten the "distances which separated the 
North from the south and the East from the west."12 For 
those moving west, the Homestead and Desert Acts promised a 
share of public land to all those who could manage it. With 
the discovery of gold in Colorado, Wyoming, and California, 
there emerged a time of rapid economic growth. The push to 
the Oregon country by the Zionists, moreover, enhanced 
western migration. All of these factors added up to an 
expansionist land policy. A land policy that argued land 
was to be conquered, not preserved. 
Alexis de Tocqueville noted this expansionist sentiment 
as he came across it in northern Michigan in 1831. Finding 
few in awe of wilderness, de Tocqueville decided that the 
American vision was "fixed upon ... the march across these 
wilds, draining swamps, turning the course of rivers, 
peopling solitudes, and subduing nature."13 Yet, there were 
a few anomalies to this attitude of development, notedly, 
12Alan Tractenberg, "Progress and the Environment", as 
cited in Roderick Nash, Environment and Americans: The 
Problems of Priorities, (Santa Barbara: the University of 
California, 1979) p.15. 
13Alexis de Tocqueville as quoted in William c. 
Everhart, The National Park service, (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1972) p.6. 
16 
George Catlin. 
In 1827, Catlin emersed himself in painting Niagara 
Falls. Noting the commercialism already marring the view, 
he was later to propose setting aside a tract of this land 
as a "Nation's Park, containing man and beast in all the 
wildness and freshness of their natural beauty."14 Catlin's 
sentiments were echoed by another early nature advocate: 
Henry David Thoreau. As Thoreau stated, "Why should not we, 
who have renounced the King's authority have our national 
reserves ... in which the bear and panther, and some of the 
hunter race, may still exist, and not be civilized off the 
face of the earth."15 Thoreau and Catlin's ideas regarding 
land management and the conservation of natural resources, 
however, were well ahead of their time. 
The Reservation of Arkansas Hot Springs 
In 1832, congress authorized the governor of Arkansas 
to set aside the territory surrounding Arkansas' Hot Springs 
so that they might always be publicly used.16 While the Act 
set a precedent protecting geological features, the Hot 
14Velma Linford, Wyoming: Frontier state, (Denver: The 
Old West Publishing Company, 1947) p.258. 
15Henry David Thoreau, "Chesuncook", Atlantic Monthy, 
August, 1958, p.317. 
16"An Act in relation to the Hot Springs Reservation in 
Arkansas", as cited in Laws Relating to National Park 
Service, p.221. 
17 
Springs were reserved for their medicinal value and to avoid 
a private monopoly rather than for aesthetic beauty. The 
Hot Springs Preservation Act "makes no mention of the 
preservation of natural curiosities in their original state, 
the protection of wildlife, (or) the public pleasuring 
ground feature."17 The Act, thus, was not thought to be in 
the same class as those later preserving national parks. 
The two most frequented areas of scenic beauty in the 
United states in the 1830's that most resembled the later 
national parks were Niagara Falls in New York and Virginia's 
Natural Bridge. Thousands flocked to these places annually 
to witness their unique beauty, albeit, there were no laws 
formally protecting either of these geological wonders.18 
Yosemite Park 
After the Arkansas Reservation Act, it was not until 
June 30, 1864 that congress again moved to reserve land for 
public use. Under the persuasion of senator John Conness 
and American steamship Transit company owner Israel Raymond, 
the federal government set aside a portion of Yosemite 
Valley and Mariposa Redwood Tree Grove to be administered by 
the state of California.19 The state was to have control of 
17Jenks Cameron, The National Park Service, (New York: 
D. Appleton and co., 1922) p.6. 
18Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, p.26. 
19Runte, National Parks: An American Experience, p.29. 
18 
the Yosemite valley on the condition that it was to be held 
for "public use, resort, and recreation ... for all time."20 
The Yosemite Park Act is often thought to be the 
precursor for later national park legislation. It embodied 
the first ideals of conservation and use for the benefit of 
the people. Yosemite Park also mirrored the later commonly 
understood criteria for national parks. Yosemite was set 
aside for its incredibly beautiful valleys in the Sierras. 
In fitting with the later national park criteria, the land 
reserved in Yosemite was "sublime" and "scenic" as based 
solely on "direct human appreciation."21 The designated 
boundary of Yosemite included only those scenic areas. 
Thus, American's early "biological ignorance or 
indifference" towards wilderness was depicted in this 
delineation process.22 
Shortly after the establishment of Yosemite Park, John 
Muir arrived in the "range of light" and began writing a 
series of articles on nature as he knew it.23 While they 
20Laws Relating to National Park service, p.64. 
21Ronald A. Foresta, America's National Parks and Their 
Keepers, (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1984) 
p. 3. 
22Joseph Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, (Ann Arbor: 
the University of Michigan Press, 1980) p.7. 
23John Muir, Wilderness Essays, (Salt Lake City: 
Peregrine Smith, Inc., 1980) p.xii. 
19 
rapidly became in vogue as were Thoreau's collection of 
essays and John Burrough's descriptions of flora and fauna, 
their popularity hinged on descriptions of unusual and 
incomprehensible forms in nature. In the early 1800's, the 
public was not drawn to nature by a mass concern for 
ecological awareness. Rather, Americans nationwide were 
intrigued by descriptions of monumental forms of nature as 
yet unknown to most on the East coast. 
The Establishment of Yellowstone National Park 
Monumentalism was found in plentitude by the first 
exploration parties that discovered the Yellowstone region 
in 1870. While a trail of Indians, fur trappers, and 
prospectors preceded the exploration party led by Henry 
Washburn, Nathaniel Langford, and Gustaveous Doane, "it was 
not until 1870 that the region was closely examined and its 
wonders officially confirmed."24 The diaries of the 
Washburn, Langford and Doane team members show that all were 
continually-amazed at Yellowstone's unique hot springs, 
geysers, waterfalls, and canyons. 
During the nightly campfires of the expedition, 
proposals were made by some of the members that they should 
each buy quarter sections of Yellowstone, especially "those 
that would eventually become a source of great prof it to the 
24Ed., Donald E. Bowen, The Magnificent Refugee: crest 
of a Continent, (New York: Wethesiane Books, 1972) p.261. 
20 
owners".25 As history holds it, one member of this 
expedition, a Judge by the name of Cornelius Hedges, had 
another idea. Judge Hedges was so impressed by what he saw 
that he countered initial proposals and instead argued one 
night, "there ought to be no private ownership of the 
region ... The whole of it ought to be set aside as a great 
national park.''26 The suggestion was met by "an 
instantaneous and favorable response from all except one. 11 27 
By the time the expedition emerged from this wildness they 
were committed to the idea that this land should be kept 
free from development. 
Nathanial Langford noted in his diary during the trip, 
"our purpose to create a park can only be accomplished by 
untiring work and concerted action in a warfare against the 
incredulity and unbelief of our national legislators."28 
Yet, while the Washburn, Langford, and Doane expedition 
emerged very much determined to create a park, Alfred Runte 
argues in National Parks: An American Experience, that 
25Nathanial Langford, as quoted by Harlean James, 
Romance of the National Parks, (New York: Macrnillian 
company,1941) p.13. 
26Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, p.41. 
27Nathanial Langford, as cited in Devereux Butcher, 
Exploring Our National Parks and Monuments, (New York: 
oxford University Press, 1947) p.76. 
28Butcher, Exploring our National Parks and Monuments, 
p.76. 
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preservation and protection of the wildness for nature's 
sake was not one of their goals. As he notes, "Nathaniel 
Langford's visions for Yellowstone Lake ... might well have 
been inspired by Lake Como or the French Riviera. 'How can I 
sum up this wonderful attraction!' he exclaimed. It is 
dotted with islands of great beauty, as yet unvisited by 
man, but which at no remote period will be adorned with 
villas and the ornaments of civilized life. '"29 
While Langford's intentions for Yellowstone may not be 
as pure as some historians would have us remember, following 
the end of the expedition, Langford immediately set out to 
publicize the region. Newspaper clips, lectures, and 
magazine articles all conveyed the message brought by this 
team that this was "probably the most remarkable region of 
natural attractions in the world", and "should be ... set 
aside as a public National Park."30 
In the fall of 1871, the United states Geological 
survey traversed the Yellowstone plateau to map and explore 
the region. This scientific team, lead by Dr. Ferdinand 
Hayden included artist Thomas Moran and photographer, 
William Henry Jackson. With their help, Hayden's team was 
29Runte, National Parks: An American Experience, p.43. 
30Ed, New York Tribune, January 23, 1871, as cited in 
Haines, Yellowstone National Park: Its Exploration and 
Establishment, p.94. 
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the first to extensively map and survey Yellowstone. Their 
resulting geologic records of this trip provided invaluable 
insight into the unique Yellowstone plateau in later 
Congressional hearings. However, it was to be Thomas 
Moran's paintings and Jackson's photographs of the scenery 
that would convince Congress of the uniqueness of the 
natural phenomena to be found there. 
The Railroad Influence in the Creation of Yellowstone 
By 1871, it had dawned on the Northern Pacific Railroad 
that a Yellowstone park could potentially be a boon to rail 
use. Its remoteness meant the Northern Pacific would hold 
practically a monopoly on tourist transportation to the 
area. On October 27, Dr. Hayden received a letter from a 
Northern Pacific Railroad employee, A.B. Nettleton, who 
pleaded: "Let Congress pass a bill reserving the Great 
Geyser Basin as a public park forever--just as it has 
removed that far inferior wonder the Yosemite Valley and big 
trees."31 The letter was written on the stationary of "Jay 
Cooke and co., Bankers, Financial Agents, Northern Pacific 
Railroad company."32 
The Northern Pacific Railroad moved to sponsor Nathanial 
31Aubrey Haines, Yellowstone National Park: Its 
Exploration and Establishment, (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1974) p.109. 
32Ibid. 
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Langford travels on the lecture circuit in 1871, selling the 
national park idea to the American public. Langford 
extolled upon the magnificent scenery in his public speeches 
which "appealed to a tenacious American desire to measure up 
to European civilization."33 Yet, he also yielded to more 
puritan Americans by noting Yellowstone's uselessness to 
agriculture, mining or manufacturing purposes. The 
"remoteness" of Yellowstone "also assured, by in large, that 
(it) had little economic value."34 
Langford met with Montana Territorial Representative 
William Claggett in the winter of 1871-72, who with the help 
of Dr. Hayden, drew up a bill to set aside the Yellowstone 
region. Representative Claggett first introduced this 
legislation to the House on December 18, 1871. Senator 
Pomeroy introduced it in the senate. 
As the bill was heard in the senate Committee on Public 
Lands, Pomeroy also emphasized the unsuitable Yellowstone 
environment~ As he noted, "there are no arable lands, no 
agricultural lands there. It is the highest elevation from 
which our springs descend, and as it cannot interfere with 
any settlement for legitimate agricultural purposes, it was 
33Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.9. 
34Ibid. 
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thought it ought to be set aside."35 Dr. Hayden assured the 
senators that the land was totally worthless. Expedition 
team leader Gustaveous Doane took the stance on the stand 
that while it was worthless land, it did have great 
scientific value. As he stated, "in the branches of 
geology, mineralogy, botany, zoology, and ornithology, it is 
probably the greatest laboratory that nature furnishes on 
the surface of the globe."36 
While, it is thought that the Northern Pacific "greased 
the wheel" a little for legislative approval, the 
Yellowstone Park bill was approved by the Senate on January 
30, 1872.37 Yet, a number of Montanans remained unconvinced 
this was a positive step for Yellowstone. As the editor of 
the Helena Daily Herald noted, "without a doubt the Northern 
Pacific Railroad will have a branch track penetrating this 
Plutonian region, and few seasons will pass before excursion 
trains will daily be sweeping into this great park thousands 
of the curios from all parts of the world."38 Anyone 
35Haines, Yellowstone National Park: Its Exploration 
and Establishment, p.117. 
36William c. Everhart, The National Park Service, (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1972) p.8. 
37Craig Allen, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982) p.28. 
38Ed., "A National Park", Helena Daily Herald, January 
31, 1872. 
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desiring to see it in a more pristine state, he advised, 
should come immediately. 
others regarded the project with little favor because 
they were concerned that congress would not "open roads or 
hostelries" in Yellowstone, leaving it inaccessible to the 
great mass of travelers."39 As a petition appearing in the 
Rocky Mountain Weekly Gazette stated, "we are opposed to any 
scheme which will have a tendency to remand (Yellowstone) 
into perpetual solitude by shutting out private 
enterprise."40 Thus, were recorded some of the first public 
arguments regarding preservation in tandem with use. 
On February 27, the national park legislation passed in 
the House 115-65 and on March 1, 1872 it was signed into law 
by President Grant. The act itself was billed as being 
inherently democratic. By setting aside a tract of land for 
the benefit and enjoyment of all, it ensured that 
Yellowstone's wonders would not be controlled by a wealthy 
few. As senator Trumbull assured, with a national park no 
one could "plant himself right along the path that leads to 
these wonders and charge every man that passes along ... a 
39Ed. "The National Park--Memorial to congress", Helena 
Daily Herald, February 3, 1872. 
40Ed., "The National Park--A Memorial to Congress'', 
Helena Daily Herald, February 3, 1872. 
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fee of one to five dollars."41 In the eyes of the majority 
of congressional officials, however, the land was set aside 
with the understanding that it was inherently "worthless" 
and that it would require no congressional appropriations to 
be maintained.42 
Americans understanding of the national park concept 
as it was conceived in the Yellowstone Act was broad and 
varied. Yet, the loosely written act could be interpreted 
to provide something for everyone. some looked to 
Yellowstone as a "valuable resort for a certain class of 
invalids".43 Others hoped its conservation clause would 
pave the way for the "rescue" of the Niagara "from its 
present degrading surroundings" in a similar manner.44 It 
emerged rather to suit a "happy convergence of many 
disparate interests."45 
In Mountains Without Handrails, Joseph sax argues, that 
"the modern desire to view "the first national park" as the 
41Senator Trubull, as cited by Fred B. Eiseman, "Who 
Runs the Grand canyon", Natural History, March, 1978, p.83. 
42Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.9. 
43Ed. "The Yellowstone Park Bill", New York Times, 
February 29, 1872, p.4. 
44Excerpt from The Nation, March 7, 1872, p.153 as 
cited in Haines, Yellowstone National Park : Its Exploration 
and Establishment, p.128. 
45Joseph Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.11. 
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product of (an early) public ecological conscience has 
little history to support it."46 certainly this is the case 
with Yellowstone and a number of the other early parklands 
to follow. When the boundaries of Yellowstone National Park 
were carved out by Hayden and Langford, no thought was given 
as to the boundaries of its ecosystem. Rather, "the 
enormous size of the Yellowstone reservation ... (was) 
largely to avoid missing any wonders not yet discovered 
which might exist in the same general area."47 Yellowstone 
was undoubtedly set aside strictly for its unique thermal 
features. Interest in them being more indicative of 
America's "fascination with monumentalism" rather than any 
concern for biology.48 
Yellowstone National Park was created in a time in our 
nation's history when the West had yet to be fully explored. 
Montana, Wyoming, and Idaho, the three territories that 
Yellowstone's boundaries were carved out of, were not even 
admitted to·the union. Indian wars were still being fought 
in this region. The idea that the park was set aside at 
that time strictly as a wilderness preserve, thus, is 
inconceivable. 
46Ibid., p. 7. 
47Craig Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982) p.28. 
48Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.7. 
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Park Management 
In the early years, the only access to Yellowstone was 
by stage via roads running from Montana's southern border 
into the park. The first few handfuls of tourists in 
Yellowstone in its formative years, thus, were Montana 
residents. The primary reason they came to Yellowstone was 
the hot mineral baths. Bathhouses, offering cleansing 
thermal waters and medicinal cures were provided in 
abundance by early concessionaires. Locals, such as James 
Mccarthy and Uncle Jim Yancy, also provided accommodations 
for these visitors as approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior.49 
Nathanial Langford was appointed to be the park's first 
superintendent shortly after Yellowstone was set aside in 
1872. But, because Congress had been promised they would 
spend "not one cent for scenery", they never appropriated a 
salary for him.50 Moreover, Langford had no legal authority 
to make and ·enforce laws to protect the park. These 
limitations were eventually to force him to return home to 
Minnesota. Records show Langford was only in the park twice 
during his five year stint as Superintendent. 
The absentee landlord management policy found in 
49Dyan Zaslowsky, The Black Calvary of Commerce, p.27. 
50Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.10. 
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Yellowstone during its formative years offered a whole new 
set of problems for the park. Squatters "moved in and 
vandals and poachers preyed on its natural wealth."51 The 
few adventurous tourists who came into the park were often 
seen with "shovel and axe, chopping and hacking and prying 
up great pieces of the most ornamental work they could 
find."52 Yet, no one seemed to care. Complacency among 
Congressmen and others was a result of the predominant 
understanding that held land could not be permanently 
disfigured. This was especially true in an area as vast as 
Yellowstone Park. 
Langford was relieved of his superintendent duties in 
April, 1877 and replaced by Philetus w. Norris. Norris was 
provided with a salary and annual appropriations "to 
protect, preserve, and improve the Park".53 While he had 
no more authority than Langford to enforce law within the 
park, at least with the allotment of funding he was able to 
approve construction of buildings and hire a "gamekeeper" to 
prevent poaching of the animals. Norris was thought to have 
been a great asset to Yellowstone as Superintendent, yet, he 
made one unfortunate mistake. As he choose to name hundreds 
51Clary, The Place Where Hell Bubbled Up, p.33. 
52Ibid. 
53Ibid. I p.36. 
of thermal features, roadways, and mountains after himself 
and his family, a few prominent Montanans became concerned 
he was taking over Yellowstone and used their clout to 
convince congress to remove him in February 1882. 
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With the removal of Superintendent Norris, Yellowstone 
witnessed a series of weak superintendents during the mid 
1880's. As none of these superintendents had the gumption 
to stand up and fight for the park, it left the land 
extremely vulnerable to spoilation. Especially as during 
this same time, the park was experiencing its first real 
boon in tourism. With the completion of the Northern 
Pacific Rail line into Gardiner, Montana, over five hundred 
visitors were arriving annually by rail. The railroads 
offered packaged tours so that travelers could see many of 
the park's primary attractions as part of their ticket 
package. The railroads also helped to set up stage coach 
companies and subsidized the construction of lodging 
facilities inside the park to improve guests stay.S4 Yet, 
as their money came from tourists, neither the railway lines 
or the concessionaires assumed the role of protectorates of 
the environment. Guests came first.SS It was thought the 
beauty of Yellowstone would exist in perpetuity. 
S4Zawslowsky, The Black Calvary of Commerce, p.29. 
SSClary, The Place Where Hell Bubbled Up, p.Sl. 
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While the park's interior was threatened by unregulated 
visitor use during the 1880's, forces in Washington seemed 
determined to legally revise the national park idea to its 
detriment as well. Northern Pacific railroad owners were 
continually exerting their influence in congress to run a 
line through the northern section of the park. The 
legislative sponsor noted he could not fathom "the sentiment 
which favors the retention of a few buff alos to the 
development of mining interests."56 While mining had been 
prohibited in the initial legislation protecting 
Yellowstone, it was hoped this clause would be reversed. In 
the meantime, the railroad's "right of way" bill was toted 
as a means of bring the park to the people, yet, it was also 
seen as a measure "inspired by corporate greed and natural 
selfishness."57 on December 14, 1886, this measure was 
defeated in the House 107-65. Allin argues in The Politics 
of Wilderness Preservation that this preservation success 
was primarily brought about because "the slaughter of 
buffalo had been on such a magnificent scale that it 
must ... have been recognized as a conservation crisis before 
the exhaustibility of most other resources was apparent."58 
56United states Congress, "The congressional Record", 
18 (December 14, 1886) p.150-151 as cited by Allin, The 
Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.32. 
57Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.32. 
58Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.55. 
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To combat apparent management problems, congress moved 
to make some changes in the park's administration. 
Beginning in 1883, the civil superintendents were allowed to 
remain and each was to hire ten assistants. However, the 
duties of protecting the park and developing roadways were 
reassigned to the Army. While they still had no formal 
authority to enforce law within the park, the secretary of 
the Interior at least could request the use of troops from 
the secretary of War. 
The Army's role in Yellowstone was to "prevent 
trespassing or intruders from entering the park for the 
purpose of destroying the game or objects of curiosity."59 
When congress failed to appropriate any money for the park 
in 1885, the secretary of the Interior appealed to the War 
secretary for troops to take over park administration in its 
entirety. While the secretary of the Interior remained the 
Chief Park protectorate, the Army would regulate and enforce 
laws in the ·parks. The commander of troops was eventually 
to become "the acting superintendent''.60 In this fashion, 
the Army was to administer Yellowstone between 1886 and 1916 
before the Park Service was established. 
59"An Act making appropriations for sundry civil 
expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June 
30, 1884 11 , as cited in Laws Relating to the National Park 
Service, p.27. 
60Cameron, The National Park service, p.34. 
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The Army in Yellowstone 
On August 17, 1886, Captain Moses Harris lead fifty men 
in to the park to begin their duties as park managers. one 
of their first tasks was to put out forest fires which had 
been burning for the "greater portion" of the summer 
season.61 They also moved to oversee concession operations 
and create the first visible system of law and order. The 
Army curtailed the cutting of live trees, enforced the ban 
on hunting or trapping of the wildlife, and stopped 
trespassing and squatting. It was to be "enjoined upon all 
soldiers to be vigilant and attentive in the enforcement of 
the foregoing regulations ... They were not "to hesitate to 
make arrests when necessary", although they had little 
recourse for action once they did.62 
In the eyes of the early concessionaires and tourists, 
the army officers were seen as being kind, courteous, and an 
overall asset to the park. They rapidly moved to fill 
informal duties as that of trail crew and tour guide as well 
as being general law enforcement officers. Yet, the Army 
neither had any sense of ecology or wildlife conservation. 
In fitting with Americas nineteenth century attitude that 
61Aubrey Haines, The Yellowstone Story, Vol.II, 
(Colorado: Colorado Associated University Press, 1977) p.4. 
62H. Duane Hampton, How the United states cavalry saved 
our National Parks, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1971) p.83. 
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wildness was unlimited, they proceeded to kill animals in 
the park thought to be a detriment to the tourists. It was 
primarily the mountain lion, cougar, bison, and wolf that 
were thought to be "bad" animals in the park and the Army 
attempted to kill them all. 
It is important to note that the united states Army 
officers in Yellowstone were not hard headed utilitarians. 
Rather, they ordered the slaughter of animals and allowed 
logging in the park as they truly believed Yellowstone to be 
an unlimited wilderness. There was no conceivable way man 
could destroy wilderness because there was just too much of 
it. Moreover, the puritan ethic held fast even in the late 
nineteenth century that "generally held altruism and 
aestheticism in disdain."63 The Army acted on this 
philosophy. While it might contradict modern philosophies 
of conservation or preservation of natural resources, it can 
be argued nevertheless, in the late 1800's, military 
management "saved the National park idea".64 
The Establishment of other Early National Parks 
As the United States Army moved to improve Yellowstone 
and the park ideal in eyes of the public and congressional 
officials, it paved the way for the establishment of other 
63Hampton, How the United states Calvary saved our 
National Parks, p.4. 
64Ibid., p.5. 
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national parks. By 1890, Yosemite's status was changed from 
that of a state park to a national park and the land was 
reverted to federal ownership. In the same year, Sequoia 
and General Grant (now known as Kings canyon) national parks 
were established.65 In 1899, Mt. Ranier national park was 
created. Most of these new parks were established as a 
result of "local action led by a few concerned individuals 
to prevent despoiling. 11 66 New parks were not thought of as 
being part of a system of national parks. Their protective 
legislation was basically worded in the same manner as was 
Yellowstone's and all fell under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of the Interior. Albeit, all parks were 
independently administered. until the creation of the 
National Park Service in 1916, the history of the national 
parks was "a history of individual parks rather than group 
development."67 
The conservation Era 
While the national park idea was gaining increasing 
acceptance among Americans by 1890, there was evidence as 
well that they were reassessing their attitude toward land 
65Ronald A. Foresta, America's National Parks and their 
Keepers, (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1984) 
p.16. 
66Everhart, The National Park Service, p.9. 
67Jenks Cameron, The National Park service, Monograph # 
11, (New York: D. Appleton and co., 1922) p.8. 
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use. As more and more people were able to travel to 
Yosemite and Yellowstone by rail, they became aware of the 
beauty of the country. At the same time many at home were 
becoming aware of waste and mismanagement of land within 
their own townships. The striking blow came with the 1890 
census as it "sounded America's earliest environmental 
warning, announcing for the first time in history the 
country no longer had a frontier."68 As the frontier had 
long symbolized "abundance and prosperity", the public 
responded with an unprecedented concern for natural 
resources.69 Environmental awareness groups, such as the 
Sierra Club and the Appalachian Mountain Club took root and 
prospered. support for the environment also came from the 
business community, garden clubs, and scientists. 
With a growing concern for the environment came a 
growing acceptance in America of national parks, especially 
among the middle class. The idea of public park ownership 
"fit into a ·homogeneous, universal notion of the public 
good; all Americans, regardless of class and region would 
become the beneficiaries of its bounty."70 As the rail and 
tent camps, such as Wylie Way, made parks accessible to the 
p.14. 
68Everhart, The National Park service, p.13. 
69Everhart, The National Park Service, p.13. 
70Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
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middle class, visitation soared. In Yellowstone visitation 
increased from 5,438 in 1895 to 9,579 in 1899.71 As John 
Muir noted in 1898: 
Thousands of nerve-shaken, overcivilized people are 
beginning to find out that going to the mountains is going 
home; that wildness is a necessity; and that mountain parks 
and reservations are useful not only as fountains of timber 
and irrigating rivers, but as fountains of life.72 
To Americans' in the late 1800's, parks were for people. 
Two important pieces of legislation were enacted by 
Congress in the 1890's that were to have a great impact on 
parklands. The first, known as the "Lacey Act", gave the 
secretary of Interior and those under him the legal 
authority to enforce laws in Yellowstone. Under this act, 
the Park was mandated to be part of the United States 
judicial district of Wyoming. Regulations set by the 
secretary of the Interior would be punishable by law and the 
laws of the state of Wyoming would be applicable 
otherwise.73 
In addition, the ''Lacey Act" declared that 
"hunting, ... killing, wounding, or capturing at any time of 
any bird or wild animal, except dangerous animals, when it 
71Henry Finck, "Yellowstone Park as a summer Resort", 
The Nation, September, 1900, p.248. 
72Freedman Tilden, The National Parks: What They Mean 
To You and Me, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951) p.19. 
73Hampton, How the United States Calvary saved our 
National Parks, p.125. 
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is necessary to prevent them from destroying human life or 
inflicting injury", would be prohibited.74 This passage was 
extraordinarily important as it provided unprecedented 
protection for wildlife. It was thus recognized that 
wildlife in the parks had value as did unique thermal 
features, rock formations or mountains. Wildlife would no 
longer exist simply to feed the guests. Yet, the Act also 
made allowances for fishing, leaving the Secretary of 
Interior to set concrete stipulations. Fishing was much too 
popular a sport to eliminate. 
The second piece of legislation that was to have a 
tremendous influence on the parks was a provision 
designating forest reserves, later known as national 
forests. The provision itself was actually attached to a 
much larger sundry Civil bill so it was never subject to 
debate.75 However, this inconsequential rider provided the 
President with the unprecedented authority to set aside 
large sections of public lands to be protected for their 
timber.76 Almost immediately, President Harrison 
established the Shoshone Forest Reserve, setting aside 1.25 
74An Act to Protect the birds and animals in 
Yellowstone National Park, and to punish said crimes in said 
park, and for other purposes as cited in Laws Relating to 
the National Park service, p.30. 
75Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.34. 
76Ibid. 
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million acres buttressing Yellowstone Park.77 
In 1897, Congress also moved to provide for "the 
management" of these forest reserves so that the timber 
would not be destroyed.78 subsequently, the Forest Service 
was created and Gifford Pinochet became the first Chief of 
the Division of Forestry. Pinochet was a great advocate of 
land use and national forests were quick to be labeled 
"lands of many uses".79 Yet, use of forestland would become 
an issue of concern for national park advocates as forests 
were primarily located next to parklands. As national 
forests provided a vital buffer zone between parklands and 
developed areas, they would later become of vital importance 
to park managers. 
The Conservation Movement Continued 1900-1910 
The two greatest lobbyists for the conservation 
movement by the early 1900's were thought to be President 
Theodore Roosevelt and Chief of Forestry Gifford Pinochet. 
While they worked diligently to promote the idea of land 
conservation by pushing congress to set aside more and more 
federal lands, there was no consensus how these lands should 
be managed or what "conservation" meant. Many people, 
77Ibid. 
78Hans Huth, Nature and the American, (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1972) p.177. 
79Motto of the United states Forest Service. 
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especially westerners were still "apt to dismiss 
conservation as an artificial concept tinged with Eastern 
romantic and humanitarian notions."80 They labeled 
conservationists as "nature lovers or socialist 
planners."81 Yet, to those in tune with the environmental 
awareness movement for the most part, the notion of 
conservation had less radical overtones. "Conservation'', 
was merely the notion that natural resources should be used 
more wisely. 
Between the years 1900-1910, the conservation movement 
along with the influence of President Roosevelt assured the 
addition of parklands. Six national parks were created 
during this period in time: crater Lake in Oregon, Wind cave 
in South Dakota, Sully's Hill in south Dakota, Platt in 
Oklahoma, Mesa Verde in Colorado, and Glacier in Montana.82 
All establishing acts for the parks were similar to that of 
Yelllowstone's. 
During -this same time period, congress also passed an 
Act for the preservation of American Antiquities in 1906. 
This Act gave the President the unprecedented authority to 
80Arthur A. Ekirich, Man and Nature in America, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1963) p.81. 
81Ekirch, Man and Nature in America, p.82. 
82Foresta, America's National Parks and their Keepers, 
p.12. 
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set aside lands as national monuments which he deemed to 
have ''historic or prehistoric interest."83 Beginning with 
Devil's Tower in Wyoming and the Petrified Forest in 
Arizona, President Roosevelt was quick to set aside sixteen 
other national monuments during his adrninistration.84 
Management of these areas was split with the Department of 
Agriculture, administering the national monument status 
battle fields; while the Departments of war and Interior 
shared responsibilities for the monuments of natural 
significance. Yet, problems with this divided management 
policy were many. As it was noted, "under existing 
conditions two departments were charged with jurisdiction 
over national monuments, and three may be. Responsibility 
is divided. There can be no uniformity on administration 
unless there is uniformity in letting the monuments 
alone."85 
Between 1900-10, this same haphazard federal land 
management style was prevalent throughout the parklands as 
well. All parks continued to be managed independently. 
While some of the parks were graced with the presence of the 
83James, Romance of the National Parks, p.68. 
84Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, p.72. 
85Report of the Director of the National Park service 
to the Secretary of the Interior, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, June 30, 1917) p.6. 
42 
Army and the corp of Engineers, others were managed by the 
Secretary of the Interior with the help of forestry 
officials. Problems with the forestry professionals in the 
parks, however, was to come to a head within the first 
decade. Goals for the parklands differed between the 
Forest service under Pinochet and the Interior department in 
tandem with other conservationists, such as John Muir and 
his Sierra Club. For Muir and others, reserved parklands 
were to be sanctuaries of nature, entirely left in their 
natural state as a contrast to the state of society. To 
Pinochet, the goal of conservation was "development."86 
In 1908, President Roosevelt called a Conservation 
Conference of Governors to discuss the conservation of 
reserved lands and ways they could be better managed. While 
this conference was led by Pinochet, the most influential 
speaker appeared to be Dr. Horace McFarland, President of 
the American Civic Association. In contrast to Pinochet's 
utilitarian philosophy toward park management, McFarland 
pushed instead for better park protection. As he noted, 
the national parks, all too few in number ... ought to 
be held absolutely inviolate by congress ... The scenic value 
of (land) ... should be jealously guarded as a distinctly 
important national resource, and not as a mere incidental 
increment.87 
86Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.14. 
87James, Romance of the National Parks, p.69. 
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Arguing for the creation of a national bureau, he stated, 
Nowhere in Washington can an inquirer find an off ice of 
the national parks, or a desk devoted solely to their 
management. By passing around through three departments, and 
consulting clerks who have taken on the extra work of doing 
what they can for the nation's playgrounds, it is possible 
to come at little information.BB 
After the conference, Dr. McFarland began to campaign in 
earnest for the establishment of a single agency to manage 
the national parks. He found support for his idea from 
those in the Sierra Club who in 1910 "took up the cause ... 
and appointed a special promotion committee to advance the 
idea."B9 By 1911, with their help, it was clear he had won 
the support of a great number of public interest groups. 
By 1912, national park conferences were being organized 
by these public interest groups to discuss how parks should 
be managed. Also for the first time in 1911 and 1912, the 
national park superintendents and officers from the 
Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and War convened in 
Yellowstone and Yosemite respectively to discuss park 
management. It was the Superintendents' goal to bring about 
improvements that would lead to greater park control by the 
Department of the Interior.90 
BBibid., p.72. 
B9Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.17. 
90Cameron, The National Park Service, p.9. 
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on February 12, 1812, President Taft sent a request to 
congress asking them to create a Bureau of National Parks. 
such a bureau for parks was ''essential", he stated, as 
"everyone recognizes the obligations of the Government to 
preserve them for the edification and recreation of the 
people."91 While legislation was introduced in 1812, 
nothing ever became of it in the Sixty-second Congress. 
In 1913, however, the dream of a single agency 
administering the parks began to hold more promise. For 
one, a new secretary of the Interior came on board, Franklin 
K. Lane, who was eager to establish a National Park service 
to be placed under the authority of the Department of the 
Interior. Yet, legislation for the National Park service, 
even with the support of Secretary Lane, did not win the 
support of the Sixty-third congress.92 
The Hetch-Hetchy Controversy 
While Congress did not see fit to create a National 
Park Service in 1913 they did move, however, on December 19, 
1913 to allow "the city of San Francisco the right to use 
certain lands in the Yosemite Park, specifically the Hetch 
Hetchy Valley, for the construction of a reservoir to supply 
the city with water and to generate electric power."93 It 
91James, Romance of the National Parks, p.73. 
92James, Romance of the National Parks, p.75. 
93Cameron, The National Park service, p.10. 
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was an "exceptional case'' and even considered to be a 
radical act in its own time as it provided for unprecedented 
industrial use of parkland.94 Albeit, the damming of the 
Hetch Hetchy valley had a long history, even longer than the 
history of Yosemite National Park. 
Citizens of San Francisco had considered damming Hetch 
Hetchy Valley since 1882, however, they had never before 
been able to simultaneously gain local, state, and federal 
permission. once Yosemite had become a national park in 
1899, the Valley legally was restricted from such 
development, but that did not stop developers from moving to 
fight. Developers since the turn of the century had sought 
to elect a mayor in San Francisco with the same utilitarian 
philosophy and attitude toward Hetch Hetchy. In 1907, they 
found one in Mayor James Garfield, a good friend of Gifford 
Pinochet. Garfield pushed the Hetch Hetchy dam proposal to 
approval in San Francisco and then took it to Congress. 
In congressional hearings over Hetch Hetchy valley, 
Forestry Chief Pinochet set the tone as he stated, "the 
fundamental principle of the whole conservation policy is 
that of use, to take every part of the land and its 
resources and put it to that use in which it will best serve 
94Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.9. 
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the most people."95 Pinochet promised any assistance 
necessary to see it to completion. The dam was entirely in 
fitting with his "conservationist" or utilitarian philosophy 
regarding land use. In opposition, John Muir appealed to 
Congress in arguing: "Dam Hatch Hetchy? As well dam for 
water-tanks the people's cathedrals and churches, for no 
holier temple has ever been consecrated by the heart of 
man. "96 
In the end, the utilitarians lobbying in congress 
clearly won any debate on Hetch Hetchy, mostly owing to 
circumstance and the understanding of "conservation'' at the 
time. Looking ahead to the future, many Congressmen were 
convinced San Francisco's potential domestic water supply 
was at stake. Even as people revered their parklands, their 
"spiritual attachment to untrammed nature" was not as great 
as their "commitment to economic progress."97 None of the 
eleven California congressional officials opposed the 
damming of the Hetch Hetchy valley. As the chairman of the 
House Public Lands committee noted; 
When it comes to weighing the highest conservation, on 
the one hand, of water for domestic use against the 
95Roderick Nash, The call of the Wild, (New York: 
George Braziller, 1970) p.86. 
96John Muir, The Yosemite, (New York: The Century 
company, 1912) p.261. 
97Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.10. 
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preservation of a rocky, scraggly canyon, allowing 200,000 
gallons of water daily to run idly to the sea, doing no one 
any good, there is nothing that will appeal to a thoughtful 
brain of a commonsense, practical man.98 
Thus, the Act was passed and the dam was built, albeit, 
almost immediately, some came to regret it. 
The Establishment of a National Park service 
While the approval of the Hetch Hetchy dam was lauded 
by many, it was also equally devastating to others, 
especially to those "conservationist", or "preservationist" 
Sierra Clubers who had actively fought the dam proposal for 
fifteen years.99 The damming of the Hetch Hetchy valley was 
to be an irrevocable loss of scenic beauty in the Sierra 
highlands. As John Muir was to write, "some sort of 
compensation must surely come out of this dark damn-dam-
damnation."100 
Initially, the dam act was to jolt public awareness 
that parklands were not being held in perpetuity as their 
establishing acts would suggest. More importantly, however, 
the damming of the Hetch Hetchy valley renewed with vigor a 
national fight to establish a National Park service. In the 
damming of the Hatch Hetchy, some influential parties were 
98Everhart, The National Park Service, p.16. 
99Ibid. I p. 16. 
lOOAllin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, 
p. 47. 
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finally convinced of the need for an administrative agency 
for the parks. 
While the secretary of the Interior Lane had initially 
supported the Yosemite park dam, in 1914, he was to admit 
that it was a mistake. It is believed "he was committed to 
the cession of the Hetch Hetchy valley ... as a reward to 
California for giving its vote to Wilson."101 Determined to 
make amends, Lane renewed his efforts to gain a separate 
bureau for the parks. 
In December of 1914, Lane appointed a new Assistant 
secretary, Stephen Tyng Mather, whose sole job initially was 
to garner support for the establishment of a national park 
service.102 Mather devoted the entire year of 1915 to 
selling influential railroad owners, writers, lawyers and 
congressman on the idea of a National Park Service. He 
sponsored and personally financed numerous first class 
excursions through the parks for these gentleman. As it was 
noted, Mather's "enthusiasm, public spirit, and 
generosity" ... (gave him) ''friends in every direction, and 
especially in congress. The stage was set for action and 
101Huth, Nature and the American, p.196. 




State of the Parks -- 1915 
In 1915, 334,799 visitors were reported to have entered 
the fourteen existing national parks.104 The Army had done 
a good job of providing law enforcement and interpretive 
services over the years, yet, troops in the parks were 
expensive to maintain. In 1915, it was estimated that 
military management in Yellowstone alone cost the goverment 
$194,193.49. Costs of establishing and maintaining a 
civilian force it was figured would cost half as much.105 
President Wilson was concerned, moreover, there were not 
enough men in the Army even during a time of peace to 
divided some among the parks. 
As the primary managers in the parks for the past 
thirty years, the Army had done a commendable job overseeing 
concessions, building roads and bridges, while dealing with 
the continuing problems of illegal poaching and hunting. 
Yet, even with their hard work, the parks still lacked many 
necessary facilities and access routes to accommodate the 
increasing numbers of visitors. While the use of 
103Horace Albright as cited in James, Romance of the 
National Parks, p.77. 
104Stephen T. Mather, "A Glance Backward at National 
Park Development", Nature Magazine, August, 1927, p.112. 
105Hampton, How the United Stated Calvary saved our 
National Parks, p.178. 
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automobiles was first sanctioned in many park areas in 
1915, many of the initial stage coach roads simply could 
not accommodate them. 
Another monumental problem to be reckoned with in the 
parks in 1915 was the existence of private lands within many 
national park boundaries. With the exception of Yellowstone 
and Arkansas Hot Springs, many plots of land within park 
areas had been developed prior to their reservation. There 
were no Congressional appropriations to secure these plots, 
thus, leaving private land owners free to do as they wished 
with their property.106 
The Creation of the National Park Service 
In the spring of 1916, Congressman William Kent, "a man 
with good credentials among both wise-use conservatives and 
preservationists", introduced a bill establishing a National 
Park service, as did congressman John Raker.107 Senator 
Reese introduced similar legislation in the senate. With 
the Hatch Hetchy Act controversy still shadowing Congress, 
it was time to move forward. The House bills were first 
addressed in hearings of the committee on Public Lands in 
April and it quickly became clear to those present that the 
106Hather, "A Glance Backward at National Park 
Development", p.115. 
107Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, 
p.49. 
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Kent proposal carried the momentum. 
In hearings, the financial rewards to be reaped from 
the park lands were the prime selling point for the 
establishment of a Park Service. As Agricultural secretary 
Fisher opened the hearing on the Park service bill before 
the House Public Lands Committee, he stated, "we should try 
to make our people spend their money in this country instead 
of abroad, and certainly as far as spending it abroad for 
the scenic effect."108 Mather took the stand at the 
hearings as the representative for the Department of the 
Interior and also gave his support for the Kent bill. As he 
stated, "our national parks are practically lying fallow, 
and only await proper development to bring them into their 
own."109 In addition, Dr. McFarland also testified as a 
contributor to the Kent bill. As he noted, parks were 
practical. Parks enabled men to be challenged in a 
different manner than work. Parks would promote "service 
and efficiency ... (rather than) pleasure and 
ornamentation."110 
The most important passage from the Kent legislation, as 
McFarland noted, was taken from an earlier writing of 





Frederick Olmsted, Jr. It stated: 
The fundamental object of these aforesaid parks, 
monuments, and reservations is to conserve the scenery and 
the natural and historical objects therein and to provide 
for the enjoyment of said scenery and objects by the public 
in a manner and by any means that will leave them unimpaired 
for the enjoyment of future generations.111 
This initially noncontroversial statement was to become the 
statement of purpose for the National Park Service (NPS). 
Support for the NPS bill could be found in the 
Departments of the Interior, and Agriculture, numerous 
environmental organizations, the American Civic Association, 
and railroad owners.112 It seemed this broadly written 
piece of legislation offered something for everyone. The 
avowed "preservationists" organizations supported the Park 
Service act as it promised to conserve the scenery. The 
utilitarian railroad owners supported it in their thinking 
that a Park Service would ensure scenic areas were be 
maintained for their rail tours. Another factor of 
consideration: war. The United States would almost 
certainly become involved in world war I. It was 
considered by many to be only a matter of time before the 
troops in the parks would have to be removed. 
The Kent bill establishing the National Park Service 
lllJames, Romance of the National Parks, p.76. 
112Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, 
p.101. 
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{NPS) was passed by Congress on August 25, 1916 and signed 
into law by President Wilson. Overnight, the National Park 
Service became the ninth bureau in the Department of the 
Interior and the overseer of 14 national parks and 22 
national monuments encompassing over six million acres.113 
To manage these properties, NPS was to hire a Secretary, an 
assistant director, a chief clerk, a draftsman and any other 
employees the Secretary of the Interior deemed necessary.114 
The secretary of the Interior also was granted the final 
authority to "make and publish such rules and regulations as 
he may deem necessary ... for the use and management of the 
parks".115 
In congress, the only firm understanding as to how 
parks should be managed could be summed up in one word: 
profitably.116 There was no consensus exactly how these 
parks and monuments should be managed with respect to flora 
and fauna. No congressional official was an expert on land 
113At this time NPS only assumed responsibility for the 
national monuments ~lready under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of the Interior. 
114"An Act to establish a National Park Service and for 
other purposes approved August 25, 1916 as cited in Laws 
Relating to National Park Service, p.9. 
115An Act to establish a National Park Service and for 
other purposes approved August 25, 1916 as cited in Laws 
Relating to National Park Service, p.10. 
116Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.11. 




management. Moreover, land management, especially relating 
to parklands, was not a high priority. Secretary Lane had 
their trust and they were satisfied to leave those details 
to him. There was also widespread confidence that NPS was 
in good hands under the directorship of Stephen Mather. 
For conservationists, the establishment of NPS cemented 
the legitimacy of the parks and provided for a centralized 
decision-making agency. Prior to this act, any park 
superintendent's efforts to correlate "methods of management 
was impossible ... (Moreover,) ... the supervisory officers in 
Washington could only give the parks incidental 
attention."117 For railroad owners, it was hoped with NPS 
help, parks could be made more profitable. The 
environmental groups, on the other hand, finally had a 
promise from the federal government that the scenery would 
be protected or "conserved." As they were soon to be 
reminded, however, the term "conservation" meant many things 
to many people. 
117Department of the Interior, "Report of the Director 
of the Park service to the Secretary of the Interior", 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917) p.3. 
Chapter II 
While the National Park Service Act was approved on 
August 25, 1916, congress failed to appropriate funds 
towards its establishment until April, 17, 1917.1 At that 
time, Stephen Mather was named Director of the Park service. 
Horace M. Albright became Assistant Director. Together, 
these two men almost singlehandedly determined the direction 
of the Park Service for the next two critical decades. They 
saw NPS through a "time of rapid growth and development" 
despite world War I and the Great Depression.2 Yet, even as 
they moved to bring tourists to the parks and enlarge the 
park system, they established a policy of prudent 
development as known in their time and set a precedent for 
all to follow. 
The Mather Years 1917-28 
In 1917, Mather and Albright had a formidable task 
ahead of them with regard to problems within the parks and 
the park system. Within the original parks, there was no 
"integrated planning in the construction of new buildings, 
camps, villages, entrance roads, and trails."3 While cars 
lReport of the Director of the Park Service to the 
secretary of the Interior, 1917, p.1. 
2Everhart, The National Park service, p.23. 
3Albright, The Birth of the National Park Service, 
p. 104. 
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had recently been permitted in the parks, few park roads 
were able to accommodate them. This left the Park service 
faced with inadequate facilities, irate tourists, and 
automobile clubs who were quick to protest the 
inaccessibility of many areas. 
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Mather and Albright also were faced with the growing 
problem of private land ownership within the park 
boundaries. Among these private land owners, there seemed 
to be a pervasive general disregard for park management and 
lack of understanding of conservation. In 1917, there were 
simply no funds available to begin to buy these individual 
tracts of land. 
The greatest problem appeared to be the lack of any 
semblance of a park system. Each park was operating 
independently, often swaying to local political interests or 
concessionaires pressures. Prior to 1917, there were no 
formal rules for park management, only an establishing act 
and a string of mandates issued by various Army Corps and 
other groups. While the Army had set about to establish 
some form of park management, policies ranged widely between 
the parks, often to the detriment of the wildlands and 
wildlife. 
The 1918 Policy Directive 
To combat these problems, the first task Mather and 
Albright undertook was to build an effective organization 
L __________________________ _ 
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and establish a set of bylaws for the parks. In 1918 
secretary Lane formally issued a policy directive to Mather 
which addressed twenty three specific references as to how 
parks should be managed. This letter, "commonly believed to 
have be written by Mather himself, was a concise expression 
of Mather's management philosophy."4 (See Appendix A) It 
alone probably best denotes park management policies as 
realized during the first two decades. 
This policy directive was not a Magna Carta for park 
management that argued parks should be managed solely by 
preservationist or utilitarian principles. Rather, Mather 
argued that park lands were to be used for recreation, and 
thus, should be protected against any commercial or 
"industrial use."5 Mather argued for development in parks 
where warranted for the enjoyment and recreation of 
visitors. He encouraged the development of concessions. He 
encouraged the use of the automobile in the parks. He 
encouraged park personnel to take an active role in the 
management of wildlife and range. Yet, at the same time, he 
created a set of bylaws to ensure the parks would remain in 
their natural state. 
4Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.27. 
5The American Association for the Advancement of 
science, "The safeguarding of National Parks'', Science, 




The First Decade 
With his stated mission for the parks, Mather next set 
out to make parks more accessible to everyone, especially 
automobile owners. To accomplish this, Mather and Albright 
revived their promotional campaign for the parks in earnest 
throughout the first decade. This "ambitious publication 
campaign included articles strategically placed in mass 
circulation magazines like National Geographic'' as well as 
professional journals.6 It also included articles targeted 
at automobile owners to encourage their use.7 This campaign 
was designed not only to provide information, enhance public 
interest, and subsequently increase visitation, but it was 
also to link the new NPS with the national parks. Their 
efforts in all arenas quickly paid off. As public 
awareness of park lands and support for the parks and NPS 
increased, so did the legitimacy of NPS and congressional 
response to park projects. 
Within a period of ten years, park visitation increased 
five hundred percent from 335,000 to 2.3 million.a 
growth is largely attributed to Mather's promotional 
This 
6Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.25. 
7Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.65. 
8Stephen T. Mather, "A Glance Backward at National Park 
Development", Nature Magazine, August, 1927, p.112. 
! ______________ _ 
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campaigns and introduction of the affordable automobile. 
The rise in tourists encouraged a sharp increase in 
appropriations for park roads and the addition of seven new 
parks during this time: Ht. McKinley (1917), Grand canyon 
(1919), Arcadia (1919), Zion (1919), Great smoky Mountains 
(1926), Shenandoah (1926), and Mammoth cave (1926). Funds 
to establish the latter three parks were raised almost 
entirely through matching grants aided by private 
contributions. 
Management of Concessionaires 
To better accommodate the increasing numbers of guests, 
Mather moved to drastically reorganize concession operations 
in the first decade. Appalled at "both the wasted space and 
duplication of services" evidenced in many parks, Mather 
subsequently decided that any business competition in parks 
was unhealthy.9 He opted instead for "regulated 
monopolies" that could provide everything visitors 
needed.10 Under the organic Act, Mather was permitted to 
"enter into contracts with responsible persons of firms for 
up to thirty years, without having to advertise or accept 
competitive bids for projects."11 Mather monitored these 





"under strict Government supervision and rate control."12 
Mather and Albright also replaced the Army personnel in 
the parks with park rangers. Rangers took on the 
responsibilities of law enforcement in the parks but were 
also there to provide nature talks and other interpretation 
activities. In addition to permanent rangers, university 
professors were invited to give lecture series in the parks. 
When Albright took over as the Superintendent of Yellowstone 
in 1919, he began to recruit "ninety day wonders", better 
known as college students, to put in new trails, 
campgrounds, and provide nature education programs.13 
As with any concessionaire or NPS project, Mather and 
Albright were cautious to look at the ramifications of 
their projects and congressional proposals. Distinctions 
were constantly being made as the park system grew in size 
and stature as to what was appropriate in the parks and what 
was not. For example, in Yellowstone, swimming pools and 
bear dumps were endorsed where as dam proposals were fought. 
In the Grand canyon, mule rides along the rims were 
permitted while cable cars were not.14 In Yosemite, the 
12Mather, "A Glance Backward at Park Development", 
p.113. 
13Albright, The Birth of the National Park Service, 
p.142. 
14Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p. 23. 
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"fire fall'' over Yosemite falls was approved initially and 
later banned.15 Mather and Albright considered themselves 
to be conservative in their planning for the parks. As 
Mather noted 
I am firmly against over-development of the parks by 
too many roads, and only those needed to facilitate easy 
access to the most scenic sections will be constructed. 
Large areas will be retained in their original wilderness 
condition, accessible only by trails for horseback riding 
and hiking. In several instances we have been urged to 
construct roads through sections of the park that are the 
ranges of wild animals. In refusing to consider these 
projects favorably, the Service is complying with the 
expressed will of Congress to conserve the wildlife of the 
parks.16 
Once Mather's policy directive was implemented in the 
parks, it won the support of a great many influential 
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persons. The wealthy Americans, who made up the majority of 
visitors to the national parks, "leaned toward minimal 
development and preservation-oriented management."17 They 
were pleased that the Park Service was taking "an active 
role as promoter of tourism, road building, and hotel 
development without losing support of its preservationist 
constituency.''18 Also pleased were prominent 
15Lillard "Priorities in Nature Preservation'',as 
I • printed in Nash, Environment and Americans, (New York: 
Krieger Publishing company, 1979) p.66. 
16Stephen Mather, "What I am Trying to Do with the 
National Parks", world's work, Hay, 1924, p.41. 
17Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.29. 
18Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.10. 
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preservationists such as John Muir. Muir recognized that 
support for the parks was critical, even if it meant they 
must "compromise their ideal of complete preservation ... 
surely, they reasoned, the public's recreation could never 
harm the parks the way dams could."19 
Management Decisions Made in the National Interest 
In the early years, Mather and Albright faced the 
classic public policy problem of justifying the work of the 
new bureaucracy and its importance to America to ensure 
continued funding. For this, they needed a strong 
"favorable image, to convince the public what the agency 
does is in keeping with the highest of popular values."20 
Their desire to keep a strong favorable image often 
lead them to management practices that were less than 
scientifically sound. With regard to wildlife management, 
for example, Mather and Albright were inclined to feed elk 
rather than see them starve through the winter.21 They had 
no understanding, as did most persons of their time, of the 
natural ecological food chain. Mather and Albright also 
continued the practice, initiated by the Army, of killing 
19Zaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce", p.29. 
20Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.25. 
21Robert Shankland, Steve Mather of the National Parks, 
(New York~ Alfred A. Knopf, 1951) p.86. 
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"mountain lions, wolves, and other killers" in the parks.22 
NPS was always "looking to their extinction" as they were 
thought to be "bad" animals.23 Furthermore, Mather and 
Albright introduced non-native fish into parks' river and 
streams in the hopes that they could create prime fishing 
grounds. In many of the larger parks, there were even fish 
hatcheries set up to aid in this goal. 
Early land management practices were another area in 
the early years where a favorable public image dictated 
policy. Throughout the Mather and Albright years all forest 
fires were suppressed. Forest fires were "the greatest 
menace ... and guarded against by strict supervision (and) 
constant patrolling."24 Forests were also cleared of any 
dead trees where funds permitted as they were thought to mar 
the view. And in many parks, cattle grazing was permitted. 
Yet, these were management practices acted in innocence 
rather than a renouncement of management by science. As the 
Report of the Delegate of the American Society of Zoologists 
to the National conference on Parks was to add, 
NPS is "without constructive plans of management ... 
which will insure them against destruction from over use as 
recreation parks. such plans of management must be based on 
22Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, 
p.111. 
23Cameron, The National Park service, p.53. 
24Ibid., p.52. 
knowledge of plant and animal ecology which they do not 
possess."25 
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Yet, Mather and Albright, like many connected with the 
parks at the time, had little concept of any contradiction 
between preservation and use. With a minuscule amount of 
tourists enjoying the parks even at their peak in the 1920-
30' s (in comparison to the numbers today) they could detect 
no noticeable impact of tourists on natural areas. so 
accordingly, they widely encouraged tourism and conservative 
development. As Congress had earlier promised "not one cent 
for scenery", it was extremely important that Mather and 
Albright prove that national parks were profitable 
enterprises. 
Park Issues Mather and Albright Failed to Address 
There were also several park issues Mather and Albright 
failed to address in their tenure altogether. Professional 
papers relating to park management during this time were 
quick to criticize NPS for failing to set any criteria as to 
what constituted a national park. Most parks at the time 
were established as a result of local or political interest 
in an area. outside of suggesting that they should be unique 
in their policy directive, there was no directive to 
25V.E. Shelford, "National Parks", Science, May 6, 
1921, p.431. 
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"safeguard national park standards."26 Some critics argued 
there should be no additions to the national park system 
which did not contain extraordinary features equal to that 
of Yellowstone or Yosemite. Other critics, concerned with 
preserving land for the sake of science as well as 
recreation, argued for the establishment of parks just to 
retain tracts in their natural state.27 
There was also the question of boundary lines for the 
national parks. While Mather recognized that many of the 
early park lines were ''arbitrarily set", it was difficult to 
convince Congress and the local residents they should be 
changed. Even when they were changed they were usually 
restructured to include "natural topographic features such 
as rivers and mountain ranges."28 No thought was given as 
to what area the natural ecosystem encompassed or to 
migration habits. Primarily, because parks in the early 
years were not run on scientific principles, but rather on 
Mather's business principles. 
A third concern relating to NPS was that of the ever 
26Robert s. Yard, "Congress and Conservation", The 
survey, April 15, 1929, p.133. ~-
27Willard G. van Name, "Maintaining the standard and 
the scientific usefulness of the National Parks", science, 
August 17, 1928, p.157. 




increasing numbers of automobiles in the parks. While the 
automobile age had "promoted popular support for the parks", 
negative environmental and recreational aspects associated 
with thousands of cars in the parks was just being 
realized.29 The National Parks Association (NPA), a private 
organization supporting national parks, was one of the first 
to make note of this in 1923. They feared "that what it saw 
as the true worth of the national parks--their value as 
places for communion with nature ... would be diminished by 
the flood of auto campers."30 
Mather and Albright learned early, however, that you 
cannot please everyone all of the time. While Mather and 
Albright moved to make parks more appealing to the public as 
a whole, from the beginning NPS was forced to encounter 
those who disapproved of the park concept in its entirety. 
With each area that was transferred into a national park, 
there were congressional battles. The Forest service viewed 
them as a threat every time a section of their land was 
transferred to NPS.31 Mining interests and developing 
interests were alarmed at each addition to the Park System. 
29Everhart, The National Park Service, p.23. 
30Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.29. 
31Albright, The Birth of the National Park Service, 
p.88. 
Mather moved to try to convince the public that parks 
were advantageous for all. To minimize interagency 
conflict, he assured the Forest service that the Park 
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service's mission in land management was entirely different 
from their utilitarian perspective. As forests often 
buttressed parks he argued, many "national parks play an 
important part in protecting the watersheds of streams 
important for economic use."32 To sooth those who lived on 
the edge of parks and saw them as a threat to development, 
he shared his vision of parks as business opportunities. As 
he argued, it was in everybody's interest to promote the 
parks. More support for the parks meant more opportunities 
for those living on their boundary and more federal support 
to further the protection of important tracts of land. 
Analysis of the Mather Years 
Mather and Albright's successes in the first two 
decades are attributed to a great many things. For one, 
Mather unselfishly devoted himself entirely to the parks. 
He donated money to see through the completion of projects 
such as Tioga Road. He also acted as a philanthropist, 
encouraging others to give generously. Whenever possible 
both Mather and Albright heightened public awareness of the 
parks through lectures and tours. They succeeded primarily 




because of their own ingenuity and their desire to make the 
national park concept a reality for many generations to 
come. 
Mather succeeded also, however, as he had the great 
fortune of having a close relationship with the President, 
Congress, and the secretaries of the Interior during his 
term. Mather "was a Bull Moose Republican" in a "Wilson 
Democratic administration", but he rarely met with any 
"political interference in getting his job done."33 He was 
to come to know a great many of the Congressmen personally 
and felt at home in requesting Congressional appropriations. 
Secretary Lane was instrumental in justifying to Congress 
and the people the need for the Park Service in its early 
years. Yet, Lane interfered little with park management 
operations. This NPS independence is reinforced by all 
historical accounts of the early years of the park service. 
In them, there are few references to Lane or the Department 
of the Interior at all.34 
33Albright, The Birth of the National Park Service, 
p.18. 
34There are only two conflicts between Lane and Mather 
that are cited by historians. The first is Secretary Lane's 
approval of the Hetch Hetchy Dam in 1913. The second is the 
Fall River-Bechler dam proposal for Yellowstone National 
Park. Introduced in the Senate by Senator Frank Nugget in 
1919 Lane insisted that the Park Service respond favorably 
to it over the objections of Mather and Albright. Cameron, 
The National Park Service, p.20. 
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Following Lane there was a quick succession of 
Secretaries under President Harding between 1919-1921. The 
new Secretary, Albert Fall, avoided disturbing the work of 
"the Park Service in any way."35 Hubert Work replaced Fall 
in March of 1923 as the Secreatary of the Interior.36 
Mather noted in 1924 that Work had "taken a deep personal 
interest in the parks and forcibly defined his policy toward 
them as one of complete protection from commercial 
exploitation."37 
At the same time, Mather and Albright benefitted as the 
nation enjoyed a period of great economic prosperity. While 
this economic prosperity meant an increasing demand for 
natural resources, it also made it easier for Mather to 
secure large private donations for park projects. During 
his tenure, Mather secured private land donations to extend 
Sequoia National Park, Yosemite, and many others. Even when 
35With Fall as well there was one issue that historians 
recount Fall and Mather disagreeing upon. It was relating to 
Secretary Fall's proposal for an all year round national 
park in New Mexico to be used for both recreation and 
commercial uses. Adamant that the land site was not national 
park material, he avoided acting on it. Fall took it to 
Congress himself in January 1923, where it failed. Albright, 
The Birth of the Park Service, p.126. 
36Jack Ellis Haymes, Haynes Guide: Handbook of 
Yellowstone National Park, (Bozeman, Montana: Haynes 
Studios, Inc., 1958) p.38. 
37Mather, "What I am Trying to do with the National 
Parks", p.42. 
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Congress acted in 1919 to reject any "private funding of 
governmental programs," Mather was still able to carry on 
private promotional work through the establishment of the 
National Parks Association.38 With the support of Congress, 
he later was able to raise private funds to match government 
grants for the purchase of private lands within park 
boundaries as well. 
Economic prosperity following the end of the first 
world war also allowed more Americans the luxury of leisure 
time. This boon gave Mather and Albright's promotional 
campaigns for the parks a boost as Americans could afford to 
travel. To add to this, there was the commencement of the 
automobile age. With the introduction of affordable 
automobiles, Americans were able to experience the parks in 
the numbers Mather never dreamed of .39 The popular new auto 
brought more tourists into national parks and eventually 
justified the need for a Park service. 
The Albright Years 1929-33 
Mather suffered a severe stroke in November, 1928 and 
it rapidly became clear that he could no longer perform his 
duties as Director. He named Albright as his successor who 
was sworn in on January 12, 1929. Albright was well 
38Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.66. 
39Harlean, Romance of the National Parks, p.82. 
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prepared for the job. Having served three years as assistant 
director and ten years as Superintendent of Yellowstone 
National Park, he understood the Mather philosophy regarding 
park management. As he recalled in his memoirs, 
The years had prepared me as well as anyone for the 
job. I knew personally about one hundred members of Congress 
and was on a first-name basis with about one-third of 
them.40 
The Service Albright inherited was twice as large as 
the one Mather had begun with in 1917. It was a well-
established organization incorporating "twenty-one national 
parks and thirty-three national monuments, with 2.6 million 
annual visitors, and a budget of $9 million.41 During his 
tenure as Director, Albright concentrated his efforts on 
buying up private plots of land within existing park 
boundaries, expanding park boundaries, and bringing national 
monuments and historical sites still under the jurisdiction 
of the War Department over to the Park Service. 
Aldo Leopold and the Age of Ecology 
While park policies remained essentially the same 
during the administration of Albright, as Mather had 
established, nationwide there was the beginnings of an 
understanding of ecology that would eventually move to have 
a great impact on park management. While the term "ecology" 
40Albright, The Birth of the Park Service, p.256. 
41Everhart, The National Park Service, p.28. 
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had been around since 1866, it was later through a rapid 
succession of scientific breakthroughs that ecological 
studies found life existed through interaction with other 
life forms.42 Ecology came to be associated with the idea 
that all living things within an environment were 
interdependent. It gave man a whole new way of looking at 
nature. 
Prior to the 1920-30's, man's "respect for nature had 
been more sentimental and spiritual than scientific."43 
This perspective can easily be seen in the writing of 
Thoreau and Muir. Yet, with the help of early ecologists' 
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such as Aldo Leopold, Bob Marshall, Victor E. Shelford, and 
G.A. Pearsons, the science of ecology became better 
understood. As it did, people began to listen to ecologists 
call for wilderness preserves. While ecologists initially 
looked to the Forest Service to establish these preserves, 
they recognized the closest thing to them existed already in 
the national parklands. 
Conservation vs. Preservation 
In line with the ecologists' findings, in 1933, V.E. 
Shelford authored a very important article in Science 
42Susan Flader, "Aldo Leopold and the Evolution of an 
Ecological Attitude", as cited in Nash, Environment and the 
Americans, p.115. 
43Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.194. 
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magazine in which he defined the difference between 
preservation and conservation with regard to the national 
parks. In many ways this was a radical idea in itself, but 
as he explained: 
Many people conceive of the National Park Service as a 
conservation organization. To conserve, as the term is now 
most frequently used, means to preserve while in use and it 
often implies ultimate depletion. In actual practice the 
operations carried on in the name of conservation are not 
designed to preserve the natural order, not to establish and 
maintain a different order as regards kind and abundance of 
animals present. The difference between preservation and 
conservation is well illustrated in a recent publication by 
Wright, Dixon, and Thompson, who advocate the preservation 
of the birds and mammals in national parks. They point out 
the importance of dead timber to various birds and mammals, 
and the need of such timber for numerous invertebrates might 
well be added. Conservation as usually practiced removes 
dead and mature timber, while preservation lets nature take 
its course."44 
V.E. Shelford thus linked the idea of preservation to 
natural regulation long before its time. 
The Parks and the New Deal 
While a new thinking on park management was taking hold 
in the scientific communities, in the business world, things 
were grim. The stock Market crash and onset of the Great 
Depression in 1929 finally moved in to effect the parks by 
1931. As it did, coping with the Depression became the Park 
Service's priority. NPS quickly found itself "an important 
place in New Deal efforts to cope with the wounded economy 
44V.E. Shelford, "Conservation Versus Preservation", 
Science, June 2, 1933, p.535. 
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and social consequences."45 
Albright resigned from the Park Service in 1933, and 
his assistant director, Arno B. cammerer, became his 
successor. While it was expected Cammerer would operated 
the parks in the tradition of Mather and Albright, cammerer 
instead saw the Park Service through the New Deal reforms 
initiated by President Roosevelt. It was a time, he 
believed, to concentrate on "the necessities of life ... to 
build ... a saner mode of living."46 No longer could the 
Park service dictate policy in the political vacumn Mather 
had realized. Park Service autonomy was to some extent 
relinquished in an effort to work with other government 
agencies to the benefit of the people. 
The Depression did not paint as a bleak a scenario for 
NPS and the parks, as it did for so many others. In June of 
1933, President Roosevelt approved a Congressional 
resolution "consolidating all national parks, all national 
monuments, all national military parks, 11 national 
cemeteries, all national memorials, and the parks of the 
National capital under National Park Service 
45Foresta, America's National Parks and Its Keepers, 
p.43. 
46Arno B. cammerer, "National Government Services 
Through Recreation", Recreation, January, 1935, p.465. 
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administration."47 In 1933, President Roosevelt also 
"instituted a broad program of natural resource conservation 
implemented in part through the Civilian Conservation corp 
(CCC)".48 President Roosevelt's close ties with the 
Secretary of the Interior Ickes made the Park service the 
beneficiary of thousands of CCC workers. 
Because of the depression, NPS had the advantage of 
being able to employ the best architects, biologists, 
archaeologists, and historians in the CCC program. The CCC 
set up camps in the parks and worked to build roads, 
roadside information stands, trails, NPS housing, and 
visitor facilities. Many of these projects had been planned 
by Mather and Albright, "but which had not been carried out 
for lack of money and manpower."49 
Between 1933-40, the Park Service was the recipient of 
more that $220 million provided through a number of 
emergency relief programs.SO The majority of this money was 
directed toward CCC endeavors. CCC operated 650 camps and 
during the height of their program, employed 7,000 workers 
47Ed, The National Parks: Shaping the System, 
(Washington, D.c.: Department of the Interior, 1985) p.24. 
48Ed, The National Parks: Shaping the system, p.42. 
49Foresta, America's National Parks and Its Keepers, 
p.44. 
50Everhart, The National Park Service, p.32. 
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in the national parks alone. 
From a $50 million dollar grant extended by the Public 
Works Administration (PWA), the Park service was able to 
acquire more land. This enabled a portion of the everglades 
in southern Florida to be designated a national park and the 
Grand Teton National Park was extended as well. National 
seashores were also approved for preservation and recreation 
purposes. The first to hold such status was Cape Hatteras. 
A third source of funding for the Park Service came from 
the Emergency Relief Administration (ERA). They donated $28 
million to be used for "recreation demonstration areas.''51 
These sites were undeveloped tracts of land outside cities 
that the Park Service developed for recreation purposes and 
eventually returned to the cities. While this project was 
not in line with those traditional associated with the park 
service, it brought the NPS to America's back door. In 
working on local community projects, NPS strengthened public 
recognition of their agency and the integrity of the NPS 
within many communities. 
NPS As Recreation Leaders 
In 1936, congress passed the Parks, Parkway, and 
Recreation Act. The Act "clearly established the Park 
51Ibid., p.32. 
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Service as the preeminent federal recreation agency."52 In 
promoting recreation, the Act expanded their purpose. In 
providing technical assistance to other agencies, it was a 
boost to their status. The Act was also a sign of the 
times. In the 1930's, "recreation was a rapidly expanding 
federal activity."53 
There were others, namely the National Parks 
Association and the Wilderness Society, who were very 
dismayed to see the Park service labeled as a recreational 
agency. They considered the act to violate national park 
standards. National parks, in their eyes, were not 
recreational grounds, but great natural areas to be revered. 
To uphold that status, the National Parks Association 
recommended dividing up the national park system. On "one 
side would be 'national primeval parks' ... on the other ... 
the rest of the Park System and the other responsibilities 
the agency had acquired."54 While the motion was never 
seriously considered, it did address the conflict between 
preservation and recreational use. In questioning whether 
parks were places for recreational activities, the National 
52Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.45. 
53Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.46. 
54Ibid., p.47. 
Parks Association, the private foundation for NPS, argued 
affirmatively for preservation. 
The Parks During world war II 
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secretary cammerer resigned his position in 1940 and 
was replaced by Newton B. Drury. Drury's appointment was of 
interest to many as he was the first chosen outside of the 
career ranks of the National Park service. He had served as 
the head of California's "Save the Redwoods league for 
twenty years.''55 Consequently, he did not view the parks so 
much from a business perspective as had Mather, Albright, 
and Cammerer. His guiding park management principle was 
''restraint." He was not so anxious to make the parks as 
accessible as possible and while this was a minor change in 
emphasis, nevertheless, it was a significant one. 
Drury was almost immediately to realize his goal for 
the parks, but not as he had envisioned. Shortly after his 
appointment, "Pearl Harbor brought to a sudden end twenty-
five years of almost unbroken growth for the Park Service.56 
The men went off to war and the parks themselves virtually 
shut down. The total number of Park Service employees 
dropped to 2,000 in response. 
Albeit, during the war the parks were not totally 
55Everhart, The National Park service, p.34. 
56Ibid. 
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disregarded. As Congress looked for contributions to the 
war effort, they looked to the parks. In Olympic National 
Park, they found Sitka spruce, a perfect material for 
airplanes.57 In Yellowstone, they found an abundant supply 
of elk, a perfect food source for the men abroad. 
·while the elk meat proposal was just given lip service 
in congress, the proposal to log Sitka spruce trees was 
taken seriously. In rebuttal, Director Drury argued before 
congressional committees that "critical necessity rather 
than convenience should be the governing reason for such 
sacrifice of an important part of our federal estate."58 
"Critical necessity" became the theme of Interior Secretary 
Ickes as the whole Department took it upon themselves to 
investigate the matter and pose alternative resources. 
Fortunately for the parks, the war Department and Congress 
found alternative resources to replace those in the parks. 
But the case nevertheless set a precedent. In future years, 
the policy became that one would have to show "critical 
necessity" to be able to extract anything out of the parks. 
The Park Service after 1945 
Immediately following the end of the war, throngs of 
people came to the parks. The post war years were a time of 
57Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.64. 
58Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.65. 
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recreation. Popular magazines equated the national parks to 
"Playgrounds for Everyone" and everyone wanted to know "How 
to see a National Park." suddenly, in peace times, millions 
of "families in heavily laden sedans ... courageously set out 
every summer to explore the wilds."59 By 1949, park 
visitation had topped thirty million as compared to twenty-
one million in 1940. 
While the public's interest in the parks was at an all 
time high in the ensuing decade, congressional funding for 
the parks remained at an all time low. The parks total 
budget had dropped from "$21 million in 1940 to $5 million 
during the war" and remained low thereafter.GO By 1949, the 
total operating budget was just $14 million. 
Dwindling federal funds forced massive staff reductions 
during the war and it was soon evident that there would be 
no replacement of these services. By 1949, there were only 
2,393 permanent employees to oversee 45 million acres·of 
land as compared to 5,104 before the war.61 
As a result of inadequate funds, Director Drury 
reported, "rangers were cleaning the washrooms in the 
Petrified National Forest, and directing traffic in Muir 
59Dulles, A History of Recreation, p.324. 
60Everhart, The National Park Service, p.34. 
61Bernard Devoto, "The Easy Chair", p.67. 
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Woods, while visitors roamed largely unguided and 
unrestrained."62 Vandalism reached an apex as so many 
treasure seekers and souvenir hunters were free to help 
themselves. Well traveled parks were littered with 
graffiti and trash while delicate sub alpine terrain and 
thermal features were destroyed. In 1950 damage to park 
facilities, trees, and monuments was estimated to be in the 
millions of dollars.63 
As a result of the wear and tear on the physical 
structures realized from the hoards of visitors and neglect 
during the war, Director Drury was to report to the 
secretary in 1949, the "backlog of needed physical 
improvements throughout the park system has pyramided to an 
estimated cost of ... $496,000,000."64 For the 1949 fiscal 
year, the National Park Service received an appropriation of 
$7,440,000 for improvements. It barely made a dent and 
visitors were quick to complain. As Bernard Devoto wrote, 
A woman in travel-stained denim is angry because Indian 
Creek campground is intolerably dusty ... Another woman 
reports that the toilet at Inspiration Point Cliff has been 
clogged since early last evening ... All but one of the 
62Frank A. Tinker, "Vandalism--Nature's Number 1 
Enemy", Nature Magazine, June, 1952, p.317. 
63Annette H. Richards, "The Great American Litterbug", 
Natural History, May, 1952, p.200. 
64Annual Report of the Director of the National Park 
Service to the secretary of the Interior, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1949) p.302. 
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campgrounds looks like slums; in the observer's opinion, the 
reason why they look that way is that they are slums.65 
Yet, even as it seemed prudent to improve park facilities, 
there were no subsequent increase in congressional funding. 
With the commencement of the Korean War in 1950, 
appr_opriations for the Park Service were again cut back. 
Albeit, visitors did not stop coming. 
The visitor count rose from thirty million in 1949 to 
48 million by 1954.66 Some conservative critics attributed 
this rise in popularity to a "phenomenal demand for outdoor 
recreation."67 Other preservationists argued that people 
sought "inspiration" ... (and an) ... "intimate experience ... 
far from our highly urbanized and standardized 
civilization. 11 68 Regardless, it was argued that they should 
pay more of the privilege of doing so. As it was noted, "if 
motor visitors to Yellowstone during 1954 had paid just 
$1.27 each toward what they received, instead of 75 cents, 
and those to Yosemite 95 instead of 62 cents, they would 
65Bernard, Devoto, "Let's Close The National Parks", 
Harper's Magazine, October, 1953, p.49. 
66Anthony Netboy, "Crises in our National Parks", 
American Forests, May, 1955, p.26. 
67Everhart, The National Park Service, p.35. 
68Richards, "The Great American Litterbug", p.204. 
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have paid the entire annual cost of the two parks.''69 Yet, 
even then, this was not likely to occur. All park revenues 
were deposited in the federal Treasury. 
Shortly thereafter, Bernard Devoto wrote a widely 
publicized article in Harper's Magazine suggesting that the 
government close all the parks. It was the only 
alternative, he stated, since neither Congress nor the 
people cared that our "priceless heritage'' was "beginning to 
go to hell."70 Frank Tinker argued that all that was truly 
impressive in America should have remained relatively 
unknown. In that way, it would have only been sought out by 
those with a "sincere interest" in it.71 
Wildlife and Wildlands Management 
In addition to the problems realized by increasing 
numbers of visitors by the 1950's, there were also problems 
to be reckoned with in the areas of wildlife and wildlands 
management. There had been few changes made in either area 
since the days of Mather and Albright. And yet, Mather and 
Albright did not focus on the science of wildlife or 
wildlands management to begin with. They did their best to 
69Ed, "Contents Noted", Nature Magazine, March, 1955, 
p.119. 
70Bernard Devoto, "Let's Close the National Parks'', 
Harper's Magazine, October, 1953, p.51. 
71Tinker, "Vandalism--Nature's Number #1 Enemy", p.314. 
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set policies with the information they had available at the 
time. This left Drury and his followers to face the 
consequences related to unbalanced wildlife populations. 
By 1950, it was very apparent that few parks were 
complete ecosystems. (i.e. all range lands and habitats 
where park animals roamed were protected) While Mather had 
stated in his 1918 policy directive that parks needed to 
incorporate only spectacular geographic features, it was a 
policy implemented without the benefit of later 
understandings of ecology. Science had since proved that 
animals were interdependent on one another. Yet, park 
boundaries were set. There was no money to enlarge them and 
many border properties had been commercially developed 
anyway. 
In the parks, it was apparent that range reductions and 
human interferences had altered normal wildlife 
relationships. Albeit, in 1949, Director Drury described the 
NPS method of wildlife management as "nonmanagement". "In 
theory", he stated, "all forms of wildlife are ... left to 
shift for themselves."72 It was apparent by the 1950's if 
the Park Service wanted to preserve the wildlife, new 
management policies would be necessary. 
Fortunately for the Park Service, many of their lands 
72Annual Report of the Director of the Park service to 
the Secretary of the Interior, 1949, p.317. 
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had been carved out of Forest service holdings and remained 
surrounded by national forests. While the Forest Service 
took a more utilitarian approach to resource management and 
permitted seasonal hunting, wildlife was still better 
protected on their property than in developed areas. Yet, 
this was still not enough to ensure the survival of many 
species. Without a complete ecosystem, some animals were 
dying out while others were be coming overpopulated with the 
absence of any natural predators. 
In Yellowstone, for example, moose and deer populations 
were decreasing as the elk were moving into their natural 
winter range to find food.73 Consequently the elk 
populations were multiplying at a terrific rate, especially 
as they had no natural predators. The Army and later the 
Park Service had successfully decimated the mountain lion 
and wolf populations by the 1920' in their belief that they 
were "bad" animals. While the Park Service had proposed to 
the Montana State Game Department that they increase their 
hunting permits for elk north of the park boundary, the Game 
department refused. Thus, Drury noted, the "Service itself 
will be forced to affect a drastic reduction ... to save the 
remaining range and associated wildlife."74 
73Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.23. 
74Annual Report to the Secretary of the Interior from 
the Director of the Park Service, 1949, p.317. 
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Another problem to be reckoned with in regard to 
wildlife was the bear populations in the parks. Bears in 
Yellowstone, Glacier, Yosemite, Sequoia, and Great smoky 
Mountains all came to associated humans with food as 
tourists "and their goodies ... managed to turn ... black 
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bears into panhandlers."75 consequently, beggar black bears 
were becoming a menace on the roadsides. The problem only 
acerbated itself as more and more visitors were coming into 
the parks. 
With regard to wildland management, the greatest threat 
to park terrain after the war Drury considered to be forest 
fires. The policy with regard to forest fires was one of 
immediate suppression, yet inadequate staff and funds often 
kept park fires burning. A second ongoing threat to the 
wildlands was insect epidemics. Beginning in 1949, congress 
had provided funding to chemically control such bugs as the 
pine bark beetle in Grand Teton National Park and the needle 
miner in Bryce canyon National Park, but as the 
appropriations were so small, the park service was not able 
to control all infestations.76 
75Ed. "Fifty Three Million On The Go", Newsweek, August 
6, 1956, p.64. 
76It is likely that the limited funding in this case 
may have saved a great deal of the parks' wildlife. In their 
innocence, one of the more popular chemical sprays used was 
DDT. Annual Report of the Director of the National Park 
service to the Secretary of the Interior, p.321. 
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Echo Park Controversy 
In addition to all the problems facing the Park Service 
with regard to the interior of the parks, the power of the 
agency was put to the test several times during Drury's 
administration. The showdown, however, came in 1950 
regarding a proposed dam project for Dinosaur National 
Monument near Echo Park, Colorado. It fell in line with a 
number of other dam proposals for parks and appeared to be 
the critical deciding factor. As it was noted in the 
initial department hearings, "let's open this to its 
ultimate and inevitable extent, and let's settle ... once and 
for all time ... whether we may have ... wilderness areas ... 
in the United states." 77 
Drury had approved of a dam study in this area by the 
Bureau of Reclamation in the 1940's. While he may have 
considered the approval to be just a courtesy extended to 
the Bureau of Reclamation, over the years they garnered 
political support for the project. By 1950, they were ready 
to build. The Park Service, however, ''had failed to keep 
its allies, the preservation groups, informed of the 
issue.''78 They had no political momentum behind them to 
oppose the dam and when Secretary Chapman approved it, it 
77Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.210. 




seemed as if it would become a reality. 
By 1951, all that NPS could hope for was that congress 
would defeat the Echo Park dam. In senate and House 
hearings, however, it was evident the project had a great 
deal of support. It came mainly from: "Congressman, 
governors, civic clubs, chambers of commerce, utility 
companies, water-users associations, the Bureau of 
Reclamation, and a tribe of Navaho Indians."79 Opposition 
came primarily from preservation organizations and 
educational groups. The Park service as an agency under the 
Department of the Interior was in no position to directly 
oppose it. Thus, they were forced to rely on the support of 
interest groups and public appeal. Fortunately for them, 
this proved to be enough. After a long battle in Congress, 
the Echo Park dam legislation was defeated on April 1, 
1956.80 
Wilderness advocates hailed the def eat as a great 
victory. In the face of future dam proposals, they were 
encouraged that with the Echo Park decision, Congress had 
affirmed the value of undeveloped land. For the Park 
Service, though, there was little joy in the victory. Their 
79Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.216. 
80Michael Frome, Battle For The Wilderness, 
(Washington: Praeger Publishers) 1974, p.131. 
89 
power over the fate of parklands had been tested and it was 
clear they were not in control. Rather in this case, NPS 
was dangerously dependent on their allies. As Foresta 
explained in America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
An agency always pays a price for the support of its 
allies. The greater the relative strength of the allies, the 
greater the restrictions they will be able to impose on an 
agency and the greater will be the consideration of their 
interests in the formation of common goals.81 
While the Park Service had previously enjoyed a great deal 
of autonomy in its decision-making processes regarding the 
parks, the Echo Park controversy signalled a weakening of 
this power. Yet, the Park service's reliance on its allies 
was only beginning. 
A Changing of the Guard 
In the heat of the Echo Park controversy, Director 
Drury had resigned and Conrad L. Wirth was appointed the new 
Director after a short period of leadership by Arthur E. 
Damaray. Wirth, unlike Drury, was a career Park Service 
official with "practical knowledge of how things get done in 
washington."82 And undeniably, there was plenty to be done. 
With the parks and the Park Service's integrity rapidly 
diminishing, he s~t about to change the system almost 
immediately. 
81Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.51. 




To combat the problems facing the parks, in 1955 
Director Wirth announced the beginning of "Mission 66, ... a 
ten year rehabilitation and capital development program ... 
to improve facilities, staffing, and resource preservation 
at all areas in time for the 50th anniversary of the 
Service."83 This program was designed to be conservation 
oriented. As Director Wirth noted, "to achieve specific 
protection goals within a park, the best control is properly 
planned and executed development."84 As Lou Garrison, 
Chairman of the Mission 66 Steering committee concurred, 
"appropriate development of facilities such as roads or 
trails actually could be viewed as a conservation and 
protection measure, as it tended to channel and restrict 
use."85 With eighty million visitors projected to visit 
the parks in 1966, it was apparent some action in this 
direction needed to be taken. 
It was calculated in 1955 that "Mission 66" would cost 
the federal government $800 million over the period of ten 
years.86 To garner support for the project and necessary 
83Ibid. I p. 42. 
84Conrad L. Wirth, "Mission 66", American Forests, 
August, 1955, p.16. 
85Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, (New York: THe 
Atlantic Monthly Press} 1986, p.204. 
86Everhart, The National Park Service, p.36. 
91 
funding, Wirth looked to the American Automobile Association 
(AAA) and environmental groups for help. While AAA 
sponsored the kick-off activities in Washington for the 
program, the "surge of publicity calling attention to the 
dilemma of the national parks", was also a boon to the 
cause.87 
In a meeting between President Eisenhower and Wirth in 
1956, the President pledged full support for Mission 66. 
With that advantage, a bill was submitted with some funds in 
it for every Congressman with a park in his district. Not 
surprisingly, "Congress bought Mission 66 completely and 
gave it a warm reception at budget-hearing time.88 
Eventually, Congress would wind up contributing more that $1 
billion for this one NPS program. 
Conclusion 
At the close of the 1950's, NPS found itself facing a 
myriad of problems throughout the national park system. Yet, 
it was hoped that as a result of Mission 66 some of the 
tension on the park's facilities would be relieved. It was 
also hoped that satisfactory completion of Mission 66 would 
help NPS to regain integrity, agency independence that was 
lost as a result of the war, and more federal funding. 
87Wirth, "Mission 66", p.17. 
88Everhart, The National Park Service, p.37. 
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The Park service had become well established by the 
1950's, however. It was clear people loved their parks and 
with the increase in vacation time, people were getting out 
and enjoying them more. Mather, Albright, and their 
predecessors had done their job well. In the process of 
building up public support, they had also built up a 
powerful political constituency, including key congressional 
officials and environmental organizations. While the costs 
of a powerful political constituency was realized in the 
Echo Park Controversy, the alliance nevertheless proved to 
be beneficial to the ecological integrity of the parks. NPS 
came to recognize that agency autonomy in some cases would 
have to be sacrificed. 
L 
Chapter III 
Management of the national parks changed drastically 
between the 1950's and 1960's, in part because of the parks' 
increasing popularity. As the public continually showed 
more interested in the parks, more people and political 
forces wanted a say in the management of these lands. For 
the first time, these forces began acting on NPS to 
significantly usurp its autonomy. Together, the power of 
these forces bespoke of a new era in park management. 
It is important to note that there was no one single 
force impacting the Park Service during the sixties. 
Rather, the forces of change were many. For the purposes of 
this thesis, I would like to discuss three of these forces: 
secretary Udall, environmental lobbies, and congress. These 
are the three most significant forces of change during the 
sixties because of the legacy they left on park management. 
The State of the Parks - 1960 
In the early years of the Park Service, the directives 
for the service had been relatively forthright. Mather and 
Albright knew they needed people in the parks in order to 
justify their existence and the question was how best to 
attract the people. The Park Service in the 1960's, 
however, was much different. Objectives were fused with the 
lack of consensus as to what was the appropriate role of 
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parks. In the face of an overwhelming number of visitors by 
1960, the preservationist constituency was very concerned 
about their impact on the environment. They were also 
disturbed that the "modern style of tourism was depriving 
the parks of their central symbolism, their message about 
the relationship between man and nature, and man and 
industrial society. 11 1 The utilitarian was disturbed because 
there were not adequate facilities to provide for the 
tourists. Mission 66 was not keeping up with the demand as 
a private manager might be able to. 
Mission 66 had been sold to Congress and the public by 
Director Wirth in 1955 as a catch all plan and conservation 
program for the parks to refurbish them. But it appeared as 
early as 1960, that Mission 66 was not all that the parks 
needed. Despite the Park service's work to improve 
facilities, interpretation programs, and park protection 
under Mission 66, park visitation was increasing at such an 
astronomical rate that the program afforded in reality 
little protection for the park or improvements for the 
guests. 
seventy two million people visited the national parks 
in 1960, a sharp increase from the fifty-four million in 
1955.2 Consequently, facilities and services were still 
lSax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.11. 
2Statistical Abstracts, 1989. 
inadequate. Park personnel could not keep up with the 
visitors demands. Even the protective efforts on the part 
of the Park Service were not ensuring that the geologic 
wonders many were corning to see were not being destroyed.3 
As the preservationists described it, Mission 66 was 
"road-oriented and big-development oriented."4 As Edward 
Abbey noted in Desert Solitaire, "Industrial Tourism is a 
threat to the national parks."5 so long as we are willing 
to build more roadways and facilities in the parks, he 
argued, "rangers are going quietly nuts answering the same 
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three basic questions five hundred times a day: (1) Where's 
the john? (2) How long's it take to see this place? (3) 
Where's the Coke rnachine?"6 
In 1960, the Mission 66 program was reevaluated and 
reassessed. Secretary Seaton, in a letter to Director Wirth 
in 1960 indicated that more land should be set aside as 
parks, more personnel should be employed, but never was it 
mentioned that more facilities should be built to 
accommodate guests. Seaton's goal rather was to "preserve 
3Ed., "Mission 66 Reappraised", National Parks 
Magazine, April, 1961, p.2. 
4Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.207. 
5Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire, (New York: Ballatine 
Books, 1968) p.59. 
6Ibid. I p. 52. 
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the wilderness areas in the system."7 The National Parks 
Association took a similar view. It was their 
recommendation that visitors could do with "fewer and less-
elaborate visitor accommodations", fewer roads, but greater 
amounts of "management, protection, and research in the 
parks."8 
The Kennedy Administration and the New Frontier in the Parks 
At the same time that Mission 66 was being reassessed 
in 1960, there was a changing of the guard in the White 
House. With the election of a new president: John Kennedy 
and his subsequent appointment of a new Secretary of the 
Interior: Stewart Udall, a new direction for the parks was 
declared. Udall led this new direction for parks guided by 
his own ideas about conservation and park management. 
While previous Interior Secretaries had left the Park 
Service pretty much alone, deferring to the experienced 
career men that served as Directors, Udall did not. Coming 
into office, Secretary Udall "made no effort to disguise the 
fact that his first two loves within the Department were 
Indian affairs and the national parks".9 He took an active 
role in park management to a degree previous Interior 
7Ed., "The Six Points", American Forests, February, 
1960, p.25. 
8Ed., "Mission 66 Reappraised", p.2. 
9Everhart, The National Park Service, p.38. 
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Secretaries had not. Consequently, Udall was to have a 
great impact on the parks and the Park service during his 
tenure. 
Mission 66, in Udall's mind, was not the direction that 
the Park service should be taking. As Udall saw it, .Mission 
66 still "reflected a great faith in progress rather than a 
healthy distrust for it ... Its building program reflected 
assumptions about the harmony of development and wilderness 
which were no longer in fashion."10 Without Mission 66, 
"there probably would have been a disaster of 
insufficiency".11 Much of the blame for the unpopular 
program was placed on Wirth who initiated it and still 
shared the progressive ideas of his predecessors towards the 
parks. so with pressure brought on from Secretary Udall, 
Wirth resigned in October, 1963 and was replaced by George 
B. Hartzog.12 
Hartzog and Udall both found the Park Service in a 
turbulent time as it began to struggle for the first time 
with its equivocal mission both to preserve the parks and 
provide for their use. To realign park management, Udall 
lOForesta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.67. 
llGeorge Hartzog, "Over the Years With the National 
Park Service", National Parks, May, 1969, p.14. 
12John Prokop, "Man in the Middle", American Forests, 
p. 35. 
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decided that areas within the national park system would be 
divided into three categories: natural, historical, and 
recreational.13 In the natural areas, preservation would be 
emphasized. In the historical areas, historical facilities 
would be maintained while preservation of the land would be 
secondary. In recreational areas, "both natural and 
historic resource preservation would be subordinate to 
management for outdoor recreation."14 Management plans 
appropriate to these three different areas would then be 
drawn up and administered. 
Park management plans under Hartzog were also revised 
so that each unit of the Park Service would have more 
autonomy in the decision made regarding that unit. While 
Mather and Albright had strived to achieve a sense of 
uniformity in park management, the diverse needs of the 
Service no longer found "one over-all policy of management" 
to be the most effective.15 Thus, Yellowstone biologists 
were permitted to solve the problem of their rapidly growing 
elk herd as they saw fit while the Master Plan in the Great 
smoky Mountains National Park focused on enlarging the 
13"Memorandum to the Director of the National Park 
Service to the service from the Secretary of the Interior on 
Management of the National Park System", July 10, 1964. 
14NPS, The National Parks: Shaping the System, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985) p.62. 
15Prokop, "Man in the Middle", p.36. 
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campgrounds. 
Finally, both Udall and Hartzog firmly believed the 
Park service should be expanded. In his July 10, 1964 
directive to Hartzog, Udall specifically requested that NPS 
continue to take on additional areas of natural, historic, 
and recreational value. During the sixties, consequently, 
NPS made numerous recommendations to congress of appropriate 
land acquisitions. With a conservationist-minded 
administration and Congress, it was possible to expand the 
NPS system by more than five million acres by 1969.16 
The Rise of the Environmental Organizations 
While the Park Service was rethinking its management 
plans for the parks, it was clear public concern for the 
environment was on the upswing. Spurred by books such as 
Silent Spring and Science and survival, awareness of the 
threats to the environment were receiving a great deal of 
public attention.17 
By the 1960's, it was becoming painfully evident to 
many Americans that true wildlands were diminishing at an 
astronomical rate. Industry "appeared destined to occupy 
all the unoccupied lands", while those set aside as parks 
16Hartzog, "Over the Years with the National Park 
Service", National Parks, p.14. 
17Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflen, 1962); Barry commoner, science and Survival, (New 
York: Viking Press, 1966). 
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were becoming more congested every year.18 The public 
responded with a outcry of concern. Their concern led to a 
surge in memberships in major environmental organizations 
throughout the United States. Throughout the sixties, 
environmentalists organizations, such as the Sierra Club and 
Wilderness society, were growing rapidly in terms of 
followers, lobbying dollars, and political power. 
The membership growth of the Sierra Club, alone, 
increased ten fold between 1945-65. Yet, for those 
connected with organizations such as the Sierra Club and 
Wilderness society, it was not enough just to fight for 
environmental protection. They were determined to have a 
say in park management and did so by lobbying Congress for 
new legislation affecting the parks. The environmentalists 
had earlier shown how much power they could wield in 
Congress during the Echo Park controversy. At the time, it 
proved to be greater than that of the Park Service, even 
though the agency later chose to ignore "the wishes of its 
preservationists supporters in carrying out Mission 66. 11 19 
In the sixties, however it appeared, environmentalist 
organizations were to be a force to be reckoned with in 
deciding park management policies. 
18Frome, The Battle for Wilderness, p.138. 
19Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.69. 
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one common concern shared by most of these environmental 
organizations was the rapid increase in park visitation. 
While the country's population increased 9.4 percent between 
1960-1969, visits to the national park system increased 
ninety percent during the same time period.20 If parks were 
to remain great wilderness areas, it was clear park success 
could no longer be counted in terms of numbers of visitors 
as it had been for the past forty-five years. The land 
simply could not support the numbers entering the parks. 
Moreover, there was a recognized "saturation point beyond 
which the wilderness experience' was no longer possible."21 
While there was no consensus what this maximum carrying 
capacity for the parks was, most were sure it was eminent 
and called for more prudent wilderness management. 
The public raised such an outcry in the 1960's that the 
Park Service had no choice but to reevaluate their 
traditional park management practices. No longer would the 
progressive vision Mather had for the parks be acceptable to 
the public. something new was needed as all the park's 
traditional sources of support began to fall away. The 
momentum as it was, lay with the environmental organizations 
20Hartzog, "Over the Years with the National Park 
Service", National Parks, p.14. 
21Ed., "Some Thought on Future Park Policy", National 
Parks Magazine, November, 1966, p.20. 
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such as the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society. And 
they had lost faith in the idea that preservation 
accompanied progress. 
The Wilderness Act 
The first showdown between the Park service and 
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environmental organizations in the sixties came as a result 
of a proposed wilderness bill. This bill, under study in 
Congress since 1957, was designed to give "an unprecedented 
degree of protection to wild country."22 While the Park 
Service, Forest service, and Bureau of Land Management all 
provided for the construction of roads and accommodations on 
their property, the proposed wilderness bill would ensure 
that there would be some land left as much as possible in 
its natural state. 
The idea for such a wilderness bill came about in the 
mid-1950's. At that time, it was noted by scientist James 
P. Gilligan, that "wilderness in America was doomed to 
extinction under the prevailing conditions and that 
prevailing conditions could not be altered unless 
preservation interests formed a united front in support of 
some positive program of wilderness preservation."23 The 
Sierra club picked up on this and proposed "a national 
22Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.221. 
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wilderness preservation system based on legislation to be 
drafted through the cooperation of federal land-management 
agencies and conservation organizations."24 The 
organizations that actually drafted the bill, however, were 
the Citizens committee on Natural Resources, the council of 
Conservationists, the Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club, 
the National Wildlife Federation, the National Parks 
Association, and the Wildlife Management Institute along 
with the aid of others. 
As it was proposed by Senator Hubert Humphrey on June 
7, 1956, the initial legislation listed eighty areas in the 
national forests, forty-eight in national parks and 
monuments, twenty in national wildlife refuges, and fifteen 
on Indian reservations that would comprise the wilderness 
system. Its intent was "to secure for the American people 
the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness."25 The 
need for it lay in the fact that many people, including 
environmental organizations wanted a greater assurance that 
there would be land that was not developed. 
It quickly emerged that the federal land agencies were 
opposed to any such wilderness preservation system. The 
Park Service opposed the idea of a congressionally-mandated 
24Frome, Battle for the Wilderness, p.138. 
25Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.220. 
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wilderness system on federal land as it would limit their 
authority over park lands. After all, according to their 
enabling legislation, they were designated the supreme 
federal preservation agency. Wirth also "questioned the 
appropriateness of many Indian and wildlife refugee lands 
for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation 
System."26 
But the environmentalists organizations were adamant 
that there was a need for designated wilderness areas. 
104 
Historically, land management policies in "national forests 
had been only an administrative decision subject to change 
at any time by Forest Service personnel. Even the laws 
creating the national parks and monuments deliberately left 
the way open for the construction of roads and tourist 
accommodations.''27 The Park service management philosophy 
at the time could not prove that there were indeed tracts of 
land that were totally safe from any future development. 
They were still of the mindset that land could have 
multiple uses. Land, as Wirth saw it, could be both used 
and preserved for future generations. 
The debate over the wilderness bill droned on into 
1964. one reason for its delay was the defensive front 
26Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, 
p.110. 




against any such legislation being led by logging 
industries, oil, grazing, mining interests, professional 
foresters, and other developers. But finally a ground swell 
of grassroots support lead by the popular environmental 
movement secured the legislation. on April 10, 1963 the 
wilderness bill passed in the Senate 73 to 12. It was 
later approved in a different form in the House, differences 
were reconciled, and it was signed into law September 3, 
1964.28 
The passage of the wilderness bill proved that the 
forces of the popular environmental movement were not to be 
easily dealt with in the 60's. Momentum was definitely in 
their direction. 
The Leopold Report 
At the same time the Wilderness Act was ratified, 
Staker Leopold, son of Aldo Leopold, and other 
environmentalists made public a government report detailing 
how parks should be managed. Written on the request of 
Secretary of the Interior Udall, the Leopold Committee 
concluded that national parks ideally should "represent a 
vignette of primitive America."29 The committee recognized 
28Frome, The Battle for the Wilderness, p.140. 
29The Leopold committee Report, "Wildlife Management in 
the National Parks", as reprinted in American Forests, 
April, 1963, p.33. 
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that most were not complete ecosystems, but they recommended 
"as a primary goal ... that the biotic associations within 
each park be maintained ... as nearly as possible in the 
condition that prevailed when the area was first visited by 
white man. 11 30 
It was a radical idea for national parks, which for the 
most part, had virtually no wildlife management policies 
based on science at all. Yet, the Leopold Report recognized 
too, at the time, they did not have all the necessary 
"ecological skills 11 to carry out such a plan. Not enough 
was known about the original state of parklands as most had 
been developed prior to being set aside. Thus, the Leopold 
committee recommended that "a greatly expanded research 
program ... be developed by the Park service itself ... Both 
research and the application of management methods should be 
in the hands of skilled park personnel. 11 31 The first 
priority of the Park service, they argued, should be 
historical research. 
Environmental groups lauded the idea. In their 
recommendations, the Leopold committee "did not yield to 
western pressures to open our parks to public hunting" in an 
30The Leopold Report, "Wildlife Management in the 
National Parks", p.33. 
31Ibid. 
l _____________ _ 
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effort to keep the wildlife populations under control.32 
Rather, it made them "proud to be identified with 
conservation" as it seemed to be a definitive step in 
solving the wildlife management problems plaguing the larger 
parks.33 The Park Service was less certain. District 
rangers in both Yellowstone and the Grand canyon who had 
been artificially controlling ungulate populations for 
years, had their doubts that a complete ecosystem could be 
recreated. secretary Udall, as well, "was reluctant to 
accept the committee's findings."34 Yet, as Starker Leopold 
recalled, "the environmental community received it so 
enthusiastically, that Udall changed his mind."35 On May 
23, 1963, secretary Udall ordered the service to "take such 
steps as are appropriate to incorporate this philosophy and 
the basic findings into the administration of the National 
Park Service."36 
Congress and the Parks 
The shifting balance of power in park management in the 
32Ed., "Leopold Committee Report", American Forests, 
April, 1963, p.11. 
33Ed., "leopold committee Report", American Forests, 
April, 1963, p.11. 





1960's cannot entirely be credited to the rising 
environmental groups or secretary Udall. A third key player 
was Congress. 
In the 1960's, Congress began a move to "gain some 
control over their expanding workloads and over the 
increasing fragmentary nature of their work."37 They 
accomplished this by expanding congressional staffs, 
improving the Congressional Research service, and expanding 
the responsibilities of the General Accounting Office. This 
move was to have a significant impact on the autonomy of the 
Park Service. 
Prior to the 1960's, the Park service was one of many 
agencies that operated with little congressional control or 
oversight, primarily because Congress did not have the 
resources and the Park service was a small agency and 
relatively non-controversial. With the increase in human 
resources in the 1960's, however, Congress was able to play 
a greater role in bureaucratic oversight and consequently 
was in a better position to monitor federal agencies, 
including the Park Service. Congressional oversight 
"heightened expectations and Congress came to expect more 
37Michael J. Malbin, "Delegation, Deliberation, and the 
New Role of congressional staff" as cited in ed. Thomas E. 
Hann, The New congress, (Washington: American Enterprise for 




control over the federal bureaucracy."38 The Park service 
was no exception. 
In the 1960's "Congress increased its sway over the 
Park System, (and) the environmental groups in turn 
increased their influence over Congress."39 Thus, 
environmental groups exhibited even more political clout as 
they exerted their force both on the Park service and 
Congress. Park policy making in the sixties became public 
decision-making to be made by very powerful environmental 
and Congressional groups as well as federal land agencies. 
In his book, Parks, Politics, and the People, Wirth 
provides a great deal of insight into NPS/Congressional 
relations during the sixties. Of special interest, he 
notes, was the strength of the House committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, led by congressman Wayne N. Aspinall 
(D-CO) from 1959-72. As he stated, 
The record of the committee during that period is 
outstanding from a Park service point of view. I don't 
recall a park bill reported out of committee that ever 
failed to pass once it was called up in the House for 
consideration.40 
The number of NFS-related bills corning out of Aspinall's 
38Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.75. 
39Ibid., p.76. 
40Conrad Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 
(Norman: university of Oklahoma Press, 1980) p.324. 
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committee was impressive. Many of these bills to be passed 
into law enlarged the park system and defined policy and 
administrative matters. While many bills increasing the 
park system were passed after Wirth's retirement, arguably 
Wirth notes, ''the big influx of proposed legislation to add 
new parks to the system result(ed) from studies made during 
Mission 66."41 
This committee work was encouraging to NPS who had 
suffered since W.W.II when Congress "seemingly lost interest 
in the park system."42 The additions to the park system 
gave it the vote of confidence it needed. But it is 
important to note that the NPS legislation coming out of 
Congress was not entirely preservation oriented. A classic 
example of alternative legislation affecting the parks was 
The concessions Act. 
The Concessions Act 
At the same time that the Park Service was trying to 
diffuse what the Wilderness Act and the Leopold Report meant 
for the parks, the concessions Act was passed by congress. 
It was a seeming antithesis to both the Wilderness Act and 
the Leopold Report. While the Wilderness Act and the 
Leopold Report stressed keeping things in their natural 
41Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, p.335. 
42Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.200. 
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state, the Concessions Act made it more feasible for 
concessionaires to build facilities and provide services to 
visitors. It was in fitting with the age of the Great 
Society and the New Frontier's emphasis on recreation. 
After all, how can one recreate without the aid of 
recreation facilities? Albeit, the mission of the Park 
Service, it seemed, was again lost in the desires of outside 
interests. 
The Concessions Policy Act of 1965 was designed to 
refine National Park service policies toward concessionaires 
to make it easier for them to survive in a seasonal 
operation. Even with the hoards of tourists visiting the 
national parks, concessionaires were having a difficult time 
realizing a profit because of the NPS regulations. 
The regulations as they had evolved since Mather's time 
had changed very little. Under the NPS organic act, the 
Park service was permitted "to enter into contracts with 
'responsible' persons or_ firms for up to thirty years, 
without having to advertise or accept competitive bids for 
projects."43 concessionaires continued to act as "regulated 
monopolies" in the parks, however, they never owned the land 
nor did they have legal title to their buildings.44 While 
43Dyan zaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce", 
Wilderness, Spring, 1983, p.29. 
44Ibid., p.28. 
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there were informal agreements made between the Park service 
and the concessioner in many cases, even so, this system 
gave a "great deal of discretion to" the Park service.45 
The Concessions Policy Act, evolving from a congressional 
review of the concession situation, set about to amend the 
discrepancies. 
The Concessions Policy Act "recognized the existence of 
concessionaires and stated that their operations were proper 
if their services were appropriate and necessary."46 But 
more importantly, it gave concessionaires "all incidents of 
ownership except legal title."47 This was accomplished by 
giving concessioner a "possessory interest" in the parks 
which provided them with "more control".48 As long as 
concessionaires met their part in the contact with the Park 
service, they had the right to operate concession facilities 
in the park and this could not be taken away "without just 
compensation."49 The concessionaires also benefited under 
45Don Hummel, stealing the National Parks, (Bellview, 
Washington: The Free Enterprise Press, 1987) p.208. 
46Fred B. Eiseman, Jr., "Who Runs the Grand canyon?", 
Natural History, March, 1978, p.83. 
47Public Law 89-249, 89th congress, H.R. 2091, October 
9, 1965, "Relating to the Establishment o~ Concession . 
Policies in the Areas Administered by National Park Service 
and for Other Purposes". 
48Dyan zaslowsky, These American Lands, (New York: 
Henry, Holt, and co., 1986) p.51. 
49Hummel, stealing the National Parks, p.246. 
I 
the act as it guaranteed them a "preferential right' in 
renewing their contracts.50 This meant that the Park 
Service could not solicit or even consider any other 
concessionaires' offers until the existing concessioner 
decided not to renew the contract. 
The Park Service Response to the Wilderness Act, Leopold 
Report and concessions Act 
113 
As the SOth anniversary of the Park service came and 
went, the Park Service was painfully aware that they were no 
longer the same autonomous agency that they were when the 
Service was established.51 While the Park Service had 
realized a great deal of success in the first fifty years, 
whether it be measured in the millions of acres of park 
lands, millions of visitors, or millions of federal dollars, 
in their success, they lost some of their independence. 
This was all too apparent in the passage of the Wilderness 
and concessions Acts. It was also evident that the Park 
Service desperately needed a proactive plan for management 
that specifically spelled out its management objectives. As 
Edward Abbey noted in Desert Solitaire, "it is apparent that 
we cannot decide the question of development versus 
sozaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce", p.30. 
51Philip M. smith, "New Approaches to National Park 
Administration and Management", National Parks Magazine, 
February, 1968, p.14. 
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preservation by a simple referral to holy writ or an attempt 
to guess the intention of the founding fathers; we should 
make up our own minds and decide for ourselves what the 
national parks should be and what purpose they should 
serve."52 
The National Park Service responded to the Wilderness 
Act and the Concessions Act with little enthusiasm. Both 
laws clearly restricted their management options in certain 
areas. The Leopold Report, however, was to have the 
opposite effect on NPS. Both Secretary Udall and Director 
Hartzog were to use this highly publicized paper in the 
ensuing years to implement long overdue directives for 
change. In lieu of a well-accepted management plan 
emanating from NPS or the Interior Department, the Leopold 
Report would have to do. 
The Park Service Response to the Wilderness Act 
As designated by the Wilderness Act, the Secretary of 
the Interior was to review every roadless area in the 
national parks, national monuments, and wildlife refugee 
systems and make subsequent recommendations as to which were 
"suitable" for "wilderness" designation. These 
recommendations were to be sent to the President and then 
onto congress, who would make the final decision. The 
52Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire, p.55. 
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Secretary had ten years to complete his study of all lands 
included in the Park System.53 
Problems with this system were apparent right from the 
start. Neither the Park Service nor the secretary of the 
Interior was anxious to classify land as it undermined the 
purposes of the parks' Organic Acts as well as that of the 
NPS's. They wanted to be able "to reserve flexibility in 
respect to wilderness in the parks."54 Moreover, there was 
no consensus as to what classified as "suitable" land. 
While the restrictions on wilderness areas were explicit, 
the classification of "wilderness" had been left to NPS. 
NPS promptly set up a complex zoning classification system 
that provided them with a number of loopholes by which to 
avoid classifying land as "wilderness." 
The zoning system that the Park Service offered to the 
public came forth under the guise of the Master Plans for 
each park. As Hartzog described it in 1967, 
It has long been the practice of the National Park 
Service to prepare and m~intain a Master Plan to guide the 
use, development, interpretation, and preservation of each 
particular park. Graphics and narrative specify the 
objectives of management. These Master Plans in the true 
sense of the word are zoning plans. They not only define 
the areas for development, but also define the areas in 
53Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, 
p.148. 
54A.W.S., "Common sense on Park Protection", National 




which no developments are to be permitted.SS 
The main difference between the wilderness areas set aside 
under the Master Plans for the parks, however, and the 
wilderness areas that could be created under the Wilderness 
Act was: Park Service control. The Park service would 
always be in control of those areas they designated 
wilderness under their Master Plans. They would be free to 
change a particular area's classification if they cared to. 
The Wilderness Act would not afford them the same freedom. 
In the meantime, however, Secretary Udall and 
Director Hartzog did make two recommendations for 
"wilderness" tracts to be instated in craters of the Moon 
National Monument and Lassen Volcanic National Park. The 
combined acreage of both tracts of land was less than 
100,000 acres.56 Environmental groups were clearly 
disappointed. Some accused the Park service of "using the 
review process to set aside large tracts of land for park 
developments."57 In doing so, the parks would be able to 
accommodate more guests, win more supporters, who would in 
turn lobby Congress for more facilities in the parks. 
55Hummel, stealing the National Parks, p.249. 
56Ed. "Park Wilderness Hearings", National Parks 
Magazine, September, 1966, p.21. 





Later, three more tracts of land were recommended by 
the Secretary and Director to be included in the wilderness 
system: Petrified Forest, Pinnacles, and Lava Beds.58 Yet, 
the real battle over the Wilderness Act emerged in the Great 
Smoky Mountains National Park. There, as part of the NPS 
Master Plan for the area, the Park service desired to build 
a major road running in between the mountains and connecting 
many of the remote mountain areas. Director Hartzog argued 
the road would provide better access to wilderness threshold 
areas. As Hartzog stated, "the only facilities planned in 
these natural-environment lands are the minimum required for 
public enjoyment, health, safety, preservation, and 
protection of the features, such as one-way motor nature 
trails, small overlooks, informal picnic sites, short nature 
walks, and wilderness-type uses."59 To Wilderness Act 
advocates, this proposal was in direct violation of the NPS 
commitment of preservation. As Anthony Wayne Smith, 
President of the National Parks and Conservation Association 
stated, "the actual purpose of the so-called wilderness 
thresholds, whether acknowledged or not, is really to 
reserve such areas for road, parking lot, and facility 
58A.W.S., "Common sense on Park Protection", National 
Parks Magazine, September, 1968, p.2. 




development in the future."60 
In June of 1969, one hundred prominent 
environmentalists met with Interior secretary Hickel and 
requested that the road proposal be abandoned. Hickel 
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instead offered an alternative roadway, one which still 
included visitor services, but instead it skirted along the 
edge of the park instead of through the middle of it.61 The 
Park Service eventually succeeded in their fight to build 
this new roadway in the Great Smoky Mountains. But in doing 
so, they were acutely aware of the power of the 
environmental groups against them and the force of 
legislation which threatened their autonomy. To combat 
this, the succeeding NPS Master Plans for the parks were 
prepared "behind closed doors."62 
The Impact of the Leopold Report 
Ironically, while the Wilderness Act proceeded to 
estrange the Park service even farther from the thinking of 
many environmentalists, the Leopold Report brought them 
closer together. The Park Service was quick to accept the 
60National Parks and Conservation Association, 
Preserving Wilderness in our National Parks, (Washington, 
o.c.: National Parks and conservation Association, 1971) p.xvi. 
61Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, 
p.149. 
62A.W.S., "Wilderness in the Parks", National Parks 





Leopold Report, not only because of the pressure brought on 
by the environmentalists, but because it provided the Park 
Service with an excuse to instigate change. The Park 
Service's approach to wildlife management had traditionally 
been less than scientific. By the sixties, NPS was 
realizing tremendous wildlife management problems, most 
notedly in Yellowstone National Park, and any move toward 
new solutions was welcomed. 
In 1968, Director Hartzog published the Green, Red, and 
Blue books which elaborated on new policies for the parks 
which corresponded with the management plans recommended by 
the Leopold Committee. Natural primitive parks were to be 
managed: 
... so as to conserve, perpetuate, and portray as a 
composite whole the indigenous aquatic and terrestrial fauna 
and flora and scenic landscape. Management will minimize, 
give direction to, or control those changes in the native 
environment and scenic landscape resulting from human 
influences or natural processes of ecological succession. 
Missing native life forms may be reestablished, where 
practicable. Native environmental complexes will be 
restored, protected, and maintained, where practicable, at 
levels determined through historical and ecological research 
of plant-animal relationships. Non-native species may not 
be introduced into natural areas. Where they have become 
established ... an appropriate management plan should be 
developed to control them.63 
Thus, the parks were to be returned to a "vinaigrette 
63National Park service, Administrative Policies for 
Natural Areas of the National Park System, (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968) p.17 as reprinted in 
Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.39. 
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of primitive America." And yet, while the Leopold committee 
recognized that parks were not complete ecosystems, Hartzog 
directed that they were to be managed as if they were. What 
is important, he stated, is "the concept of preservation of 
a total environment as compared with the protection of an 
individual feature or species."64 This policy, very similar 
to the one proposed by V.E. Shelford in the 1930's, came to 
be dubbed as "ecosystems management." 
For parks, such as Yellowstone, ecosystems management 
was to have a profound effect on their policies towards 
regulating wildlife. While park management had evolved from 
a period of non-management (1872-1930) to a period of active 
management (1930-1968), it seemed as if non-management, 
under the guise of scientific ecology, was in vogue again.· 
As discussed earlier, Yellowstone NPS officials had 
been artificially controlling the northern range elk herd by 
shooting a number of them annually since the 1930's. 
Artificial control seeme~ the best way to avoid an ungulate 
population irruption seeing as the park itself was not a 
complete ecosystem. However, in 1960, the NPS elk shootings 
were publicized on television. Environmentalists were so 
outra~ed that they brought the issue before Congress. In 
Senate Hearings in 1967, there was a great deal of 
64Ibid. I p.40. 
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controversy "over just what elk management in Yellowstone 
was expected to accomplish."65 
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The elk controversy put the NPS in a catch-22 position 
in the late 1960's. Park biologists firmly believed there 
were too many elk for the land to support, yet, public 
outrage over the elk shoots was costing them public support. 
Fortunately, Hartzog and his new "Leopold" management 
directives were being issued at this time. The NPS 
interpreted these new policies to mean that parks could be 
left alone to manage themselves, although the Leopold 
Committee specifically commended the elk shooting in the 
park as an appropriate means of control. Regardless a new 
experiment was begun in Yellowstone: that of natural 
regulation. The elk populations, park scientists argued, 
would take care of themselves. Even though the elk no 
longer had any natural predators in Yellowstone, save for 
the grizzly bear, the elk populations, nevertheless, would 
naturally stabilize. 
In other parks, mainly McKinley in Alaska And Isle 
Royale in Lake Superior, the new "ecosystems management" 
policy had a much better chance of success. In these parks, 
lack of NPS staff had, in effect, put natural regulation in 
65Don Despain, Douglas Houston, Mary Meager, Paul 
Schullery, Wildlife in Transition, (Boulder: Robert 
Rinehart, Inc., 1986) p.25. 
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practice a long time ago. Populations of predators and prey 
appeared to live in balance and "by these two populations 
being together the vegetation habitat is conserved."66 In 
Yellowstone, the overgrazing of range land had shown that no 
"biotic whole" existed as such. 
The Impact of the Concessions Act 
The changes in the law governing park concessions made 
concessions very appealing to corporations. Almost 
overnight, small family operations ... were bought out by 
conglomerates."67 These were corporations who were often 
running operations in several parks while concessions were 
only a small part of their business.68 
The new conglomerates quickly expanded concession 
operations in order to accommodate the ever increasing 
numbers of tourists in the parks. But as they invested 
millions of dollars in concession operations, they also 
endeavored to ensure that their investment would be 
protected. corporate concessions began to exert a much 
greater voice in park management than their predecessors 
had. The Concessions Policy Act of 1965 protected their 
66F. Fraser Darling and Noel D. Eichhorn, "Man and 
Nature in the National Parks: Reflections on Policy", 
National Parks Magazine, p.20. 
67Zaslowsky, These American Lands, p.41. 
Jr. I "Who Runs the Grand canyon?", 68Fred B. Eiseman, 
Natural History, March, 1978, p.83. 
right to do so. 
conclusion 
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By the close of the 1960's, numerous pieces of 
legislation impacting on park management had been 
ratified.69 Clearly, Congress was exerting its influence on 
park management as was Secretary Udall and the 
environmentalists. Conservation was politically popular in 
the New Frontier and Great Societies. NPS and the parks 
were also affected, however, by the nationwide 
environmental movement coming to fruition in the early 
1960's. 
Under the mandates of the new legislation, the new 
public interest in the parks, and the administration of 
Secretary Udall, it was clear that the Park Service would 
never enjoy the same degree of autonomy as it had prior to 
the beginning of the decade. Hartzog had tried to restore 
some of the autonomy to the parks by shifting much of the 
park management decision~making down to the individual park 
level. He had also moved to lessen the public response to 
park Master Plans as a reactionary measure. But neither 
plan of action restored the Park Service's autonomy that 
they had lost. 
Hartzog and the Park service were fortunate in the 
69Hummel, stealing the National Parks, p.248. 
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1960's, however to have the support of the secretary of the 
Interior and his staff in their congressional battles. 
Secretary Udall was very much concerned with the parks and 
worked closely with Hartzog on park policies. While the 
Park Service was unenthusiastic about the new laws as they 
dictated to some extent future park management directives, 
nevertheless, they were not out of line with the policy 
directives that the Park Service had created and 
implemented themselves. 
L_ __ . ____ _ 
Chapter IV 
Congressional influence over the federal bureaucracy 
was expanded between 1960-1980 generally as a result of 
burgeoning congressional staffs accompanied by the support 
of an enlarged congressional Research Off ice and General 
Accounting Office. Congressional control over the Park 
Service was to be enlarged by two additional factors as 
well. The first was "the reluctance of recent Presidents to 
make use of the 1906 Antiquities Act".1 Without 
Presidential initiative, the Park service became reliant on 
laws enacted by congress for expansions and improvements. 
secondly, the low priority of NPS in Nixon's administration 
agenda transferred much initiative to congress. Fortunately 
for the national parks and the National Park service, there 
was an NPS Director in place who was willing and able to 
take a stand in congress. 
Director George Hartzog and congress 
From the time he was appointed as Director in 1964, 
George Hartzog made it a practice to make "courtesy calls'' 
to all key congressional members.2 He was very much aware 
lForesta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.75. 
2George Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, 
(New York: Moyer Bell Limited, 1988) p.118. 
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of the power Congress held over the Park service. Thus, he 
made it a point to know the people that held the authority 
to preserve the parks. In addition to personal visits, 
Hartzog also led tours of the nearby parks for congressional 
members which he used as an opportunity to discuss park 
policies. Hartzog made sure all members of Congress had 
reason to take note of these discussions. He made it clear 
that the establishment of parks represented tangible 
benefits to constituents. congress duly reacted to his 
sage advice. With the establishment of the National 
Wilderness Preservation system (1964), the National Trails 
System (1968), the Historic Preservation System (1966), and 
the Wild and scenic Rivers System (1968) there was an NPS 
administered tract of land in every congressional district.3 
Pork barrel parks had come of age. 
Director Hartzog and President Nixon 
While Hartzog had become a popular and well respected 
figurehead within the NPS and on the Hill by the 1970's, he 
was not popular with President Nixon. When rumors leaked 
from the White House in 1969 that Hartzog would be replaced, 
"congressmen and senators heated up in sufficient numbers to 
evaporate the rumor."4 Hartzog, nevertheless, only remained 
3Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.138. 
4John McPhee, "Profiles--George Hartzog", The New 
Yorker, September 11, 1971, p.42. 
a part of the Nixon Administration until 1972. Upon the 
reelection of President Nixon in 1971, Hartzog was fired. 
some park critics argue that NPS lost control of the Park 
service with his dismissal. 
Nixon replaced Hartzog with Ronald Walker, "a White 
House staff aide who knew nothing about either agency 
administration or national parks."5 Totally "unfamiliar 
with park operations, Walker's appointment dismayed the 
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career employees, loyal park service alumni and the citizen 
conservation organizations."6 As a result of walker's 
inexperience, secretary Rogers Morton asked Assistant 
Secretary Nathanial Reed to oversee NPS matters. Reed 
instead wound up running the Park service. Fortunately, for 
the parks and NPS, Reed "was an environmentalist and he took 
a personal hand in ensuring that the agency managed the Park 
system in accord with the Wilderness Act and the National 
Environmental Policy Act."7 His actions "did not 
significantly disrupt park policy or operations."8 
While Reed managed the parks in an ecologically 
5Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.85. 
6Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.263. 
?Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.85. 
8Robert and Patricia Cahn, "Disputed Territory", 
National Parks, p.30. 
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sensitive manner, it was clear that the NPS was not in 
control of itself. Even after Director Morton resigned in 
January 1975 and was replaced by a well-liked NPS careerman, 
Gary Everhardt, the power of the director was not restored. 
Reed continued to "dabble in day-to-day operational 
management" while his assistant became the associate 
director for National Park service legislation.9 
The Interior Department was not the only usurper of NPS 
control, however, during the early seventies. A second 
major influence on the Park service was the revived Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB). Nixon's OMB gave him and 
later presidents a cadre of loyal men who had the ability to 
control agency budgets. consequently, the OMB was able to 
control agency policies. OMB also permitted the President 
and staff to play a greater role in park management. 
OMB and NPS 
From its inception, OMB argued that the Park Service's 
problems "could be solve.a through greater management 
efficiency. 11 10 This translated into a "no-growth policy11 
for the Park service.11 As OMB Associate Budget Director 
9Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.264. 
lO"Anecdotes & Alibis & OMB", National Parks and 
Conservation Magazine, June, 1976, p.19. 
ll"Closing the Door on the National Parks'', National 
Parks and conservation Magazine, January, 1975, p.23. 
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James L. Mitchell noted, "park superintendents almost always 
want more personnel and funds ... They will just have to do 
the best job they can with what they get."12 
In 1963, Glacier National Park in Montana had 72 
permanent personnel and 261 seasonals to help the 800,000 
annual visitors. By 1975, Glacier had only 56 permanent 
personnel and 273 seasonals to cope with 1.6 million annual 
visitors. This was the scenario in many of the "crowned 
jewels." While total national park visitation increased by 
27 percent between 1971-1975, there was no significant 
increase in park personnel. congress "had authorized an 
increase in permanent staff positions totaling seven 
percent, from 7,925 to 8,491, but the Service never 
~eceived these increases."13 on March 1, 1974, the Park 
Service summarized its situation: 
As the service continues to spread manpower over 
;;rreater numbers of areas ... maintenance, resource 
nanagement, safety, and visitor services are not being 
:onducted at prescribed standards.14 
~oads deteriorated in the parks along with visitor services. 
\s Representative William Moorhead noted, "I can find no 
12Mary Alice Kellogg, "The Shame of the National 
?arks", Newsweek, May 10, 1976, p.70. 
13"The crises in National Park Personnel", National 
)arks and conservation Magazine, April, 1975, p.20. 
14"The crises in National Park Personnel", p.20. 
L_ 
other phrase to better describe the OMB's attitude toward 
the existing conditions in the parks than that of 
'thoughtless neglect'."15 
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During the same time period, NPS properties increased 
seven percent. Congress was clearly much more receptive to 
the idea of aiding and expanding the system than was the 
OMB. Pork barrel parks that were created included urban 
parks in New York and San Francisco in addition to Big 
Thicket National Preserve in Texas and Big Cypress National 
Preserve in Florida. These tracts were definitely not on 
the scale of the "crowned jewels" of the system, but they 
were important nevertheless. 
The leader on national park matters in the 95th 
Congress was Representative Philip Burton, Chairman of the 
House subcommittee on conservation, Energy, and Natural 
Resources. Burton realized that a healthy environment was 
indicative of a healthy society. Yet, Burton was "also an 
astute politician who realized that parks, because of their 
distributive value, were good bargaining chips and that 
therefore his subcommittee had control of a powerful 
political currency."16 under Burton, the subcommittee made 
a vigilant search for new park additions. In their efforts 
15Mary Alice Kellogg, "The Shame of the Parks", p.70. 
16Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.eo. 
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to acquire more additions, they convinced congress in 1976 
to pass legislation that established the "park-of-the-month 
club."17 This legislation ensured that the subcommittee had 
a continuous list of park proposals for the committee to act 
on. 
While congress took an interest in the parks in the 
early seventies, the Nixon and Ford administrations did not. 
Their arguments against the Park service had a basic 
reoccurring theme: "the need for decentralization of 
government, complex management and acquisition problems, 
emphasis on state, local, and private efforts; and the 
scarcity of federal dollars."18 The Park service had been 
hopeful that President Ford would take more of an interest 
in the parks as he had been a former ranger in Yellowstone 
National Park, but that did not prove to be the case. Only 
during his election campaign in 1975 did he visit the park 
and promise $2.5 billion for the parks.19 Unfortunately, 
his last minute efforts were viewed as campaign rhetoric. 
Many asked, "why hasn't he done it before?"20 
Pressing Issues for NPS 
17Ibid., p.81. 
18"Closing the Door on the National Parks", p.23. 
19Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.264. 
20James A. craig, "A Bully Pit", American Forests, 




While personnel shortages and funding problems plagued 
NPS continuously, there were two looming NPS issues that 
begged to be resolved during the seventies. The first issue 
was concessioner control in the parks. While the 
Concessions Act of 1965 had established ground rules for 
concession operations, it also created new problems. The 
second issue was the fate of the wild, mineral rich Alaskan 
public lands. 
Concession Control of the Parks 
As a result of the Concessions Act of 1965, many family 
run concession operations in the parks were bought out by 
large corporations as the law made it advantages for them to 
do so. For many of these large corporations, "business 
goals of seeking the maximum profit ... penetrated the 
National Park service planning process and ... led to the 
promotion of national parks as amusement parks rather than 
areas to be preserved."21 For example, in the early 1970's, 
the Park Service desire~ to phase out overnight lodging 
facilities in Zion and Bryce National Parks. Being 
relatively small parks, the Park Service felt it would be 
more environmentally advantageous to return the land to its 
natural state. However, the concessioner, TWA, publicly 
fought this plan and eventually won out. In a report issued 
2l"Corngress Blasts NPS", National Parks and 
Conservation Magazine, p.25. 
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by Congress in 1976, the subcommittee on conservation, 
Energy, and Natural Resources found that concessionaires had 
"a disproportionate degree of influence in relation to the 
general public in the preparation of Master plans for the 
national parks."22 
To combat concessioner control of the parks, congress 
released a report calling for reform of NPS policies 
relating to concessionaires. NPS argued however, that they 
were powerless to act due to staffing shortages and 
inadequate funding. As was noted, there were 300 
concessionaires operating in the parks while the NPS staff 
overseeing their operations consisted of thirty people.23 
At the same time, however, OMB ordered the Director to 
abolish "all authorized permanent NPS positions that were 
unfilled as of December 31, 1975."24 The problem of 
concessioner control remained unresolved. 
The Alaska Lands Issue 
The second issue facing NPS was the Alaska lands issue. 
NPS had proposed that certain tracts of land in Alaska be 
set aside as national parks and monuments in compliance with 
22Ibid. 
23Ibid. 
24"Another OMB Budget Trick", National Parks and 
Conservation Magazine, May, 1976, p.26. 
L__ 
134 
the Alaska Claims Settlement Act of 1971.25 But these lands 
were also rich in minerals and oil. As a specialist with 
the Interior Department noted, these lands have "very high 
scenic value, very high mineral value--classic war."26 
The Alaska Claims Settlement Act of 1971 gave land and 
federal funds to native Alaskans. It also gave the Interior 
Secretary the option to withdraw all Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) lands for study and possible 
reclassification. The Secretary could classify these lands 
as national parks or monuments, national wildlife refuges, 
scenic rivers, or national forests. Within "five years of 
the Secretary's recommendations, Congress was directed to 
establish the areas directly and set their boundaries."27 
In December, 1973, Secretary Rogers Morton recommended that 
83 million acres be set aside and reclassified. By 1976, 
Congress had not taken any action while more mining claims 
were being staked on these lands.28 
Environmental groups_ took on the challenge of securing 
the Alaska lands, arguing they were "America's Last 
25"Closing the Door on the National Parks", National 
Parks and Conservation Magazine, January, 1975, p.24. 
26"The Alaska Lands Issue: Our Last Frontier", 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1977, p.671. 
27"The Alaska Lands Issue: Our Last Frontier", p.671. 
28"The Mining of America's National Parks", National 
Parks and conservation Magazine, January, 1976, p.20. 
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Frontier".29 They submitted their own requests for land 
acquisitions in Alaska; acquisition requests that were far 
greater than either the Administration or the Department of 
the Interior had expected. Securing Alaska's lands was to 
be their primary mission in the late 1970's. 
Considering the problems facing the parks by 1976, one 
would wonder why the public did not respond with more force. 
After all, the environmental movement begun in the 1960's 
was alive and well in the 1970's. Richard Sellers, a 
National Park Service historian, argues the general public 
did not respond because they did not comprehend the 
ramifications of these issues. As he notes, 
Despite the environmental movement of the 1960's and 
1970's, facade management based largely on aesthetic 
conditions is still acceptable to many people. Pretty 
scenery creates an impression of biological health and 
provides such overwhelming satisfaction that the general 
public gives little more than cursory consideration to ... 
greater ecological complexes. Few visitors can recognize 
when certain animal populations are too great or too 
small ... And even when human-caused ecological damage is 
explained ... , the new conditions are often accepted as 
simply 'another change in.scenery. '30 
The carter Years 
When James Earl Carter, an acknowledged 
environmentalist, succeeded Ford in 1977, many believed the 
29"Half of Park System unprotected until Congress acts 
on Alaska", National Parks, February, 1980, p.24. 
30Richard West sellers, "Not Just Another Pretty 
Facade", The Washington Post, April 9, 1989. 
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Park service would regain its independence and self respect. 
However, even under this new leadership, NPS was unable to 
regain control. The Interior Department and Congress 
continued to extended a heavy hand in management. 
Under Carter, Robert Herbst became the new Assistant 
Secretary in charge of the national parks. Like Reed, 
Herbst was an environmentalist and committed to 
conservation. Like Reed, Herbst, worked under a Secretary, 
Cecil Andrus, who was also an environmentalist but did not 
have time to delve into park affairs. Herbst, like Reed, 
was also interested in running the parks. As one insider 
noted, 11 Reed ran the Park Service with Walker as director 
and when Herbst came in he saw this and decided to do the 
same."31 
Director Gary E. Everhardt, who had replaced Walker at 
his retirement as Director in 1975, was replaced by William 
Whalen in 1977. Whalen, a young career NPS administrator, 
lacked agency confidence .. This lack of support for the new 
Director allowed Assistant Secretary Herbst to run the show 
with Whalen concentrating on day to day management. It was 
Herbst who introduced park policies and implemented them 
with help from friends in Congress. 
Assistant secretary Herbst worked closely with 
31Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p.86. 
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Representative Burton on park legislation. Like Burton, 
"and most of the other leaders of the environmental 
movement, his views of the Park System were expansionist; he 
took a broad view of the types of units which should be 
included in it and he was little concerned with conventional 
national park standards."32 Herbst was not concerned that 
national park appropriations were not keeping pace with NPS 
acquisitions. Rather, he argued, "as new park 
authorizations built a large enough demand for 
appropriations in the House, the problem would take care of 
itself .33 
Assistant Secretary Herbst worked closely with 
Representative Burton and their efforts paid off. on 
October 12, 1978, the largest park bill in history was 
passed, providing for more that 100 parks and preservation 
projects in 44 states.34 While it authorized many 
ecologically important park expansions, the legislation was 
dubbed the "park barrel bill" because it impacted so many 
states. As Senator Robert Dole noted, "is there any state 
other than Kansas that did not end up with a park?"35 
32Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, 
p. 86. 
33Ibid., p.86. 
34"0mnibus Parks Bill", congressional Quarterly 
Almanac, 1978, p.704. 
35"0mnibus Parks Bill", p.705. 
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However, no one would dub the 95th Congress the 
Environmental Congress. It "sustained the President's veto 
of ... (a) ... pork-barrel public works appropriation bill 
with its environmentally damaging water project ... (and) ... 
it failed to act on the Alaska lands measure."36 
Resolution of the Alaska Lands Issue 
When the 95th Congress failed to take action on the 
Alaska lands issue, President carter took the initiative in 
December of 1978 and declared seventeen national monuments 
in the state. The action gave many of the debated Alaskan 
wilderness areas federal protection. But carter's action 
was only intended to force Congress to act on the issue. 
The imposed national monument status was "a temporary 
stopgap insurance so that Congress--instead of development 
interests --could decide their fate."37 
It was the first time a President ever used the powers 
granted to him under the National Monument Act for this 
purpose. 
After a long and bitter fight between environmentalists 
and developers, on November 12, 1980 Congress agreed to 
36Kathy Barton, "Parks and Wilderness", Environment, 
November, 1978, p.37. 
37"Half of Park system unprotected until Congress acts 
on Alaska", p.24. 
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restrict development on 104.3 million acres in Alaska.38 Of 
that acreage, 43.6 million acres were set aside as national 
parks. 
This one piece of legislation alone increased the NPS 
land holdings by one third. For the Park service, the real 
challenge came after the legislation had been passed. As 
NPS Regional Director John E. Cook noted, in Alaska, 
There'll be more acres per ranger ... than this agency 
has ever known before, and those will contain some of the 
most sensitive natural systems on earth. Add to this the 
management of mining claims, long-standing subsistence 
activities--and visitors already showing up--and we have a 
challenge that calls for the most dedicated and able field 
staff, and a support system that won't let them down.39 
To provide for the additional staff and funding necessary to 
keep the enlarged Park service operating, congress passed 
the largest ever appropriation package for NPS. While the 
congressional appropriation was less than the Carter 
administration had recommended, the Service nevertheless 
received $468.5 million to administer the 323 units in the 
national park system.40 
Concessionaires' Role in Park Management 
38"Congress Clears Alaska Lands Legislation", 
congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1980, p.575. 
39Joan E. Gidlund, "Challenges for Alaska's New 
Parklands", National Parks in Crises, (Washington, D.C.: 
National Parks and conservation Inc., 1982) p.141. 
40"Interior Appropriations Cleared by Congress", 
congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1980, p.179. 
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While the Alaska Lands Issue was resolved by 1980, the 
problem of concessions in the parks had not. This problem 
had primarily not been resolved as a result of the 
tremendous influence the large conglomerate concessionaires 
had on the Park Service. Yet, by 1980, the issue had come 
to a head in America's first national park, Yellowstone. It 
was a classic case illustrating the power of the 
concessioner under the Concessioner Act of 1965. 
Concessions Management in Yellowstone 
Under the 1965 Concessions Act, the General Host 
Corporation's possessory interest in Yellowstone gave them 
''All incidents of ownership except legal title."41 General 
Host agreed to maintain the buildings in a manner in which 
they saw fit. The Park Service was responsible to pay for 
any additional physical improvements they desired. 
Under this contract, General Host was able "to provide 
and operate facilities and services which he deems desirable 
for the accommodation of visitors" in compliance with Park 
Service regulations.42 The government would receive a 
percentage of concessioner's profits paid as a franchise fee 
for the privilege of operating in the park. Any fees 
41Public Law 89-249, 89th Congress, H.R. 2091, October 
9, 1965, "Relating to the Establishment of Concessions 
Policies in the Areas Administered by National Park Service 




collected from the concessioner were deposited in the united 
states Treasury. 
General Host moved to successfully operate concessions 
in Yellowstone for a number of years. Albeit, over time 
their service to visitors began to lapse and by 1978, "the 
situation was too dismal to ignore any longer."43 General 
Host could no longer keep all hotel and dining facilities 
open because they could not entice people to work for them. 
Losses forced them to announce they would not "invest ... in 
the refurbishment of the buildings because it could not be 
guaranteed an adequate return."44 The Park Service 
consequently decided to evict their management prior to the 
expiration of their contract. They received permission to 
do so on November 10, 1978, under the omnibus Parks Act.45 
Under the conditions of the Concessions Act of 1965, 
the Park service was forced to buy General Host out of its 
possessory interest in the park. While the company had 
failed to "comply with certain capital expenditure 
requirements", the possessory interest made it very 
p. 27. 
43Zaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce", p.30. 
44Zaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce", p.30. 
45"0mnibus Parks Act", National Parks, January, 1979, 
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difficult to remove them.46 After what prove to be a "long 
and expensive battle", the Park service regained control of 
the concessions in Yellowstone in 1981 at a cost of $19 
million.47 
The battle with General Host made it clear to the Park 
service that reform was desperately needed in the area of 
concessioner management. The service was certain to 
approach future contracts with trepidation. Yet, because of 
all the long-term contracts the Park Service held with park 
concessionaires, reform would not take place overnight. 
Hearings were led in Congress, but no imminent solution 
appeared. 
The Shift in control 
By 1980, the Park system made some major strides in the 
areas of land acquisition and funding during the late 
seventies. But while NPS gained in trusts, it lost in 
independence. This loss of independence occurred primarily 
as a result of the rising power of Congress in tandem with 
high-level Interior Department officials using "their 
prerogative to influence park management."48 This influence 
46"General Hosts Loses Yellowstone Park", New York 
Times, April 26, 1980, p.6. 
47"Yellowstone Plans Gives New Powers to Concessioner", 
National Parks, September/October 1981, p.32. 
48Cahn, "Disputed Territory", p.30 
could have been extremely detrimental for the parks' 
ecological health and the public's enjoyment. But 
fortunately for both, park policy continued to be 
environmentally sensitive as Assistant Secretaries Reed, 
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Herbst, and Representative Burton recognized that time was 
not on the side of the environment. 
In May of 1980, Director Whalen was fired. secretary 
Andrus stated he was dismissed because of "serious morale 
and management problems in the service and because of Mr. 
Whalen's poor health."49 He was the fourth Director to be 
fired within a span of ten years. Prior to 1970, not one 
park service director had been fired.SO 
Many felt Whalen deserved to be fired. He had allowed 
the Bureau of outdoor Recreation to simply takeover many NPS 
historic preservation programs without fuss. This sudden 
relinquishment undermined his credibility "both within the 
Park Service and among its unusually loyal and active 
alumni."51 A temper tantrum in the middle of a 
concessioner' meeting sealed his fate as NPS director.52 
49Philip Shabecoff, "Director ousted Over Problems in 
Federal Parks", The New York Times, April 25, 1980, p.A15. 
50Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.265. 
51Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks. 
52Shabecoff, "Director ousted over Problems In Federal 
Parks",New York Times, April 25, 1980 p.Al6. 
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To placate angry regional directors who were upset 
about the loss of the preservation programs and the long-
term lack of good leadership, Secretary Andrus asked them to 
recommend a new director. Not surprisingly, they chose one 
of their own. Russell Dickerson, the former Pacific 
Northwest regional director became Director in the summer of 
1980. 
Conclusion 
With Russell Dickerson as the new Director, the Park 
Service felt confident it would regain the independence that 
it had lost. But loss of control had occurred gradually in 
the past twenty years and it would not easily be won back. 
Some critics argue this loss began with the firing of 
George Hartzog, others argue that it began with Watt's 
tenure. I would have to agree with Ronald A. Foresta that 
it actually began in the early 1960's when there began "a 
wide spread sense that the agency was pursuing the wrong 
goals."53 While the Park service was actively undertaking 
"park improvement 11 projects under Mission 66, society was 
calling for more preservation and less misuse of its 
resources. secretary Udall certainly believed it when he 
took charge of park policy. Environmental groups also 
abandoned the Park Service at this time when they sent their 




lobbyist to congress to push for policy reforms. Instead of 
working with NPS, they began to try to control them. In 
the 1970's, weak directors further contributed to NPS's 
management problems. They allowed the Interior Department 
and Congress to take over. This left the parks much more 
susceptible to political ebbs and tides. But fortunately, 
this shift in decision-making did not damage the parks. In 
the 1960's and 1970's environmental standards were 
maintained, even if the Park Service was not in control, 
thanks to key environmentalists in the Interior Department, 
congress, and the Administration. But future 
administrations would show just how vulnerable the integrity 
of the parks were under this shift in control. 
L 
Chapter v 
By law, the Park service must maintain the parks "for 
the enjoyment of future generations."1 While there has 
never been any consensus as to how they should best 
accomplish this task or what state the parks should be in, 
the orientation of the Park Service has traditionally 
dictated that use which distracts from the future enjoyment 
of others should be eliminated. Traditionally, they have 
acted under this principle. 
Even when the Park Service's independence began 
eroding away, those in positions of authority continued to 
follow this principle. The parks were managed with a sense 
of the organic mission. They were protected for succeeding 
generations while providing for the enjoyment of those 
living now. congress and the Department of the Interior 
insured that the growing concern for our natural resources 
was augmented by expansion of the national park system. 
During the carter administration alone, total national park 
acreage increased by one-third. 
With the election of President Ronald Reagan and his 
subsequent appointment of secretary of the Interior James 
watt, however, management policies would change. This 
lPublic Law 65-235, as cited in United States statues 
at Large, p.535. 
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change initiated from the Reagan Administration's opposition 
to federal restrictions on federal lands. To counter 
"unnecessary regulations", Watt initiated policies that 
were substantially different from those traditionally 
implemented by the National Park service.2 
The Department of the Interior's new goals combined 
with the economic strategies of this administration departed 
sharply from those established previously. However, they 
were part of a broader Reagan Administration strategy. 
Within the Reagan Administration's "strategy of bureaucratic 
control" was "its effort to pare down the federal budget and 
bureaucracy by having state and local governments and 
private business assume increasing responsibilities for the 
provision of goods and services once provided by the federal 
government."3 Reagan's goals for the bureaucracy, thus, 
were somewhat similar to Nixon's. However, Reagan was much 
more successful at reorganizing the bureaucracy so as to 
meet his agenda. Because.of the "high priority the President 
and his aides assigned to White House control of personnel", 
Reagan "achieved a degree of loyalty and coherence in the 
bureaucracy that other Presidents (including Nixon) have 
2Gundars Rudzitits and Jeffery Schwartz, "The Plight of 
the Parklands'', Environment, December, 1982, p.8. 
3Elizabeth sanders, "The Presidency and the 
Bureaucratic state" as cited in Michael Nelson, The 




longed for."4 The consequences of this reorganization, 
attention to personnel selection, and revamping of policy is 
of great importance as it will last long after the end of 
the Reagan administration. 
Watt's hand in the National Park service 
Watt was not new to the Department of the Interior in 
1981. Prior to 1981, he had served as head of the 
Interior's Bureau of outdoor Recreation during the Nixon 
Administration, an agency that frequently had pitted itself 
against NPS over departmental acquisitions. 
With the advent of secretary James Watt's appointment 
as secretary of the Interior in 1981, the Department of the 
Interior promoted an "antigovernment 'sagebrush rebellion' 
philosophy and a tilt toward development and privitization, 
which they aggressively sought to impose on the Park 
service."5 secretary's watt's promised policy reforms ''time 
and time again ... broke with the Department's traditional 
role of preserving parklands. ",6 watt's plans for reform, 
however, followed the Administration's theme that the 
4Elizabeth sanders as cited in Benda and Levine, 
"Reagan and the Bureaucracy: The Bequest, the Promise, and 
the Legacy", in Charles Jones, ed., The Reagan Legacy, 
(Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1988) p.109. 
5Robert and Patricia Cahn, "Disputed Territory", p.30. 
6William c. Lienesch, "Interior: Behind the 
Bureaucracy", National Parks, March/April 1984, p.29. 
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"public sector should be smaller and less intrusive, and 
that the private sector should be strengthened and made more 
influential."? His drive was to maximize the involvement of 
private businesses in the parks and this was certainly in 
accord with the President's desire to strengthen ties with 
the business community.a While "Watt's views reflected 
those of the Reagan administration and pro-development 
interests that he represented from 1977 to 1980 as head of 
the Mountain States Legal Foundation, some conservationists 
have suggested that his appointment as secretary of the 
Interior was like 'hiring a fox to guard the chickens.'"9 
In order to carry out his plans with minimal 
interference from NPS, Watt proceeded to remove "five of the 
top-level managers in the park service."10 For example, he 
removed the career deputy director, "replacing him with a 
political loyalist inexperienced in park management and 
7Richard P. Nathan, "The Reagan Presidency in Domestic 
Affairs", as printed in Ed., Fred I. Greenstein, The Reagan 
Presidency: An Early Assessment, (The Johns Hopkins Press: 
Baltimore) 1983, p.50. 
8Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, "The Presidency 
and the organization of Interests", as printed in Ed. 
Michael Nelson, The Presidency and the Political system, 
(The Congressional Quarterly Inc.: Washington, D.C.) 1988, 
p.323. 
9Current Bibliography, 1982, p.431. 
lORick Resse, Greater Yellowstone, No. 6, Montana 





lacking empathy for career park professionals."11 He also 
demoted the Alaska regional director and forced another 
regional director into retirement. These men were "from the 
Carter administration ... (and) ... were too committed to the 
environmentalist views he opposed.''12 This move signalled a 
"reversal of Interior's long-standing conservationist 
stance, and in the ensuing atmosphere of uncertainty, there 
was a noticeable deterioration of morale."13 
Watt did announce early on that he would retain 
Russell Dickerson as Director of NPS. Dickerson shared 
neither the same park philosophy nor management style and 
critics argued Watt would have liked to replace Dickerson.14 
Dickerson proved not to be any match for Watt, however. 
under pressure, he allowed the secretary to set park policy 
as his recent predecessors had. 
Watt used the shift in power to his advantage. The 
secretary encouraged the President to appoint a number of 
like minded political appointees to the positions of 
undersecretary and Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife, 
llGeorge Hartzog, "Raze Eyesores and Insulate 
Director", The Wall street Journal, November 23, 1988, 
p.A12. 
12Current Bibliography, 1982, p.433. 
13Ibid., p.433. 
14Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.268. 
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and Parks. With utilitarian-minded men such as Donald Hodel 
and Ray Arnett in these respective positions, Watt was more 
easily able to carry out his reforms. 
Watt was aided by shifts in control within the 
Department of the Interior that had occurred in the 1960's 
and 1970's. As the secretary and Undersecretary had taken a 
greater role in park management since the early 1960's, Watt 
was able to capitalize on this control in his own 
policymaking. Yet, in previous adrninistrati9ns, the 
Secretaries and the Undersecretaries had worked with the 
Park service officials. watt would not. This caused some 
park critics to argue that "career park service officials 
were no longer in charge as a result."15 Power struggles 
were increasingly evident in the news after 1981 pitting the 
political appointee posts of secretary of the Interior and 
the Assistant Secretary of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks against 
the professional career-personnel within the Park Service. 
Watt's Plans for the Parks 
After taking office, Watt immediately imposed a 
moratorium on new park acquisitions. He argued that the 
government could not manage the lands they currently 
15Ibid. I p. 98. 
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possessed.16 As he noted, a General Accounting Office 
report completed in 1980 showed "a number of parks to have 
substandard physical structures."17 The GAO had estimated 
$1.6 billion would be necessary to make the essential 
repairs. Watt reacted by "calling park conditions 
'shameful' and 'a disgrace,' and declared that no more money 
should be spent on parkland acquisition on the grounds that 
we should first take care of what we have."18 In an abrupt 
reversal of policy, Watt abolished the Land and Water 
Conservation Fund which had supplied money for park 
acquisitions since 1964.19 
Environmentalists were outraged at the moratorium. 
Environmental organizations, such as the "Friends of the 
Earth, the League of conservation Voters, the Wilderness 
society, the National Wildlife Federation, the Isaak Walton 
League, and the National Audubon society sought the removal 
of watt from office."20 The Sierra Club alone lead a 
16William MacDougall, "Crises Ahead in our National 
Parks'', U.S. News and world Report, September 27, 1982, 
p.75. 
17Fred Powledge, "Toward the Twenty-first Century", 
Wilderness, Spring, 1983, p.34. 
18Ibid. 
19George Hartzog, "Raze Eyesores and Insulate 
Director", The Wall street Journal, November 23, 1988, 
p.A12. 
20Current Bibliography, 1982, p.434. 
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national campaign to remove Watt, obtaining more than one 
million signatures by October 1981 demanding his 
replacement.21 
A second goal of Watt's was to increase the role of 
concessionaires in the parks while decreasing government 
responsibility. Even as park concessionaires had 
historically functioned as "perpetual monopolies", Secretary 
watt, with the support of President Reagan, promised more 
far-reaching plans for them.22 watt would give "the 
concessionaires a greater role in the management of natural 
resources, even though they have absolutely no expertise in 
this area."23 This was extremely disturbing news to NPS 
officials who had felt for some time that the 
concessionaires already had an undue influence on park 
policy. But Watt nevertheless persisted. Addressing a 
national convention of park concessionaires, he stated in 
1981, "we will use the budget system to be the excuse to 
make major policy decisions .... ('We seek') an aggressive 
program with private entrepreneurs ... ('and if any member of 
the National Park Service gives us a problem) ... We're going 
21Ibid. 
22Dyan Zaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce", 
Wilderness, Spring, 1983, p.26. 
23Philip Shabecoff, "Administration Seeks Grater Role 
for Entrepreneurs are Federal Parks", New York Times, March 
29, 1981, p.1. 
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to get rid of the problem or the personality, which ever is 
fastest."24 
Watt pushed for the privatization of park concession 
operations to fulfill the Reagan Administration's promise 
"to get the government off the backs" of American 
businessman.25 Reagan insisted on "'contracting out'" 
services in order to pare down the federal government's role 
in economic affairs.26 The Reagan Administration was not 
concerned with the environmental responsibility of the park 
concessioner. Rather, the Administration firmly believed 
that "environmentalists had gone too far" in their demands 
for environmental protections.27 With large corporations 
controlling most concession operations by the 1980's, watt's 
program of concession privatization promised them greater 
freedom to expand operations, thus, maximizing corporate 
profit. 
watt's Plan for Development Near The Parks 
A third goal of watt's was to make Forest Service and 
24Ibid. p.Al. 
25Richard Kazis and Richard Grossman, "The Future of 
the Environmental Movement," in Alan Gartner, Colin Greer, 
and Frank Riessman, eds., Beyond Reagan, (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1984) p.210. 
26Peter Benda and Charles Levine, "Reagan and the 
Bureaucracy; The Bequest, the Promise, and the Legacy", 
p.124. 
27Ibid. 
L___ __ _ 
BLM lands more accessible to timbering, mining and 
exploration. Again, this was done on the premise that 
regulation was stifling the American man's opportunities 
and economy. While timbering and development was 
encouraged outside of the national park boundaries, it 
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often were slated for areas that served as buffer zones for 
parklands.28 As most of the parks, especially the "crowned 
jewels", were not complete ecosystems, development in these 
vital buffer zones jeopardized the integrity of the parks. 
Watt's Programs in Action 
Watt's opportunity to induce change in park management 
came almost immediately in Yellowstone National Park. Since 
the summer of 1979, the Park Service had been negotiating 
with a new concessioner, T.W. Services, over their contract 
to operate Yellowstone's hotels and restaurants. From the 
administration's standpoint, the timing was right to 
introduce major changes with respect to concession 
operations. The resulting agreement between T.W. services 
and the Park Service, subsequently signed by Secretary Watt 
on November 1, 1981, was "hailed by the administration as a 
model of Reaganomics."29 
28D. Leal, "Saving An Ecosystem, as cited in J. Baden, 
A Yellowstone Primer: Policy Reform Via The New Resource 
Economics, 1989, p.62. 
29Alston Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, (Atlantic 
Monthly Press: New York) 1986, p.226. 
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Under this agreement, T.W. services was permitted to be 
the sole operator of the hotels and restaurants within the 
park. Its only competitor within Yellowstone for the annual 
two and a half million visitors' dollars was the long-
standing, family-owned and operated, Hamilton's Photo Shops. 
Thus, the federal contract offered T.W. Services the 
traditional monopoly over concessions. Yet, it also granted 
them the privilege to operate the concession with no prior 
investment in the park facilities, more commonly known as a 
"possessory interest".30 T.W. services' minimal investment 
subsequently translated into "minimal risk".31 As Don 
Hummel, former Chairman of the National Park concessions 
noted ... With no "possessory interest, no inventory, no 
capital investments that might depreciate ... They were 
practically guaranteed a profit."32 
The unprecedented 1981 contract with T.W. Services also 
allowed the Park Service in Yellowstone, for the first time 
in history, to become "a.partner of private enterprise."33 
The Park Service retained ownership of all concession 
facilities while it required the concessioner to provide the 
30Dyan zaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce", p.28. 





funds for maintaining them. These funds, amounting to 
"twenty-two percent" of T.W.'s annual gross revenues within 
the park, were to be spent at the discretion of the Park 
Service on capital improvements.34 As the amount of revenue 
the Park service received on an annual basis varied in 
accordance with the concessionaires profits under this 
unprecedented agreement, the Park service now had an 
economic interest in ensuring that the concessioner 
profited. Hence, there was a motivator, an unprecedented 
economic one, for increasing concession operations. 
The Administration's Role in the Park Buffer Zones 
outside Yellowstone National Park, the Reagan 
Administration appointees within the Forest service 
encouraged increasing timber production on the seven 
national forests that surround it. Along with logging, 
there was an "extensive road building campaign.''35 Between 
1980-1986, hundreds of roads were plowed out in "critical 
wildlife habitats."36 The roads also contributed to 
sedimentation problems. As the roads were plowed on steep 
grades, the disturbance accelerated the rate at which 
sediment was dumped into streams, thus destroying prime fish 
34Ibid. 




All of this work was done at a financial loss to the 
federal government. Between 1979-1984, "annual timber 
program costs exceeded timber receipts in all seven of the 
region's national forests."37 Yet, private logging 
companies benefitted from the deficit timber sales. Deficit 
timber sales were also in accord with the Reagan 
Administration's idea that private developers should have 
more access to public lands regardless of the cost. 
Profits and the Parks 
To make parks more profitable for the private 
concessioner, Watt supported a plan that would improve 
visitor facilities within them. In 1981, he unveiled 
"PRIP", his Park Restoration and Improvement Program, and 
requested $1 billion dollars for it. PRIP would "restore 
sewage systems, roads, buildings, and other facilities while 
ignoring programs to protect natural resources."38 In 1981, 
Congress authorized "$1 billion ... (for a) ... crash fix-up" 
for all parks to be spent over a period of five years.39 
While certainly PRIP provided much needed funds for visitor 
37D. Leal, "Saving An Ecosystem", p.58. 
38Robert and Patricia Cahn, Disputed Territory, p.30. 
39Francis R. Brown, "National Parks Stagger As 
Difficulties Grow While Budget Shrinks", Wall Street 
Journal, November 29, 1985, p.1. 
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facility improvements, many felt the funds were not offered 
in a spirit of conservationism. As one critic noted, "of 
what value would Yellowstone National Park be with 
beautiful, modern hotels and restaurants, high-standard 
roads, modern administration offices and remodeled buildings 
if it lacked free-ranging wildlife populations, naturally 
functioning biosystems, clean air and water, and vast 
stretches of unmolested lands?"40 As another park critic 
agreed, "if the profit motive is allowed to dominate, the 
beauty and sense of history our parks preserve will be 
lost."41 
To counter watt's plans for the parks, Congress took 
action. In reviewing the 1980 state of the Parks report 
which cited air quality threats, water resource problems, 
visitor overuse problems, and external development problems 
in some parks, Congress moved to add "$7 million a year to 
the NPS budget for a Natural Resources protection Program 
(NRPP) ."42 This money was targeted toward projects to deal 
with these identified threats. But the threats persisted, 
even with the congressional aid. One of the most obvious 
threats was visitor overuse. 
40Rich Reese, Greater Yellowstone, p.96. 
41Michael Frome, "Park Tourism as Big Business", P.16. 
42Robert Cahn, "Taking a count of the Threats", 
National Parks, July/August 1987, p.33. 
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ParJ.: V1s1tat1on 
Since the 1960's, there was a ~ubstantial boon in 
national park v1c1tat1on nationwide. Pcbl1c 1ntorent 1n 
wild lands translated into increar,ed v!s1tat1on. Yet, an 
total numbers v1sitinq the parks rose above four billion 
annually by the late 1970's, the Park sorv1ce roco9n1:~d t~o 
that the increaslnq UEe would threaten the park's natural 
resources. This proble~ was especially evident 1n the 
"crowned jewels". 
In Yosemite, holiday traff lc caus('d conQest1on for 
hours. In the Grand canyon, the ~ubl1~1ty was distracted by 
planes from 42 co~pan1es :oocl~Q telcw the r1=. And 1! ycu 
wanted a chance to run the Colorado rap1dR, but wore not a 
part of a concessioner tour, the wait was five yearn. 
AI::ericans clearly were "lov1nq thc·1r parks to d<.'ath. •"3 
In 1978, Congress had =oved to candate that the Pnrk 
service set "visitor carry1n9 capac1t1en" 1n nn effort to 
preserve and protect the parks.44 Y~t. 1t w3~ 3 probl~~ in 
the 1980's that both Secretary Watt and Director O!c~ers~n 
chose to ignore. As 01rector Dlc~ers~n ~ta:ed 1n 1991, "!he 
parks serve their hi;hest pur~ose wh~n they are uoed by an 
43Robert Paul Jordan, ~w111 Success Spall Our Parks", 
Haticnal Geographlc, July 1913, p.1. 
44Paul c. Pritchard "7he :our Per~ent Solut1~n", 
National Parr.r., t:o•:e::-ber/Oece=b'?'r 1997, p.5. 
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many people as possible ... It is a cop-out to set a limit on 
visitors."45 While park visitation continued to rise at a 
rate of four-percent a year, any plans to implement park 
carrying capacities were shelved.46 Any within the Park 
Service who cared to contest this game faced demotion or 
removal. 
For environmentalists, however, it was not a problem 
that could just be ignored. Watt outraged them and his lack 
of support nationwide found him under increasing pressure to 
resign.47 He did so in the fall of 1983. Watt was replaced 
by William c. Clark. 
Evaluating NPS under watt 
Watt had not been popular either with the Park Service 
or congress. His eagerness to change park policies angered 
both parties.48 Watt had been quick to reverse long range 
programs for the parks, primarily by ignoring park programs 
to protect natural resources.49 His unending loyalty to the 
45Philip Shabecoff, "Administration Seeks Greater Role 
For Entrepreneurs at Federal Parks", p.Al. 
46Ibid. 
47Joseph A. Davis, "resignation Pressure Grows As 
Watt's GOP Support Ebbs", Congressional Quarterly, October 
3, 1983, p.2068. 
48Joseph A. Davis, "Resignation Pressure Grows as 
watt's GOP support Ebbs'', Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 
October 3, 1983, p.2068. 
49Cahn, "Disputed Territory", p.30. 
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Administration frustrated both as well. 
It is difficult to discern to what extent Watt was 
circumventing Congressional intentions while altering park 
policies. The national parks emerge as an area today where 
Congress affirms its intentions primarily at budget-making 
time. This leaves the Secretary of the Interior with a 
great deal of decision-making authority by Congressional 
default. For example, in 1983, Watt, with the support of 
senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) and senator Don Young (R-AK) 
ordered Director Dickerson to transfer the NPS Alaska 
regional director, his deputy, and the superintendent of 
Glacier National Park because "they imposed restrictions on 
tour-boat operators in Glacier Bay in order to protect 
endangered humpback whales."50 This was not an issue 
congress as a whole felt obligated to deal with, so the 
decision fell to watt, spurred by two congressional 
officials who served on NPS related committees and 
subcommittees. 
watt was commonly thought within the scientific 
community to have been the worse thing that ever happened to 
the national parks. He opened border areas to development, 
he ignored visitor overuse, and he gave concessionaires 
power that rivaled that of NPS. overall, his policies were 
SOibid. I p. 30. 
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utilitarian oriented, in keeping with the Reagan 
Administration's ideals, but environmentally insensitive.51 
His disregard for the national park ideal made him 
extraordinarily unpopular with NPS, environmentalists, and 
the public as a whole. 
watt was especially unpopular within NPS because of his 
reorganization of their decision-making infrastructure. As 
a_result of Watt's reorganization, professional NPS 
directors and their director, "were being forced to accept 
decisions they felt were inimical to the Service, made by 
people who had never managed a park and whose outlook was 
toward development.''52 This did little for NPS morale as 
the professionals were forced to accept "policy changes of a 
kind" that in the past the Park service had been able to 
resist.53 
Watt's decision to halt new park acquisitions, however, 
was one policy that met with some support. While 
environmentalists were disappointed, others saw NPS as 
becoming a collect-it-all agency similar to the General 
Services Administration (GSA). Many recognized that the 
parks established in the past few decades were not on the 
51Ibid. 
52Robert Cahn, ''Takeover at the Park Service", National 
Parks, March/April 1987, p.53. 
53Ibid. 
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level of the "crowned jewels" and they challenged their 
merits as national parks.S4 Others saw the crumbling roads 
and tarnished visitor facilities in the "crowned jewels" and 
understood Watt's argument.SS As the editor of the Los 
Angeles Times noted, "Americans go to Yosemite for rest and 
recreation, not to face the same crumbling environment that 
they deal with at home."S6 But for an agency whose funds 
had not increased in proportion with its acquisitions, it 
was difficult to keep up. 
After Watt 
William Clark served as Secretary of the Interior 
through February, 198S. During his tenure, he "softened 
many of Watt's stands, improved relations with Congress and 
opened dialogue with environmental groups."57 Clark also 
attempted to return some of the park policy making to NPS, 
but his tenure was so brief that he really had very little 
impact. 
In February of 198S, Secretary Clark was replaced by 
54Jay Matthews, "Political storm over a Precious 
Wasteland", The Washington Post, April 21, 1987, p.A3. 
S5Ted Gest, "Patches Show Up in the National Parks", 
U.S. News and World Report, June 17, '985, p.70. 
56Ed., "Blemishes on Yosemite", Los Angeles Times, 
October 25, 1985. 
S7"Hodel Replaces Clark", Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac, 1984, p.346. 
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Donald Paul Hodel, the former Undersecretary of the Interior 
under Watt. With the appointment of Hodel, "the watt agenda 
quietly reappeared. 11 58 Without the flamboyant Watt, it 
seemed his policies were gone, but in fact they were there, 
alive and well under Hodel. 
Hodel and NPS 
Shortly after Hodel's administration began, Dickerson 
retired under pressure from Hodel in March of 1985. Yet, 
Hodel "delayed choosing a new NPS director .. (and) in this 
leadership vacumn, the regional directors moved to complete 
the isolation of these territories from the control and 
direction of the park service Washington office."59 
Regional "directors and superintendents were now taking 
orders from political bureaucrats in the office of the 
assistant secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks."60 
On May 19, 1985, William Penn Mott was appointed 
Director. He was not Hodel's first choice, but he was a NPS 
careerman who had served.as Governor Reagan's Director of 
California state Parks and Recreation.61 Immediately, he 
set about trying to revamp NPS from its political problems 
58Robert and Patricia Cahn, Disputed Territory, 
May/June 1987, p.31. 
59Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.269. 
60Ibid. 
61Robert and Patricia Cahn, Disputed Territory, p.31. 
166 
with the Department of the Interior. He replaced the deputy 
director Watt had appointed with a career NPS man, Denis 
Galvin. He also fired other political appointees as well, 
but two, "Smith and Fitzsimmons simply moved 'upstairs' to 
become assistants to the new Assistant secretary for Fish, 
Wildlife and the Parks, William Horn.62 This put them "in a 
position to give orders to the NPS director."63 
The Chapman Controversy 
The strength of the Secretary of the Interior was again 
realized with the resignation of NPS western regional 
director, Howard Chapman. Upset with the Interior's 
policies which repeatedly emphasized use over preservation, 
Chapman had not seen eye to eye with Hodel on a number of 
issues, including scenic flights over the Grand canyon.64 
As a punishment, Assistant Secretary Horn ordered Mott "to 
give Chapman a below-average rating and to transfer him or 
to force him into early retirement".65 
Mott refused to give Chapman a low performance rating. 
62Ibid. 
63Ibid. 
64Ronald B. Taylor, "Policy at Heart of Feud Inside 
U.S. Park Service", Los Angeles Times, February 5, 1987, 
p.23. 
65Ronald B. Taylor, "Park Service Official at Odds With 
Hodel over Public use, Quits", Los Angeles Times, April 24, 
1986 f p, 1. 
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Horn then took it upon himself to change Chapman's rating 
and Chapman fought back by speaking out. He testified 
before House and senate subcommittees that his rating had 
been altered. For many, Chapman stood ''as a lighting 
rod" ... (showing) ... the sort of manipulation that the 
Administration has been pursuing with Park Service 
professionals, intimidating them or removing thern."66 
Horn also interfered with Mott's recommendations for 
the senior Executive service (SES) and numerous appointments 
to regional directors. Mott, finally outraged at Horn's 
interference, wrote 
... If I am to be responsible for accomplishing your 
policy directions, I must have the authority to organize and 
fill key appointments within existing rules and 
regulations ... your staff's initiatives on these delicate 
matters were not discussed with me or my Deputy Director.67 
However, Horn took no action and continued to interfere in 
park policy. He tried to put a official from the Fish and 
Wildlife Service in charge of policy formation for NPS. 
When Mott appealed to Hodel, he sided with Horn. Finally, 
the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, chaired by 
Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) threatened to cut off Horn's 
66Ibid. 
67Robert Cahn, "Takeover at the Park Service", National 
Parks, March/April 1987, p.53. 
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paychecks if he did not return NPS policymaking to NPS.68 
Director Hott was persistent and determined. He pushed 
to regain control over the Park Service's policy making. It 
was a unending fight with the Reagan Administration men and 
Hodel and Horn within the Interior Department. They felt 
strongly that parks were areas of public recreation whereas 
Hott struggled to move NPS toward preservation. It was a 
classic battle of use vs. preservation. While Mott was 
pushing for park extensions, curtailing oining in 
ecologically sensitive border ares, and pollution control, 
the Reagan Administration appointees were pushing for 
development, private investment, and relaxing mining 
regulations.69 
Controlling NPS 
To keep the service under control, the Administrat1on 
proposed drastic cuts in the Park service budget. For 
P.eagan, "fewer people on the payroll meant "less meddlesome' 
activity and fewer rules and regulations."70 Every year, 
the Reagan Administrat1on proposed cuts that were countered 
by congress. Repeatedly, they appropriated more ooney for 
68Howard H. Chapnan, "Adninistration's Record on 
Hanagecent of Parks", Los Angeles Tines, June 20, 1987. 
69Ed., "Hott's Grand Design", Los Angeles Tioes. June, 
1987. 
70Sanders, "The Presidency and the Bureaucratic State", 
p.389. 
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NPS than the Administration recommended.71 Even when Gramm-
Rudman was put into effect, Congress continued to 
appropriate monies above and beyond those recommended by the 
Administration.72 Nevertheless, NPS too was affected by the 
across the board cuts, cuts NPS "had no flexibility in 
making."73 
While budget cuts were to be expected every year, user 
fees went up. In 1987 entrance fees in the "crowned jewels" 
increased from $2 dollars per car to $5 dollars per care. 
By the following summer, in Yosemite, the Grand canyon, and 
Yellowstone, the entrance fee was $10 dollars per car. 
Senior citizens and disabled persons still were admitted at 
no cost.74 Yet, the increases in user fees did benefit the 
parks. In 1987, Director Mott convinced the OMB that fee 
revenues should remain in the NPS budget rather than be 
returned to the General Fund. It was means of keeping the 
71Joseph Davis, "Interior Funding provisions Renew 
Offshore Leasing Bans", Congressional Quarterly, October 20, 
1984, p.2750. 
72Maura Dolan, "Interior Department Budget Knife Cuts 
Wide, Deep", Los Angeles Times, January 17, 1986. 
73Judith Havermann, "Mowing Down Park Services", 
Washington Post, April 11, 1986, p.Al. 
74Ed, "This Land Is Your Land?", Money, August 8, 1987, 
p.16. 
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parks financially solvent.75 
Even with the Congressionally-granted increases in user 
fees, the cost to visit a park was still incredibly low. 
For the price of one movie ticket, a family could a acquire 
a seven day permit to Yosemite. The price of an annual 
permit for Yellowstone National Park in 1988 was $15 
dollars, the same price that it was in 1915.76 And a common 
si9ht in any park was a retired couple, in a $20,000 motor 
home, with a free park permit. Retirees, who clearly had 
the money to pay and could provide much needed revenue, were 
exempt from any entrance or user fees. While raising 
entrance fees might have been publicly unpopular, it would 
have aided the financially struggling parks and valued 
their worth more accordingly. 
Pressures on the Parks 
Without adequate revenue and protective legislation, 
pressures relating to overuse, boundary development, and 
pollution continued to mount. For example, visibility in 
the Grand canyon was often decreased significantly from smog 
emanating from a nearby power plant. on the East Coast, 
pollution levels in Maine's Acadia National Park often 
75William Penn Mott, "The National Park System: Looking 
Back and Moving Ahead", USA Today, May, 1987, p.27. 
76John Baden, "free Markets can Protect The earth", 
High country News, February 27, 1989, p.13. 
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exceeded federal standards. In 1981, NPS had gathered data 
on important vistas in the parks and compiled a list of 
those that should be protected in compliance with the Clean 
Air Act. But Hodel never submitted the list to the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Hodel rejected this 
list arguing that it would "'provide a false sense of 
security' and 'would not be good for the patks' ."77 The 
provision to list important vistas for review under the 
Clean Air Act expired December 31, 1985.78 
Establishment of the Great Basin National Park 
During the entire eight-year administration of Ronald 
Reagan, only one new park was added to the system. This was 
the Great Basin National Park in Nevada. Commercial 
interests, particularly mining companies, had prevented 
previous legislative attempts from passing in Congress, but 
it was finally approved in 1986.79 
The establishment of the Great Basin National Park was 
not a signal of change in the Interior Department's 
unprecedented moratorium on parkland acquisitions. Rather, 
the park came about from a motion in Congress, led by 
77Cass Peterson, "National Parks Not Always a Breath of 
Fresh Air", Washington Post, July 8, 1987, p.Al7. 
78Robert and Patricia Cahn, "Disputed Territory", p.31. 
79Maura Dolan, "Great Basin National Park Bill sent to 
President", Los Angeles Times, October 11, 1986. 
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Nevada's congressional delegation. The park was sort of "a 
farewell gift to Paul Laxalt."80 It was also a 
congressional reaction to national parks increasing 
popularity. Between 1980 and 1986, national park visitation 
increased almost thirty percent, bringing millions more into 
America's parks annually.81 
The California Park controversy 
Another proposed land acquisition of great interest was 
a section of desert in southern California. The proposed 
Mojave National Park was a pet project of Senator Alan 
Cranston (D-CA).82 Environmental groups aided him in the 
challenge to have this tract of land reassigned from BLM to 
NPS. 
The East Mojave desert is truly one of the last 
wilderness areas in the United states. With only unpaved 
roads crisscrossing an area four times the size of 
Yellowstone, it is not only expansive but also difficult to 
navigate. The area contains the world's largest Joshua tree 
forest and some of the most valuable Anazazi Indian ruins 
known. And much of it is unexplored. The area also 
80T.R. Reid, "Great Basin Park A first For Reagan", 
Washington Post, August 15, 1987, P.Al. 
81Ibid. 
82Jay Mathews, "Political Storm Over a Precious 
wasteland", The Washington Post, April 21, 1987, p.A3. 
173 
contains 750 species of wildlife, including bighorn sheep 
and many species of endangered birds.83 
But the East Mojave desert is also valuable for the 
minerals it contains and much of it is leased out to local 
ranchers for cattle grazing. Neither industry nor the local 
ranching community supported the park idea. Rock collectors 
and off the road vehicle owners did not support the idea 
either as they saw NPS status as limiting access to the 
area.84 Hodel did not support it and congress, in a time of 
budget cutting, did not support the idea either as they were 
not willing to take on such a potentially large expense. 
The Yellowstone Fires- 1988 
The Reagan Administration rounded out its tenure in 
office with the oldest national park in flames. While the 
uncontrollable fires were controversial in themselves, in 
the midst of coming to grips with them, the media also 
unfolded the power struggle between the Interior Department 
and the National Park Service. While the media showed the 
scientific ideals of "ecosystem management" was on shaky 
ground, they also portrayed a Park service on shaky ground 
as well as it could not put the fires out. As the extent of 
83Scott Armstrong, "Debate getting hot over future uses 
of vast California desert", Christian Science Monitor, 
January 16, 1987, p.3. 
84Jay Mathews, "Political Storm Over A Precious 
Wasteland", p.A3. 
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control the Reagan men in the Interior Department had on NPS 
was better understood, critics started calling for an 
independent NPS. 
Robert Cahn was one of the first to promote the idea of 
an independent NPS. As he stated, "in the long run ... the 
only way to assure minimal political interference with the 
National Park Service is to remove it from the Department of 
the Interior and establish it as an independent agency."85 
Howard Chapman, who had been forced out of his job as the 
NPS regional director echoed his sentiments in January of 
1988. As he noted, 
The Hodel/Horn team has shown that they will do 
anything to advance their cause of use. The only force that 
has been able to shut them down is Congress. Clearly, the 
National Park Service has to get into a position where it 
has a greater ability to stand its ground against such 
adversity as presented now by the Interior Department.86 
It is an issue that has come up before Congress, and while 
unresolved, will be certain to appear again should the 
political condition established under the Reagan 
Administration persist. 
85Robert and Patricia Cahn, "Disputed Territory'', p.33. 
86Howard Chapman, "Separate status for the Park 
Service", National Parks, January/February 1988, p.46. 
conclusion 
Since its inception in 1916, the Park Service has 
struggled with its "equivocal mission" of both preserving 
the parks and providing for their use.1 At times when they 
have desired to encourage public use, they have emphasized 
park development. Other times have marked them as the 
prudent park protectorate as they have removed established 
facilities and banned practices considered to be 
inappropriate in a national park. 
By law, the Park Service must maintain the parks "for 
the enjoyment of future generations."2 While there has 
never been any consensus how they should best accomplish 
this task or what state the parks should be in, the 
orientation of the Park service has traditionally dictated 
that use which detracts from the future enjoyment of others 
should be eliminated. Historically, they have acted under 
this principle. 
Any apparent emphasis of either preservation or use 
over time, as evidenced in Park Service policy, normally can 
be traced to "lobbying power" influences emanating from 
lAlston Chase, "How to save Our National Parks", 
Atlantic Monthly, July, 1987, p.36. 
2Public Law 65-235, as cited in United states Statues 
at Large, p.535. 
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resources over park development. They adhered to the Park 
Service's mission as established in the enabling 
legislation. watt, however, did neither. 
Watt, rather, was one of Reagan's political appointees 
who was chosen for his ability to be a "team player" and 
carry out Administration initiatives.6 Watt's mission was 
to transform the Administration's initiatives into agency 
directives rather than follow the traditional mission of the 
agency. He received support for his efforts not from the 
agency he managed, but rather from Reagan's Cabinet.7 
The economic strategies of the Reagan administration 
brought about park polices that departed sharply from those 
of the last two decades. Reagan's economic strategies were 
radically altered in an effort to reverse a "decade of 
economic 'stagflation' ."8 For NPS, it meant privatization 
of many public services and loss of agency independence. 
In the case of the Park Service, the Reagan 
Administration also demonstrated that it could reshape 
"policy and the modus operandi" of an agency.9 Unlike 
6Benda and Levine, "Reagan and the Bureaucracy: The 
Bequest, the Promise, and the Legacy", p.107. 
7Ibid., p.110. 
8Ibid., p.102. 
9Elizabeth Sanders, "The Presidency and the 
Bureaucratic state'', Ed., Michael Nelson, The Presidency and 
the Political System, (Congressional Quarterly: Washington, 
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previous Administration, the Reagan team replaced career men 
with political appointees who had a like-minded attitude 
toward park management as did the Reagan Administration. 
This was done in the belief that "if you are going to run 
the government, you've got to control the people that come 
into it."10 Any one who.did not agree with the changes made 
in park management by these like-minded political 
appointees, including the Director of NPS, was simply 
removed or harassed into retirement. 
The Reagan Administration also tried to control the 
Park Service through budget cuts.11 Less money meant fewer 
administrators and fewer regulations. The Reagan 
Administration was not too successful in bringing about the 
massive cuts it envisioned because Congress controlled the 
budget. Congress, in recent decades, had become allies with 
the Park Service primarily because of the positive public 
image the national parks portrayed. 
The new policies implemented for the national parks 
under the Reagan Administration were profit-oriented and 
designed to give private interests a greater role in park 
D.C.) 1988, p.379. 
lOBenda and Levine, "Reagan and the Bureaucracy: The 
Bequest, the Promise, and the Legacy", p.108. 
llMaura Dolan, "Interior Department Budget Knife cuts 
Wide and Deep", Los Angeles Times p.Al. 
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management. Private business was the "beneficiary, and the 
federal bureaucracy (was) the target."12 It was another 
"aspect of the Administration's divestment strategy."13 
Watt looked for government activities within the parks that 
could be more efficiently performed by the private sector. 
Thus, concessionaires were given greater freedom to 
establish operations in parks. To help the concessioner, 
visitor-use quotas were abandoned and development within the 
parks was encouraged. 
Using the criteria established by Lawrence E. Lynn in 
"The Reagan Administration and the Renitent Bureaucracy", it 
appears that the Park service's extensive change during the 
Reagan Administration was not unique.14 Rather, changes 
that took place in the Park service also took place in other 
agencies such as the Employment and Training Administration 
(ETA), the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture 
(FSDA), and the Federal communications commission (FCC). 
This change came about as a part of a broader plan that the 
Reagan Administration had for the federal bureaucracy. Many 
12Sanders, "The Presidency and the Bureaucratic state", 
p.399. 
13Ibid., p.399. 
14Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr. "The Reagan Administration and 
the Renitent Bureaucracy'', The Reagan ~residency and the 
Governing of America, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute 
Press) 1985. 
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agencies and their administrative appointees under the 
Reagan Administration had two primary aspects in common. 
Like the Park Service Directors Watt and Hodel, the agency 
head "appeared to reflect Reagan's philosophy and intentions 
in making appointments to subcabinet positions."15 
Secondly, like watt and Hodel, other agency heads "promoted 
Reagan's conservative ideology ... dutifully executed 
administration policies concerning budget and staff 
reductions, and ... formulated specific goals consistent with 
Reagan's general policies."16 
The policies for the parks as established under the 
Reagan Administration were not new, however. They were very 
similar to those emanating from Park service Director Steven 
Mather in 1916. Mather also encouraged development, 
visitation, and recreation in the parks. But Mather 
followed the principle that use which distracts from the 
future enjoyment of others should be banned. Watt clearly 
did not. Mather also set park policy in a different era. 
In 1916, for example, approximately 21,000 people visited 
Yellowstone annually. Today, approximately 21,000 people a 
week witness an eruption of Old Faithful. use has increased 
tremendously, yet, Watt did not encourage any protective 




measures to compensate. 
Another significant difference between the Mather era 
and the Watt era is that under Mather, the Park Service 
created and implemented park policy. Under Watt, the 
Administration's economic policies were imposed on NPS. The 
Director had little or no say in the policies themselves. 
By 1989, the Park Service was no longer in control of what 
it was supposed to protect. 
watt is not responsible for this Department's internal 
shift in control. This shift in control came about 
gradually. When Secretary Udall took over some of the park 
policy making responsibilities from Director Hartzog in the 
late 1960's, the shift in control was especially evident. 
While Secretary Udall and subsequent Secretaries played a 
major role in park policy-making, however, they did so in a 
preservation-oriented manner. For the most part, they 
followed the principle that use which detracts from the 
future enjoyment of others should be banned. 
During Watt's tenure, he used this shift in authority 
to the Administration's advantage. Both Watt and Hodel were 
able to make broad, sweeping changes in national park policy 
because of the modus operandi that was in place. While the 
Reagan Administration worked to further channel the 
decision-making into Interior's political appointees 
positions, watt and Hodel were able early on to work toward 
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internal restructuring because of the initial policy-making 
set up. 
watt's and Hodel's alterations in the areas of park 
management and personnel helped the Reagan Administration 
to accomplish its economic objectives. What did this mean 
for the Park Service and wildlands themselves? For the 
Park service, it meant lower employee morale and fewer 
career employees. Historically, short term political plans 
have proven to be harmful to wildlands. some examples are 
the Hetch-Hetchy controversy, the Echo Park controversy and 
the Yellowstone Park Grant Village controversy. Many land 
management decisions, once made, cannot be reversed. 
Good land management requires long-range planning and 
scientific expertise. As America's "crowned jewels" stand 
as a symbol to all of our nations' bounty and wealth, they 
deserve just that. They provide us with an opportunity to 
view the past that cannot be replaced. our responsibility 
to tomorrow's heritage should not be forgotten. 
Appendix A 
Letter from Secretary Lane to Director Mather 
as Reprinted in Report to the Secretary of the Interior, 
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The administration policy to which the new service will 
adhere is based on three broad principles: First that the 
national parks must be maintained in absolutely unimpaired 
form for the use of future generations as well as those of 
our own time;second that they are set apart for the use, 
observation, health, and pleasure of the people; and third, 
that the national interest must dictate all decisions 
affecting public or private enterprise in the parks. 
Every activity of the Service is subordinate to the 
duties imposed upon it to faithfully preserve the parks for 
posterity in essentially their natural state. The commercial 
use of these reservations, except as specially authorized by 
law, or such as may be incidental to the accommodation and 
entertainment of visitors, will not be permitted under any 
circumstances. 
In all of the national parks except Yellowstone you may 
permit the grazing of cattle in isolated regions not 
frequented by visitors and where no injury to the natural 
features of the parks may result in such use. The grazing of 
sheep, however, must not be permitted in any national park. 
In leasing lands for the operation of hotels, camps, 
transportation facilities, or other public service under 
strict Government control, concessionaires should be 
confined to tracts no larger that absolutely necessary for 
the purposes of the business enterprises. 
You should not permit the leasing of park lands for 
summer homes. It is conceivable, and even exceedingly 
probable, that within a few years under a policy of 
permitting the establishment of summer homes in national 
parks, these reservations might become so generally settled 
as to exclude the public from convenient access to their 
streams, lakes, and other natural features, and thus destroy 
the very basis upon which this national playground system is 
being constructed. 
You should not permit the cutting of trees except where 
timber is needed in the construction of buildings or other 
improvements within the park and can be removed without 
injury to the forests or disfigurement of the landscape, 
where the thinning of forests or cutting of vistas will 
improve the scenic features of the parks, or where their 
destruction is necessary to eliminate insert infestation or 
diseases common to forests and shrubs. 
In the construction of roads, trails, buildings, and 
other improvements, particular attention must be devoted 
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always to the harmonizing of these improvements within the 
landscape. This is a most important item in our program of 
development and requires the employment of trained engineers 
who either possess a knowledge of landscape architecture or 
have a proper appreciation of the aesthetic values of park 
lands·. All improvements will be carried out in accordance 
with a preconceived plan developed with special reference to 
the preservation of the landscape, and comprehensive plans 
for future development of the national parks on an adequate 
scale will be prepared as funds are available for this 
purpose. 
Wherever the Federal Government has exclusive 
jurisdiction over national parks it is clear that more 
effective measures for the protection of parks can be taken. 
The Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
national parks in the States of Arkansas, Oklahoma, Wyoming, 
Montana, Washington, and Oregon, and also the Territories of 
Hawaii and Alaska. We urge the cession of exclusive 
jurisdiction over the parks in other states, and 
particularly in California and Colorado. 
There are many private holdings in the national parks, 
and many of these seriously hamper the administration of 
these reservations. All of them should be eliminated as far 
as it is practicable to accomplish this purpose in the 
course of time, either through congressional appropriation 
or by acceptance of donations of these lands. Isolated 
tracts in important scenic areas should be given first 
consideration, of course, in the purchase of private 
property. 
Every opportunity should be afforded the public, 
wherever possible, to enjoy the national parks in the manner 
that best satisfies the individual taste. Automobiles and 
motorcycles will be permitted in all of the national parks; 
in fact, the parks will be kept accessible by any means 
practicable. . 
All outdoor sports which may be maintained consistently 
with the observation of the safe guards thrown around the 
national parks by law will be heartily indorsed and aided 
whenever possible. Mountain climbing, horseback riding, 
walking, motoring, swimming, boating, and fishing will be 
favorite sports. Winter sports will be developed in the 
parks that are accessible throughout the year. Hunting will 
not be permitted in any national park. 
The educational, as well as recreational, use of the 
national parks should be encouraged in every practicable 
way. University and high-school classes in science will find 
special facilities for their vacation-period studies. 
Museums containing specimens of wild flowers, shrubs, trees, 
and mounted animals, birds, and fish native to the parks and 
L__________ ---------------
other exhibits of this character will be established as 
authorized. 
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Low-priced camps operated by concessionaires should be 
maintained, as well as comfortable and even luxurious hotels 
wherever the volume of travel warrants the establishment of 
these classes of accommodations. In each reservation, as 
funds are available, a system of free camp sites will be 
cleared, and these grounds will be equipped with adequate 
water and sanitation facilities. 
As concessions in the national parks represent in most 
instances a large investment, and as the obligation to 
render service satisfactory to the department at carefully 
regulated rates is imposed, these enterprises must be given 
a large measure of protection, and generally speaking, 
competitive business should not be authorized where a 
co·ncession is meeting our requirements, which, of course, 
will nearly as possible coincide with the needs of the 
traveling public. 
All concessions should yield revenue to the Federal 
Government, but the development of the revenues of the parks 
should ont impose a burden to the visitor. 
Automobile fees in the parks should be reduced as the 
volume of motor travel increases. 
For assistance in the solution of administrative 
problems in the parks relating both to their protection and 
use, the scientific bureaus of the Government offer 
facilities of the highest worth and authority. In the 
protection of the public health, for instance, the 
destruction of insect pests in the forests, the care of wild 
animals, and the propagation and distribution of fish, you 
should utilize their hearty cooperation to the utmost. 
You should utilize to the fullest extent the 
opportunity afforded by the Railroad Administration in 
appointing a committee of western railroads to inform the 
traveling public how to comfortably reach the national 
parks; you should diligently extend and use the splendid 
cooperation developed during the last three years among 
chambers of commerce, tourist bureaus, and automobile 
highway associations for the purpose of spreading 
information about our national parks and facilitating their 
use and enjoyment; you should keep informed of park 
movements and park progress, municipal, county, and State, 
both at home and abroad, for the purpose of adapting 
whenever practicable, the world's best thought to the needs 
of the national parks. You should encourage all movements 
toward outdoor living. In particular, you should maintain 
close working relationships with the Dominion parks branch 
of the Canadian department of the interior and assist in the 
solution of park problems of an international character. 
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The department is often requested for reports on 
pending legislation proposing the establishment of new 
national parks or the addition of lands to existing parks. 
Complete data on such park projects should be obtained by 
the National Park service and submitted to the department in 
tentative form of report to Congress. 
In studying new park projects you should seek to find 
scenery of supreme and distinctive quality or some natural 
feature so extraordinary or unique as to be of national 
interest and importance. You should seek distinguished 
examples of typical forms of world architecture, such, for 
instance, as the Grand Canyon, as exemplifying the highest 
accomplishment of stream erosion, and the high, rugged 
portion of Mount Desert Island as exemplifying the oldest 
rock forms in America and the luxuriance of deciduous 
forests. 
The national park system as now constituted should not 
be lowered in standard, dignity, and prestige by the 
inclusion of areas which express in less than the highest 
terms the particular class or kind of exhibit which they 
represent. 
It is not necessary that a national park should have a 
large area. The element of size is of no importance as long 
as the park is susceptible of effective administration and 
control. 
You should study existing national parks with the idea 
of improving them by the addition of adjacent areas which 
will complete their scenic purposes or facilitate 
administration.The addition of the Teton Mountains to the 
Yellowstone National Park, will supply Yellowstone's basic 
need, which is an uplift of glacier-bearing peaks; and the 
addition to the sequoia National Park of the Sierra summits 
and slopes to the north and east, as contemplated by pending 
legislation, will create a reservation unique in the world, 
because of its combination of gigantic trees, extraordinary 
canyons, and mountain masses. 
In considering projects involving the establishment of 
new national parks or the extension of existing areas by 
delimitation of national forests, you should observe what 
effect such delimitation would have on the administration of 
adjacent forest lands, and wherever practicable, you should 
engage in an investigation of such park projects jointly 
with officers of the Forest service, in order that questions 
of national park and national forest policy as they affect 
the lands involves may be thoroughly understood. 
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